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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents three empirical analyses related to the macroeconomic effects and 
sustainability of fiscal policy. Using a sequence of econometric models, three key issues 
concerning fiscal policy are examined. 
The first issue is related to the transmission mechanism for fiscal policy shocks in Korea. 
VAR models are employed to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks on 
GDP and the labour markets. The second issue is the sustainability of government debt in 
three selected countries (Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Several 
different approaches, such as Johansen’s cointegration tests, ARDL bounds tests, and Bohn’s 
fiscal reaction function tests, are employed to check the existence of long-run equilibrium 
between the variables. The third issue is concerned with the effects of fiscal consolidation on 
macroeconomic activity. A dynamic panel GMM model is used to examine whether fiscal 
consolidation has positive effects on GDP and a panel probit model is used to investigate the 
main determinants of the successful fiscal consolidation that reduce the debt-to-GDP ratios.  
The main findings of the thesis are as follows. First, government spending has a positive 
effect on output and its components. In particular, current government spending has a 
negative effect on private consumption, while capital government spending has a positive 
effect. When it comes to the labour market, each type of government spending has a positive 
effect. However, capital government spending is likely to boost the labour market more 
effectively than current government spending. Meanwhile, a net tax rise causes a significant 
fall in output but shows ambiguous effects on the labour market. Second, according to the 
results of Johansen’s cointegration tests and ARDL bounds tests, there is a cointegrating 
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relationship between the variables in Korea and the US, but not in the UK. That means fiscal 
policy in Korea and the US is sustainable, while fiscal policy in the UK is not. A modified 
Bohn’s tests, which estimate the response of primary surplus to government debt, also 
support the above conclusion. Third, the estimation results show that fiscal consolidation is 
not likely to be expansionary in terms of GDP growth. The results also show that fiscal 
consolidation in time of high debt-to-GDP ratios, the spending-base, or high sovereign risk 
has fewer negative effects on economic growth than fiscal consolidation in time of low debt-
to-GDP ratios, the tax-base, or low sovereign risk. The economic growth rate, government 
spending-based fiscal consolidation, low long-term interest rates, and higher sovereign risk 
have significant effects on reducing debt-to-GDP ratio. By contrast, the results suggest that 
the size of fiscal consolidation, exchange rates, and unemployment rate have positive but 
statistically insignificant effects on reducing debt-to-GDP ratio. 
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1 Chapter 1.  Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions  
The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks and the sustainability of public 
debt have long been fundamental issues addressed by macroeconomic researchers and fiscal 
policy makers; and these issues have become the focus of new attention since the great 
recession of 2008. Most advanced countries have used stimulus packages to boost the 
economies in recession since 2008. Apart from quantitative easing monetary policy, many 
governments have relied on active fiscal policy, such as government spending and tax 
exemption, to address the global economic turmoil.  
However, these large-scale expansionary fiscal policies have faced a strong 
challenge due to the steep rise in the fiscal deficit and the government debt. For instance, 
many Eurozone countries, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland, suffered a 
fiscal crisis following the financial crisis in 2008. So, by early 2010, certain countries were 
starting to think about an exit from expansionary fiscal policy. As an exit strategy, many 
European countries chose to implement fiscal austerity measures to address the fiscal crisis, 
even though there was a concern that macroeconomic activity might be harmed and the 
unemployment rate might remain high for a while. After a number of years of large budget 
deficits and rapid public debt-to-GDP ratio rises, many countries, such as the UK, Denmark, 
and Ireland, claimed that the stability of public debt was necessary for a sustainable economic 
growth and recovery from economic recession in the long run. This idea was supported by 
economists such as Alesina and Adagna who thought immediate deficit reduction was a 
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necessary precondition of economic growth. Alesina and Adagna (2010) insist that today’s 
deficit becomes tomorrow’s debt, which causes fiscal crisis, including government defaults, 
and there can be no sustained economic growth without balancing the government budget. 
But, huge concerns about the effectiveness of European countries’ fiscal 
consolidation policies have been raised by many economists (Krugman, 2010; Baker, 2010). 
For instance, Krugman (2010) strongly disagrees with the idea that the fiscal consolidation 
will have an expansionary effect and argues that non-Keynesian effects are based neither on 
evidence nor on careful analysis. He criticises fiscal consolidation in a recession period with 
such words as ‘the austerity debacle’, ‘the myth of austerity’ and ‘Europe’s economic 
suicide’. Baker (2010) thinks that the deficit should be tightened eventually, but that timing is 
the important thing. He argues that shrinking a deficit by cutting government spending or 
raising taxes in a serious economic recession causes a much deeper recession by reducing 
aggregate demand. 
Based on the above background, this research focuses on the issues of fiscal policy. 
In doing this, it addresses crucial questions concerning the effects of fiscal policy shocks and 
the sustainability of public debt using an empirical approach. The main research questions are 
as follows. (1) Can a government’s expansionary fiscal policy improve recessionary 
economic condition in a country? (2) If so, is it possible for a government to increase 
government spending permanently to boost its economy without ever having to worry about 
its public debt-to-GDP ratio? (3) Does fiscal consolidation have an expansionary effect on 
economic activity? (4) If fiscal consolidation is a necessary evil to reduce the public debt, 
what are the main determinants to decrease the public debt-to-GDP ratio?  
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1.2 Short Reviews of the Literature  
1.2.1 Theoretical Views 
As for the effects of fiscal policy shocks, the definitive facts about these effects have 
not yet been established from a theoretical point of view. Meanwhile, two main theoretical 
views have been put forward: the new Keynesian approach and the neoclassical approach.  
As a response to government spending shocks, the new Keynesian approach predicts 
an increase in private consumption and in the real wage, while the neoclassical approach 
predicts the opposite. These quite different conclusions are due mainly to assumptions which 
are based on different perceptions of reality. The neoclassical approach assumes perfectly 
competitive markets, perfectly flexible prices, constant returns to scale (CRS) in production 
function, and no credit constraints. A temporary or permanent bond-financed increase in 
government consumption raises the same amount of discounted value in future taxes under 
inter-temporal government budget constraints (Baxter and King, 1993). A negative wealth 
effect caused by the increase in future taxes reduces private consumption and raises labour 
supply
1
. The shift out of labour supply causes a decline in the real wage with a given labour 
demand curve. By contrast, the new Keynesian approach assumes nominal price rigidities and 
monopolistically competitive firms in good markets. These features cause firms to increase 
labour demand when there is extra government consumption, which produces additional 
output. The increase in labour demand raises the real wage, which triggers an increase in 
private consumption, based on a ‘rule-of-thumb consumers2’ assumption (Galí et al., 2003).  
                                                 
1
 It assumes that people choose to work harder with reducing consumption to address the increase in future taxes. 
2
 According to ‘the rule-of-thumb consumers’ assumption, many consumers spend within a budget constraint of 
labour income without using credit markets. Therefore, the increase in the real wage raises private consumption. 
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As for net tax shocks, most economists agree that higher tax rates may cause a 
decrease in economic output, and lower growth rates in the short term. But, in the long term, 
there are several different views on the growth effects of net tax shock. For instance, Lucas 
(1990) and Zou (1996) insist that fiscal policies have no long-run growth effects, whereas 
Rebelo (1991), Jones et al. (1993), and Hendricks (1999) argue that higher taxation has 
permanent negative effects on economic growth and the elimination of distorting taxes raises 
growth rate significantly.  
Lastly, there exists a similar theoretical controversy about the effects of fiscal 
consolidation. The neoclassical view suggests ‘non-Keynesian effects’: that is, that the fiscal 
consolidation stimulates economic activity even in the short run. The non-Keynesian effects 
can be explained by several channels, such as wealth effects, confidence effects, and spill-
over effects. For example, the reduction in the interest rate caused by government spending 
cuts can stimulate private investment directly, and lead to an increase in private consumption 
indirectly through a positive wealth effect
3
 in the private sector (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). 
The expectation of a future tax decrease owing to government spending cuts may also 
increase private consumption and investment (Bertola and Drazen, 1993). The increase in the 
confidence of investors after credible fiscal consolidation may enhance private investment as 
well. Moreover, public sector wage cuts may lead to wage cuts in the private sector, which is 
called a spill-over effect in the labour market. This finally increases competiveness due to the 
labour cost reduction and improves productivity in the private sector, which results in a GDP 
increase. By contrast, the new Keynesian view casts doubt on the theoretical support for the 
non-Keynesian effects mentioned above and insists that fiscal consolidation inevitably 
                                                 
3
 The low interest rate may increase the wealth of the private sector by reducing the burden of interest payment.  
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contracts aggregate demand and reduce GDP. This view maintains that if an economic 
performance gets better after government spending cuts or tax rises, it is due to a pick-up in 
the business cycle or more expansionary monetary policy taking place at the time. For 
example, Krugman (2010) strongly denies the expansionary effects of fiscal austerity 
measures and insists that the fiscal reductions will lead European countries into further 
economic decline and the higher unemployment rate. Baker (2010) and Cottarelli and Keen 
(2012) also support Krugman’s idea that too rapid and extreme fiscal consolidation would 
damage economic growth directly. 
In terms of the sustainability of public debt, theoretically, this can be explained 
through the equation of the inter-temporal budget constraint (hereafter IBC). According to the 
IBC, public debt is sustainable if it is on a trajectory such that the expected present value of 
future primary surpluses equals the initial public debt. This is based on the condition that the 
expected present value of the future stock of public debt finally converges to zero (Afonso 
and Rault, 2010). 
1.2.2 Empirical Evidence 
The aforementioned theoretical rationales would be more convincing if they were 
supported by some empirical evidence. As for the effects of fiscal policy shocks, there are 
two streams of empirical research. The first explores the effects of fiscal expansion, and the 
second explores the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation. The results of empirical 
studies vary depending on the methodology used to identify discretionary fiscal policy shocks. 
As for the sustainability of public debt, there are three strands of empirical studies based on 
the unit root tests, the cointegration tests, and Bohn’s fiscal reaction function test.   
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There are two main approaches to identifying discretionary fiscal expansion: the 
structural vector autoregression (hereafter the SVAR) approach; and the narrative approach.  
The SVAR approach identifies discretionary (exogenous) fiscal policy shocks by 
imposing restrictions on the model based on economic theory or institutional features. This 
makes it possible to estimate the size and persistence of fiscal policy effects by using impulse 
response functions avoiding the theoretical debate. This approach has been widely used due 
to these advantages, despite the results being highly sensitive to the assumptions or 
information used. To address the criticism that the SVAR approach is likely to identify fiscal 
shocks which are not actually exogenous, the narrative approach has been suggested. The 
narrative approach tries to identify abnormal fiscal events that can be safely regarded as 
exogenous fiscal shocks. For example, three large post-WW2 military build-ups (1950Q3, the 
Korean War; 1965Q1, the Vietnam War; and 1980Q1, the Reagan build-up) in the US are 
used as dummy variables (Ramey and Shapiro, 1997). However, these military build-ups also 
have some limitations in that they are not frequently experienced episodes, except in the US, 
and a few military build-ups cannot properly capture the effect of fiscal spending in the years 
leading to the military build-ups. Once a number of non-fiscal shocks hit the economy during 
the time of military build-up, the analysis of the narrative approach may lead to totally 
different results. Moreover, the usage of dummy variables values for each shock equally does 
not seem to make sense.  
Likewise, there are two main approaches to identifying fiscal consolidation: the 
approach based on the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB); and the approach based 
on policy action. The CAPB-based approach identifies fiscal consolidation episodes using 
changes in the CAPB which may reflect policymakers’ decisions to adjust taxes and 
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government spending. Most of the literature (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Giavazzi and Pagano, 
1996; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010, 2012; Afonso, 2010) has used this approach, even 
though there are some differences in defining the changes to the CAPB. Recently, some 
literature has cast doubt on the reliability of the CAPB-based approach. The main criticisms 
are that it can be affected by asset price cycles (Girouard and Price, 2004), one-off measures 
which do not reflect the overall policy stance (Von Hagen and Wolff, 2006), and 
measurement issues surrounding the output gap (Guichard et al., 2007). To address the 
shortcomings of the CAPB-based approach, the policy action-based approach (or narrative 
approach) is used to identify fiscal consolidation episodes (IMF, 2010; Leigh et al., 2011). 
This approach identifies fiscal consolidation episodes directly from historical documents such 
as budget reports, presidential speeches, central bank reports and congressional reports.  
Empirical studies of the sustainability of public debt have been developed to find the 
proper way of satisfying IBC. Most of the early literature tries to test the stationarity of public 
debt by using unit root tests (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Wilcox, 1989). After that, 
cointegration tests between government expenditures and revenues were been widely used 
(Trehan and Walsh, 1991, 1998; Hakkio and Rush, 1991; Quintos 1995). However, more 
recently, Bohn (1991, 2007) suggests an alternative test, casting doubt on the validity of 
traditional sustainability tests, such as unit root tests and cointegration tests
4
. He focuses on 
finding out whether governments react by adjusting their primary surplus to match the 
changes in public debt, assuming that public debt is sustainable if the primary surplus 
increases when the public debt picks up. 
                                                 
4
 Bohn insists that the sustainability of the debt by itself cannot provide decisive evidence on sustainability and 
the lack of cointegration between the variables does not prevent the series’ consistency with IBC. 
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1.3 Focus of Study and Methodology 
This thesis presents three empirical studies related to the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policy and the sustainability of public debt. Using a sequence of empirical models, 
three key issues concerning fiscal policy are examined and the policy implications of the 
empirical findings are also suggested.  
Chapter 3, the first empirical study, relates to the transmission mechanism for 
expansionary fiscal policy shocks in Korea. In particular, a three variable SVAR model, 
based on Blanchard and Perotti (2002), is applied to measure the magnitudes of fiscal 
multipliers with aggregated fiscal data following fiscal policy shocks. Then, considering the 
limitations of estimating the effects of aggregated data with a SVAR model, an extended 
VAR model is used to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of disaggregated fiscal data.  
Chapter 4, the second empirical study focuses on the sustainability of public debt in 
the three selected countries (Korea, the UK, and the US), and several different models, such 
as Johansen’s cointegration tests, ARDL bounds tests, and Bohn’s fiscal reaction function 
tests, are employed to estimate the long-run equilibrium between the variables.  
Chapter 5, the third empirical study, measures the effects of fiscal consolidation on 
economic activity. Two sub-issues are investigated: the existence of expansionary fiscal 
consolidation, and the main determinants of successful fiscal consolidation. The analysis uses 
panel data from 18 OECD countries. Dynamic panel data analysis is used to confirm whether 
fiscal consolidation has positive effects on GDP growth, and a panel probit model is used to 
find the determinants of successful fiscal consolidation that reduces the public debt. 
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1.4 Contributions 
This thesis discusses the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks and the 
sustainability of fiscal policy. The central questions are whether various fiscal policy shocks 
have promoted economic activity or caused it to contract, and how to measure the 
sustainability of public debt without error. As might be expected, there are no definitive 
answers to such grand questions, but meaningful insights have been found to guide effective 
policy decision-making and further research in the future.  
The third chapter contributes to mapping in detail the transmission mechanism for 
fiscal policy shocks in Korea. There has not been any major study of the effects of fiscal 
policy shocks using emerging market data like that of Korea. Moreover, many of the debates 
on fiscal policy shocks in Korea have focused only on the GDP effects of aggregated fiscal 
variables without thinking of the labour market effects. However, it is of great importance to 
see the macroeconomic effects (including the labour market) of disaggregated fiscal variables 
in order to undertake more sophisticated and elaborate fiscal policy decision-making. The 
loss of effective estimation and testing power caused by using aggregated fiscal variables can 
be extremely large (Orcutt et al., 1968). We have to pay attention to the labour market to 
check whether the government spending shocks do have positive effects on employment and 
wages, which finally enhance the welfare of the private sector. There exists the possibility of 
jobless recovery after the fiscal policy shocks. Recovery without creating job in the economy 
can devalue the effectiveness of fiscal policy. So, the third chapter tries to shed light on the 
intrinsic transmission mechanism for fiscal policy shocks by categorising fiscal variables into 
their sub-components. Moreover, this chapter extends the scope of the effects of fiscal policy 
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shocks by adding labour market variables, along with GDP. In other words, this chapter 
contributes to the literature by estimating the macroeconomic effects of both aggregated and 
disaggregated fiscal policy shocks on GDP and the labour market. The central message of 
this chapter is that different components of government spending and revenues have different 
effects on macroeconomic variables.  
The fourth chapter contributes several points to the development of the debate on the 
sustainability of public debt. First, considering the existence of non-stationary variables in the 
model, the ARDL bounds tests are added to investigate the cointegrating relationship 
between the variables, which is essential to secure the sustainability of public debt. Second, 
the original Bohn’s fiscal reaction function model is modified using dynamic ordinary least 
squares (DOLS) methodology in order to consider non-stationary data and to avoid the 
spurious regression problem. Finally, by examining the sustainability of public debt using 
various methods, the robustness of the empirical study is greatly improved.  
The fifth chapter contributes to uncovering the effects of fiscal consolidation on 
GDP growth and the main factors responsible for successful fiscal consolidation. This chapter 
investigates whether fiscal consolidation can boost depressed economies. In particular, it 
estimates the effects of fiscal consolidation considering the role of several factors, such as the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, the composition of fiscal consolidation, and sovereign risk. This chapter 
also investigates the conditions under which a fiscal consolidation is effective in reducing 
public debt using an extended panel dataset from 18 OECD countries and a longer time 
period: from 1978 to 2011. It is notable that, unlike many previous studies, this chapter 
addresses the endogeneity problem in the analysis by using a dynamic panel data analysis 
model. 
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1.5 Organization of Chapters 
This thesis consists of six chapters, and is organised as follows. The first chapter 
introduces the thesis and sets the scene for the three main research chapters. After suggesting 
the motivation for the research, short reviews of the literature and the methodologies are 
given in sequence. The focus of the study in each chapter and its contributions to the 
literature are also mentioned. The second chapter sheds light on the Korean economy, 
focusing on economic development, the size of government finance and fiscal soundness. 
Most of the indicators described in this chapter will be used in the three main empirical 
chapters.  The third chapter analyses the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks to 
macroeconomic activity in Korea. The fourth chapter reviews the sustainability of public debt 
in three selected countries - Korea, the UK, and the US. The fifth chapter presents the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation and the main factors responsible for successful 
fiscal consolidation – those which decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio. Finally, the last chapter 
concludes the thesis with key findings and implications for fiscal policy making, mentioning 
the limitations of the research and indicating directions for future study. 
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CHAPTER 2   
REVIEW OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY 
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2 Chapter 2. Review of the Korean Economy 
2.1 Introduction  
According to World Development Indicators (2011), Korea ranks fifteenth in the 
world economy by nominal GDP and twelfth by purchasing power parity (PPP). It has been a 
member of the OECD since 1996. Despite the lack of natural resources, being a small 
territory, and having a tiny domestic market, Korea has achieved impressive economic 
growth and extensive social development out of the ashes of the Korean War in 1950.  
The most significant factor in the country’s rapid economic growth is the adoption 
of an export-oriented economic strategy. Active fiscal policy has played a significant role in 
this process as well. At the same time, many efforts have been made to maintain fiscal 
soundness to avert a possible sovereign default risk. As of 2010, the level of government debt 
in Korea is one of the lowest among the OECD countries.  
This chapter describes the main economic variables, which will be used later in the 
empirical analysis. That is, it sheds light on the development of the main macroeconomic 
indicators and fiscal policy factors in the Korean economy. This analysis covers the period 
from 1972 to 2010. The datasets are collected mainly from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), and the Bank of Korea (BOK).  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses economic 
development of Korea. Section 2.3 and 2.4 show the structure and size of government finance. 
Section 2.5 considers the fiscal soundness of Korea. Section 2.6 shows episode of fiscal 
consolidation. Section 2.7 concludes.  
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2.2 Economic Development of Korea 
2.2.1 The Trend of GDP 
In the last four decades, Korea has achieved tremendous economic growth. It has 
grown from one of the poorest countries in the world in the mid-twenty century, after the 
Korean War, into a global economic player with a solid industrial base. Korea has 
experienced a very high level of economic growth. Figure 2.1 shows that real GDP has 
increased significantly during the last four decades. 
Figure 2.1 Trend of GDP in Korea 
 
 Note :  Real GDP transformed from nominal GDP by dividing with IMF’s GDP deflator (2005=1) 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates changes in the sub-components of GDP: private consumption 
and investment in real terms. These decreased significantly in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
Figure 2.2 Real GDP per capita and its components 
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2.2.2 GDP Growth 
GDP growth rates in Korea have been fairly positive except for three periods - 1980, 
1997, and 2009 - during the last four decades.  
The main reason for negative growth in 1980 was the second oil shock at the end of 
1978. Before the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the Korean economy maintained a strong 
and stable economic growth.  
After several Asian currencies were depreciated by the attack of speculators in 1997, 
the Korean economy also suffered national bankruptcy and experienced a bailout by the IMF. 
As a result, the GDP growth rate in 1998 plummeted to an all-time low, -5.9 per cent. 
However, the Korean economy picked up very quickly due to strenuous efforts by both the 
public and the private sectors. After recovery from the crisis in 1997, the Korean economy 
achieved a strong continuous growth in GDP from the early 2000s onwards.  
The Korean economy maintained stable growth up to the Global Financial Crisis in 
2008, when it too suffered significant difficulties. But, unlike most other advanced countries, 
Korea was able to minimize the damage by timely and active stimulus packages and strong 
domestic consumption. So, the Korean economy rebounded to a pre-crisis level with an 
annual growth rate of six per cent in 2010.  
As for the inflation rates, they have kept decreasing despite international oil price 
rises. Since 2009, inflation has remained quite stable, at around a modest two per cent. This is 
mainly due to the government’s efforts to stabilize price. 
 
  
17 
 
Figure 2.3 GDP Growth Rates and Inflation Rates  
GDP growth rates Inflation rates 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Structure of Government Finance 
Fiscal activity by the Korean central government is implemented in two ways – 
through the budget account and through the various funds (See Table 2.1).  
The budget consists of one general account and eighteen special accounts. The 
general account uses non-earmarked taxes and non-tax revenue for general-purpose spending 
such as social welfare, education, transportation and defence. On the other hand, the special 
accounts are established to include particular programmes (e.g., procurement, the postal 
service) or specific resources (e.g., transportation tax, registration fees).  
Funds are similar to special accounts in their role, but greater operational discretion 
is given to the ministries and agencies that manage them. 
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Table 2.1 Structure of Government Financial Accounts  
(30th.Dec. 2010) 
 
Budget 
Funds 
General Account Special Accounts 
Number 1 18 63 
Details 
Revenue Expenditure 
▪Personal  
  Income tax 
▪Corporate 
  Income tax 
▪Value- 
  Added tax 
▪Customs  
  Duties 
▪Transport  
  Tax 
▪Other taxes 
▪Non-tax 
 revenues 
▪Social welfare 
▪Education 
▪Transportation 
▪Defence 
▪General Public 
  Administration 
▪Agriculture, 
Forestry, and  
Fisheries  
▪Others 
 
Enterprise 
Special 
Accounts 
(5) 
▪Grain  
Management  
▪Procurement 
▪Executive 
Agencies 
▪Postal Service 
▪Postal Savings 
Other 
Special 
Accounts 
(13)  
▪Transportation  
  Facilities 
▪Agriculture and 
  Fisheries 
▪Balanced 
National  
Development 
▪Energy and 
Natural  
Resources 
▪Others 
 
Fiscal 
Programme 
Funds (51) 
▪National 
 Housing,  
 National   
 Pensions,  
Government 
Employees’ 
Pensions,  
etc. 
Financial 
Programme 
Funds (12) 
▪Repayment 
 of Deposit 
 Insurance  
 Fund Bond,  
 Credit  
 Guarantee, 
 Export   
 Insurance,  
 etc.  
 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance  
 
2.4 Size of Government Finance 
Table 2.2 shows the contents of government expenditure and revenue. By these two 
factors, the size of the Korean government finances can be measured. 
Table 2.2 Contents of Government Revenue and Government Expenditure  
Item Contents 
Government Revenue 
▪ Tax revenue  
▪ Non-tax revenue  
▪ Capital revenue 
▪ Grants 
Government Expenditure 
▪ Current spending 
▪ Capital spending  
▪ Net lending  including  
  net acquisition of equities  
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2.4.1 Size of Government Expenditure  
2.4.1.1 Outline of Government Expenditure 
The expenditure of central government consists of current spending, capital 
spending, and net lending. Current spending is composed of purchase of goods and services, 
interest payments, and subsidies and other current transfers.  
The combined government expenditure of the budget and funds has been held to 
within 25 per cent of GDP during the last four decades. This is mainly due to the Korean 
government’s effort to refrain from its direct intervention in the market and to promote 
private sector-led growth. It is notable that the GDP ratio of government expenditure rose 
immediately after economic crises such as the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008; and current government spending takes the biggest portion of total 
government expenditure (Figure 2.4). 
Figure 2.4  Government Expenditure in Korea 
Nominal value GDP ratio 
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2.4.1.2 Details of Government Expenditure5 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean government set high targets for both economic 
growth and national security, and increased government expenditure in areas related to these. 
In 1962, economic growth was targeted by the Korean government’s first five-year national 
economic development plan.  
In the 1970s, fiscal investment and loan programmes (FILPs) played a crucial role in 
encouraging both infrastructure investment and industrial development. By the time the 
fourth five year national economic development plan (1977-1981) was launched, FILPs were 
financing 34 per cent of total government spending. 
The 1980s saw a decline in direct investment by the government and a rise in 
private-sector-led growth. At this point, in order to combat inflation, the government 
embarked on a strong programme of fiscal deficit reduction by implementing spending cuts. 
The deficit was wiped out, and in 1987 there was the first budget surplus for 17 years. 
By the 1990s, as a result of fiscal consolidation that had continued through the 1980s 
and a rapid rise in per capita income, Korea’s roads, airports, and other areas of social 
infrastructure were proving inadequate. To counteract these effects of its previous lack of 
public spending, the government decided to substantially increase investment in 
infrastructure. However, by the end of the 1990s, the Korean economy’s significant 
dependence on exports had made it vulnerable to financial crises elsewhere in the world. In 
1997, four decades of growth in the economy ended with the Asian Financial Crisis. The 
Korean government had to undertake a painful restructuring, which involved the financial, 
                                                 
5
 This part is mainly extracted from ‘Fiscal Management and Mid-term Framework in Korea (2010)’. 
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corporate, labour market, and public sectors of the economy. Accompanying these reforms, 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies were adopted in 1998 and 1999 to ensure that 
domestic demand was maintained.  
In 2000, as the financial crisis drew to a close, the Korean government re-focused its 
policy away from promoting economic recovery towards dealing with a fiscal imbalance. The 
policy of investment in infrastructure was rationalized and there was consolidation of various 
welfare programmes that had been expanded to soften the effects of the financial crisis. By 
2002, a strong improvement in revenues from a fast growing economy and savings achieved 
by spending cuts had led to the restoration of fiscal soundness. 
The management of Korea’s finances changed significantly in the 2000s, with the 
government introducing the National Fiscal Management Plan, top-down budgeting, and 
performance management between 2004 and 2006. These initiatives were embodied in the 
National Finance Act
6
, which became law in 2006. 
In 2008, Korea suffered the effects of the Global Financial Crisis. In order to deal 
with this, a large spending increase was introduced in the budget for 2009, with spending 
being front-loaded onto the first half of the year for maximum impact. In April 2009, further 
government finance was made available, which meant that the budget for that year was the 
largest in Korean history. This large budget was accompanied by aggressive tax cuts, and the 
two measures quickly brought about an increase in government debt. However, the 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratio was gradually brought down due to the Korean 
government’s strong intention to reduce fiscal deficit and ensure private sector-led growth. 
                                                 
6
 This Act covered the matters related to national finances, including all aspects of the government budget. Its 
aim was to create the financial framework in which financial performances get better and fiscal operations 
become more transparent. 
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2.4.2 Government Revenue 
 
2.4.2.1 Outline of Government Revenue 
Government revenue consists of tax revenue, non-tax revenue, capital revenue, and 
grants. Figure 2.5 illustrates the changes in government revenue during the last four decades. 
In terms of GDP ratio, government revenue shows a gradual increase, even though there are 
some ups and downs in several periods.  
Judging by the left-hand side figure, tax revenue decreased significantly right after 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. As for the 
composition of government revenue, the share of tax revenue and non-tax revenue is roughly 
80 and 20 per cent, respectively. 
Figure 2.5  Government Revenue in Korea 
Nominal value GDP ratio 
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2.4.2.2 Details of Government Revenue (focus on tax revenue in Korea) 7 
Korea’s modern tax system was established by the first Government of Korea, which 
took power in 1948. The Tax Law Committee was set up to ensure the smooth running of the 
modern tax system, first of all during the Korean War (1950-1953), and then in the ensuing 
peacetime. In the latter period, the system was modified in order to ensure economic growth.  
Until the 1970s, Korea’s economy grew rapidly, based on developing international 
trade and cheap imported energy and raw materials. However, the 1970s saw the rise of 
global inflation, and this interrupted the rise of Korea’s economy. During these years, it was 
frequently necessary to put in place fiscal measures that would help the Korean economy 
withstand external shocks. Taxable income and tax allowances were redefined at regular 
intervals to encourage the contribution to the economy of medium and low-income earners. 
Corporation tax too was adjusted to provide an increased incentive for Korea’s heavy 
industries, including its increasingly important chemical industries.  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, significant rises in the price of oil and a recession 
in industrialized countries brought about a steep decline in the Korean gross national product 
(GNP), and a sharp rise in inflation. Despite the incentives of the 1970s, Korea’s domestic 
economy had slowed significantly, and in 1980 the country suffered a poor harvest. Through 
1981 and 1982, the government made every effort to stabilize domestic prices and increase 
exports. Growth, however, remained elusive and, when it occurred, was volatile. The Korean 
government had the means to stabilize prices, but it was becoming apparent that the Korean 
economy had developed to a point where the effects of direct government intervention were 
becoming less important as a factor influencing growth. What was needed from then on was a 
                                                 
7
  This part is based on a book ‘Korean Taxation 2009’ which is published by MOSF of Korea. 
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gradual liberalization of the domestic market. In response to this need, the government 
embarked on reductions in tax incentives for some essential industries. In 1982, the education 
tax was introduced to raise revenue that would be used to improve the public educational 
system. 
Following this difficult period in the early 1980s, the Korean government focussed 
on stimulating recovery from the global recession and encouraging growth. At this point, 
corporation tax and income tax were lowered, and presumptive taxes on dividends were 
relaxed, in order to strengthen businesses and help them improve their financial health. In 
addition, to help those on low incomes improve their financial health, tax credits were 
increased. In this way, over the years 1984 to 1987, the tax laws were revised as part of the 
government’s strategy to promote the economic recovery. 
Further important tax reforms were implemented between 1989 and the early 1990s, 
following a worsening situation in the Korean domestic economy, which began in the second 
half of 1988 and affected exports, prices, employment, output and the balance of payments. 
These tax reforms provided investment incentives relating to manufacturing, services 
facilities and new technological development, and the aim was to raise productivity and 
improve the industrial structure. They included the simplification of the personal and 
corporate income tax system and the reduction in tax rates.  
In the mid-1990s, the Korean government created a more sophisticated tax system 
based on a mix of lower tax rates and a broader tax base. This was combined with efforts to 
stimulate the economy by lessening government intervention and encouraging market 
competition.     
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A new round of economic reforms resulted from the financial crisis of late 1997. 
With these reforms, government spending was significantly increased to respond to the 
demands of corporate restructuring and the needs of the unemployed. This rising expenditure 
led to a rapid increase in the budget deficit – an increase that could not be covered by any 
increase in tax revenue. Indeed, tax increases were ruled out due to the expanded tax 
exemptions and tax rate reductions granted by the government to encourage both foreign and 
domestic investment and to stimulate consumption.  
However, the government made a lot of effort to broaden the tax base. One tax 
measure taken by the government was to raise tax rates on items that were unlikely to be 
sensitive to the effects of the economic crisis: items such as cigarettes, petroleum and diesel. 
Meanwhile, a proportional withholding tax was substituted for the progressive taxation of 
interest income. As a result of these measures, tax revenue began to increase at the beginning 
of the 2000s. 
Finally, in order to stimulate the economy and promote mid- and long-term growth, 
a reform carried out in 2003 included tax incentives totalling one billion dollars. Corporate 
tax rates were lowered to relieve the burden of corporation tax, and tax incentives were 
provided for small and medium-sized companies so as to encourage their entrepreneurship. 
At the same time, speculative real estate transactions were countered by raising the capital 
gains tax on property. From 2005 until the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the total tax 
revenue increased each year, largely as a result of broadening the tax base by phasing out 
non-taxable benefits, tax reductions and tax exemptions, and also by making increased efforts 
to identify hard-to-trace income. 
  
26 
 
2.5 Fiscal Soundness of Korea 
2.5.1 The Size of Fiscal Balance and Government Debt 
Figure 2.6 shows the time series of the Korean government’s fiscal balance and 
government debt from 1972 to 2010. Fiscal balance means a consolidated budget balance, 
which is calculated by total government revenue minus total government spending. Korea 
recorded a consolidated budget deficit (total deficit) of 3.4 per cent of GDP in 1998, the 
biggest annual fall since 1972. The consolidated budget balance
8
  became positive from 2000 
and peaked at 3.6 per cent of GDP in 2002, remaining positive until 2009. Fluctuations in the 
consolidated budget balance have increased after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. The 
trend of the primary surplus
9
 follows that of the total surplus. 
Government debt has increased very fast since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, 
even if it is still comparatively lower than that of other countries. Government debt rose from 
19 per cent in the early 1970s to 34 per cent in 2010. The main factors behind the increase in 
the government debt are persistently rising government spending and the financial costs 
borne by public funds for restructuring the financial sector after the financial crises in 1997 
and 2008. The abrupt rise in the government debt is a burden on the Korean government 
because of the snowballing interest payment for the debt and this, finally, has disrupted sound 
economic growth. 
                                                 
8
 Related to consolidate budget balance in Korea, someone argue that it is desirable to exclude the balance of the 
National Pension Fund (NPF) and the net lending by the government to assess the financial soundness of the 
government without any overstatement. But, in this chapter, we do include NPF balance and net lending in the 
consolidated budget balance. 
9
 Primary surplus equals total surplus minus interest payment by the government. That is, primary surplus means 
tax revenues net of non-interest government spending. 
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Figure 2.6  Long-Term Trends of Fiscal Balance and Government Debt  
Fiscal Balance (1972-2010, % of GDP) Government Debt (% of GDP) 
 
 
2.5.2 Fiscal Situation after the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 
Compared to other countries, Korea successfully achieved an early recovery from 
the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 by implementing prompt and active fiscal policies. As can 
be seen in Figure 2.7, the Korean government’s fiscal spending to overcome the financial 
crisis during 2008-2010 was 6.5 per cent of GDP, and this is the largest amount among the 
major countries. As a result, the Korean economy recovered quickly compared with other 
major advanced economies (i.e., OECD countries) in 2009. 
Figure 2.7 Fiscal Expansion and Trends of GDP Growth Rates 
Fiscal Expansion (2008-2010, % of GDP) Trends of Growth Rates (year-on-year, %) 
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However, the fiscal position became worse because of the considerable fiscal 
spending. Most countries implemented expansionary policies to overcome the financial crisis 
in 2008. As a result, their fiscal conditions were weakened. Likewise, expansionary fiscal 
policy temporarily weakened Korea’s sound fiscal position during the process of overcoming 
the financial crisis. The left-hand side graph in Figure 2.8 shows that the consolidated fiscal 
balance became negative in 2009. As for the government debt in the right-hand side graph, it 
increased to 33.4 per cent of GDP in 2010 from 30.1 per cent in 2008.    
Figure 2.8 Recent Trends of Fiscal Balance and Government debt 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) Government Debt (trillion KRW, % of GDP) 
  
2.5.3 Efforts of Fiscal Soundness Management in Korea  
To achieve fiscal strength and secure the sustainability of the public finance, the 
Korean government has reinforced the fiscal soundness management since mid-2000s. The 
specific contents of the policy are as follows.  
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First, to expand the tax base, the government is reorganizing tax exemptions and tax 
cuts which have negligible effects or have achieved their original purpose. At the same time, 
it is firmly declining to establish new tax benefits. In addition, the government has adopted 
the Tax Report Checking System that confirms the adequacy of business income of all self-
employed businesses over a certain income level by a licensed tax accountant. The 
government improves the transparency of tax resources by inducing consumers to use credit 
cards and cash receipts more extensively.  
Second, to enhance government expenditure efficiency, the government has 
revamped spending standards and has implemented restructuring on projects with low 
performance or too great a similarity by drastic integration and reorganization. Furthermore, 
across all stages from planning to evaluation, the government has managed the relevant 
principles of compliance to accomplish expenditure efficiency. 
Table 2.3  The Principles of Compliance in the Government Expenditure Process   
Stage Principles 
Planning and  
Request 
Strengthening of the preliminary feasibility study, 
Substantialization  of pre-consultations on large-scale spending, etc. 
Formulation 
Mandatory submission of off-setting measures for newly launched  
mandatory spending,  
Introduction of sunset clauses to government-funded projects, etc. 
Execution and 
Evaluation 
Streamlining of fiscal project delivery system including prevention of 
abundant and fraud recipients, etc. 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance (Korea) 
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2.5.4 Relationship between Government Debt and GDP Growth 
It is meaningful to take a look at the relationship between government debt and the 
GDP growth rate. To do this, both the government debt growth rate and the debt-to-GDP 
ratio are used, respectively, as a government debt variable. Figure 2.9 shows the results of 
yearly changes in government debt and the GDP growth rate. There is a clear negative 
correlation
10
 between government debt and the GDP growth rate, regardless of the form of 
government debt.  
Figure 2.9  Comparison of Government Debt and GDP Growth Rate 
  
Table 2.4  Trends of GDP and Government Debt 
(trillion KRW, %) 
Year 
GDP Government Debt 
Size Growth Rate Size Growth Rate GDP Ratio 
1998 484.1 -1.4 92.6 27.1 16.1 
1999 529.5 9.4 112.4 21.4 17.6 
2000 603.2 8.8 128.0 14.0 18.4 
2001 651.4 4.0 135.1 5.5 18.7 
2002 720.5 7.2 143.6 6.3 18.6 
2003 767.1 2.8 172.0 19.7 21.6 
2004 826.9 4.6 205.0 19.2 24.6 
2005 865.2 4.0 248.0 21.0 28.7 
2006 908.7 5.2 283.2 14.2 31.1 
2007 975 5.1 293.5 3.6 30.7 
2008 1026.5 2.3 294.6 0.4 30.1 
2009 1065 0.3 331.4 12.5 33.8 
2010 1172.8 6.2 348.9 5.3 33.4 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
                                                 
10
 It is worthwhile to see the causality of this relationship. We deal with this issue in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.   
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2.6 Period of Fiscal Consolidation in Korea (2000-2004) 
2.6.1 Fiscal Policy 
Before the 1997 financial crisis, fiscal policy in Korea had been based on a culture 
of fiscal prudence. It was common practice in the Korean government not to make spending 
commitments until revenue had been secured. During the 1990s, the government had 
consistently reduced government debt, reaching a level of 9 per cent of GDP by 1996. 
However, the government provided a temporary, but strong, demand stimulus in the wake of 
the unprecedented economic downturn in 1998. After continuing an expansionary stance until 
1999 to address unemployment and provide a social safety net, the government then 
redirected fiscal policy towards the process of medium-term fiscal consolidation. The 
government’s aim was to reduce the stock of government debt and achieve fiscal balance by 
2004. So, the government restrained the growth of nominal spending to at least two per cent 
below the growth of nominal GDP. To achieve its medium-term goals, the government made 
efforts to increase its revenues as well. For instance, it phased out tax exemptions, expanded 
the tax base, and improved tax administration, particularly for the self-employed. 
Table 2.5  Main Fiscal Variables of Korea (% of GDP)   
Fiscal Consolidation Before During 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Government financial balance 3.0 1.3 2.4 5.4 4.3 5.1 0.5 2.7 
Primary balance 2.1 0.2 1.4 4.2 3.4 4.2 -0.4 1.8 
Government debt 11.9 16.1 17.6 18.4 18.7 18.6 21.6 24.6 
Government expenditure 21.8 24.1 23.2 22.4 23.9 23.6 28.9 26.1 
Current spending 16.2 18.2 18.0 17.6 18.9 18.9 19.8 20.6 
Government revenue 24.8 25.5 25.6 27.9 28.3 28.7 29.4 28.8 
Current revenue 24.4 25.1 25.2 27.5 28.0 28.4 29.0 28.4 
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2.6.2 Economic Environment 
Korean economic growth recovered very quickly after the 1997 economic crisis, 
maintaining rapid growth during the transition to a more market-oriented and internationally-
open economy. This outstanding achievement came in part from progress in restructuring the 
economy after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and in part from strong external demand, 
particularly from China. Looked at in detail, the Korean economy went down in 2001 due to 
a weaker-than-expected recovery in the global economy. In 2002, there was a temporary 
pick-up of the growth rate because of buoyant consumption and residential construction 
spending, but the growth rate went down again in 2003 as domestic demand stagnated. 
Unemployment decreased rapidly to near pre-crisis levels, but not to the same levels. Core 
inflation rates remained stable within the two to four per cent after 1999. Both short-term and 
long-term interest rates stabilized after 1999. Moreover, effective exchange rates declined 
sharply at the beginning of the 1997 crisis, but picked up quickly and remained stable in the 
aftermath. 
Table 2.6  Economic Situation of Korea  
Fiscal Consolidation Before  During  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Real GDP growth rate 5.6 -5.9 10.2 8.4 3.9 6.9 2.8 4.5 
Output gap 3.1 -7.4 -2.7 0.4 -0.7 1.5 -0.2 0.2 
Inflation (CPI, % change) 4.4 7.5 0.8 2.3 4.1 2.8 3.5 3.6 
Core inflation (% change) 3.4 5.9 0.3 1.9 3.6 2.9 3.1 2.9 
Unemployment rate 2.6 6.9 6.6 4.4 4.0 3.3 3.6 3.7 
Real short-term interest rate  13.4 15.2 6.8 7.1 5.3 4.8 4.3 3.8 
Real long-term interest rate  11.7 12.8 8.7 8.6 6.9 6.6 5.1 4.7 
Current account balance/GDP -1.3 12.0 5.3 2.8 1.7 1.3 2.4 4.5 
Nominal effective exchange rate
* 
106.5 76.7 88.3 94.5 87.3 90.3 89.8 89.8 
  Note: * A rise in nominal effective exchange rate indicates an appreciation of the Korean won (year 2005=100) 
  Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
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2.7 Conclusion and Policy Implication 
Korea has achieved impressive economic growth since the Korean War in 1950.  
Active fiscal policy has played a significant role in this development. Due to persistent efforts, 
the level of government debt in Korea is one of the lowest among OECD countries (See 
Appendix 2.1). However, government debt has increased very quickly since the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997. The sharp rise in government debt is a burden to the Korean 
government because it may be followed by snowballing interest payment to interest-bearing 
bonds and sluggish economic growth. There is a negative correlation between government 
debt and GDP growth in Korea. Fiscal consolidation in the early 2000s led public finances 
into a sustainable path in Korea. From 2000, the government’s financial balance and primary 
balance increased more strongly than before (See Table 2.5). However, government debt did 
not decline; rather, it continued to reach comparatively high levels. Moreover, the fiscal 
consolidation undertaken involved a stagnant GDP and nagging unemployment. So, fiscal 
consolidation seems to have prolonged the recession that began with the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997.  
In this context, it is necessary to shed light on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
policy shocks. Moreover, it is meaningful to see if the government debt of one’s country is 
sustainable in the long run, and if it has significant effects on economic activity. Finally, it is 
useful to investigate the effects of fiscal consolidation drawing on a greater variety of 
samples from across the world. That is, we can check whether fiscal austerity is effective in 
boosting recessionary economies using fiscal consolidation episodes from various OECD 
countries.  
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3 Chapter 3. The Transmission Mechanism for Fiscal Policy 
Shocks in Korea 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been an active area of research to analyse the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
policy shocks whenever there has been an economic crisis. The Global Financial Crisis in 
2008 caused a debate on the impact of fiscal policy shocks once again. There have been many 
disputes about the theoretical effects of fiscal policy shocks and the explanation of the 
existing empirical evidence (Perotti, 2008). For example, the new Keynesian models predict 
that private consumption and the real wage should increase after a government spending 
shock, while the neoclassical models predict the opposite. This issue is complicated because 
the stylized facts concerning the effects of fiscal policy shocks have not yet been established, 
in contrast to the case of monetary policy shocks (Tenhofen et al., 2010).  
It is of great interest to macroeconomists and policymakers to establish the stylized 
facts about the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks. But recent studies have 
encountered some limitations. First, most research has investigated the effects of fiscal policy 
using US data, because of the good quality time series data available there and the impact the 
US economy has on the rest of the world. It is important to consider other countries when 
undertaking empirical analysis of fiscal policy. Second, many research has concentrated on 
the effects of aggregated fiscal variables on the macro economy. However, as Orcutt et al. 
(1968) noted, the loss of effective estimation and testing power caused by aggregation can be 
extremely great. For instance, analysis based on aggregated variables is likely to fail to show 
the effects of sub-components’ variables in detail, and biased results from sub-components’ 
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offsetting movement may lead to inappropriate fiscal decision-making. Examining fiscal 
policy effects by decomposing fiscal variables provides a much clearer picture of the 
economic transmission process. 
In this context, this chapter focuses on Korea in an attempt to measure the effects of 
fiscal policy shocks on a newly developed country. It sheds light on the intrinsic transmission 
mechanism for fiscal policy shocks by decomposing fiscal variables into their sub-
components. Moreover, it extends the scope of the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the 
labour market by adding crucial labour market variables into the model. For instance, the real 
wage rate and the unemployment rate are used as crucial labour market variables because 
these factors can reflect the situation in the labour market. The main reason for paying 
attention to the labour market is to check the possibility of jobless recovery after the fiscal 
policy has been implemented. If an increase in government spending does not affect the 
labour market positively - e.g., raising private sector employment - it means that government 
spending has not been effective in enhancing the welfare of the private sector. This chapter 
contributes to the debate by adding empirical evidence relating to disaggregated fiscal policy 
shocks in Korea, one of the outstanding emerging markets, and providing an in-depth 
analysis of the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the labour market as well as output in Korea.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the 
relevant literature, emphasizing the variety of possible transmission mechanisms for fiscal 
policy shocks. Section 3.3 explains the research methodology. Section 3.4 describes the data. 
Section 3.5 gives the empirical results and presents the implications of the results. Finally, 
section 3.6 draws some conclusions.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
This section surveys both the theoretical and the empirical literature on the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks.  
3.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
 Even though there are many theoretical studies on the transmission mechanism for 
discretionary fiscal policy
11
 shocks, it is very difficult to find an agreement on the effects of 
fiscal policy shocks
12
. There are two main and conflicting theories: the neoclassical model, 
and the new Keynesian model. These theoretical arguments come from different perceptions 
of reality and offer quite different conclusions based on a couple of assumptions. The 
theoretical debates between the two views are described for each fiscal policy shock; and then 
some limitations of the two views are briefly discussed.  
First, there are the two main views on the transmission mechanism for government 
spending shocks. The neoclassical model assumes competitive markets, perfectly flexible 
prices, constant returns to scale, a separable consumption-leisure utility function, and no 
credit constraints
13
. Moreover, the neoclassical model assumes that a temporary or permanent 
bond-financed increase in government spending raises the discounted value of future taxes 
                                                 
11
 Discretionary fiscal policy can be defined as ‘intentional changes in government purchases and taxes’ in order 
to stabilize business cycles and affect macroeconomic activity including the labour market. On the contrary, 
automatic stabilizers are ‘automatic changes in taxes and transfer payments’ to stabilize business cycles without 
apparent government actions. 
12
 Fiscal policy shocks can be divided into main two types – namely, ‘changes in government spending and 
changes in net taxes’ (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 
13
 In this case, the economic agents are able to borrow and lend in any degree at the market interest rate. 
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under the IBC by the same amount. The increase in ‘the discounted value of future taxes’ 
causes a negative wealth effect, which reduces private consumption and leisure (Baxter and 
King, 1993). The shift out in the labour supply curve triggers a reduction in the real wage 
with a given labour demand curve. The rise in employment has a positive effect on output 
(Fontana, 2009). Moreover, in the neoclassical model, government spending stimulates 
private investment because it increases the marginal product of capital by shifting out labour 
supply.   
The new Keynesian model has a similar structure to the neoclassical model. In this 
model, as in the neoclassical model, a bond-financed rise in government consumption 
increases the discounted value of future taxes, which causes a negative wealth effect. The 
negative wealth effect reduces private consumption and shifts the labour supply curve 
outwards. But the new Keynesian model adds another two features: nominal rigidities and 
monopolistically competitive firms in the goods markets. These features raise the demand for 
labour, increase the real wage and produce additional output. Moreover, under the ‘Rule-of-
Thumb Consumers’ assumption that many consumers spend within a budget constraint of 
labour income, without using credit markets, private consumption shows positive responses 
to government spending shocks
14
 (Galí et al., 2007).  
Second, economists consent that higher tax rates cause a decrease in the level of 
GDP, and therefore reduce short-run growth rates. But, there are different views on the long-
run growth effects of net tax shocks. Lucas (1990) insists that tax changes have no long-run 
                                                 
14
 Instead of rule-of-thumb consumers, Basu and Kimball (2002) integrate a utility function, demonstrating 
complementarity between consumption and labour, and explaining that labour income is a source of private 
consumption. 
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effects on economic growth. On the contrary, Jones et al. (1993) and Hendricks (1999)
15
 
argue that higher tax rates reduce growth rates permanently and the elimination of tax 
distortion raises growth rate significantly.  
However, the two main current theoretical models have several limitations. First, 
both models assume an inter-temporal government budget constraint to predict the effects of 
fiscal policy shocks. But, government budget constraint is only a theoretical detail that places 
no meaningful constraint on policy, because government budgets can go into an explosive 
debt spiral for a decade or two without any disastrous consequences (Blinder, 2004). Second, 
both models accept the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, even though many well-established 
theoretical arguments contradict it. Those refuting arguments are derived from the umbrella 
of bequest motives, myopia and precautionary savings by the people.  
Under the theoretical limitations mentioned above, empirical analysis is necessary to 
reconcile these two different theoretical views. That is, it is very important and worthwhile to 
carry out a detailed empirical study to produce the stylized facts on the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks. 
  
                                                 
15
 With an overlapping generation model, Hendricks (1999) finds that the growth effects of tax reforms become 
trivial than those measured in previous research. However, his results show that the growth effects of tax 
reforms are still present and non-trivial under any condition. 
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3.2.2 Empirical Literature  
3.2.2.1 Development of Methodology 
There have been a number of studies using time series data for the US which 
examine the effects of fiscal policy on output. Earlier studies such as Barro (1981), Romer 
and Romer (1993), and Perry and Schultze (1993) estimate a reduced-form equation for 
output, including several explanatory variables capturing discretionary fiscal policy changes. 
These earlier studies suffered from an endogeneity problem in measuring the effect of fiscal 
policy shock on output
16
. As a result, there have been many efforts to identify exogeneous 
fiscal shocks more accurately. Many studies thereafter have focused on constructing a new 
methodology to disentangle the exogeneous structural component from the endogenous 
structural component or automatic component. There have basically been two main empirical 
methodologies: the narrative approach or dummy variable approach; and the structural VAR 
(hereafter SVAR) approach.  
First, the narrative approach studies a series of post-WW2 ‘abnormal’ fiscal events 
which can be safely assumed to be exogenous because of their specificity. Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) use the narrative approach to identify the political events that resulted in three 
large military build-ups which had nothing to do with developments in the US domestic 
economy
17
. Identifying three episodes of sharp rises in military spending (1950Q3, 1965Q1, 
and 1980Q1), they use these episodes as dummy variables in a regression for GDP. Edelberg 
                                                 
16
 When there is a correlation between a regressor and the error term, the regressor is said to be endogenous; 
when no such correlation exists, it is said to be exogenous. Endogeneity causes estimates to be biased even 
asymptotically. 
17
 The Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan military build-up 
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et al. (1999) extend this narrative approach by using the same dummies in a VAR framework. 
Although the narrative approach is a well-established methodology for the identification of 
fiscal shocks, it has received harsh criticism. Many researchers argue that a few military 
build-ups cannot properly capture the effects of fiscal spending in the years of these build-ups. 
This argument does make sense in that once several non-fiscal shocks are allowed to blow the 
economy in the period of military build-up, analysis produced by the narrative approach may 
lead to totally different results. So, the utilization of the series is limited to a few countries 
such as the US. Recently, there has been a new effort to address the drawback of using 
military build-ups as exogenous government spending shocks in the narrative approach. For 
instance, Yang et al. (2012) propose to identify government spending shocks using data on 
emergency spending on ‘natural disasters’ instead of ‘military build-ups’. They argue that 
emergency spending on natural disasters can be more widely used as fiscal shocks in 
countries beyond the US than military build-ups can (Yang et al., 2012).    
Second, unlike the narrative approach, many studies identify fiscal policy shocks as 
the residuals of a SVAR model. This approach imposes some restrictions on the model to 
identify the exogenous structural component of a government budget. Before a SVAR model 
is used, several studies apply a simple VAR model to estimate the effects of fiscal policy. 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) identify the reduced-form residuals of a regression of 
defence purchases as policy shocks. They use these residuals in a VAR to estimate the 
response of the economy to the policy shocks. Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Favero (2002) use 
a Cholesky ordering approach, assuming that government spending does not respond to 
economic changes within a quarter. Meanwhile, Mountford and Uhlig (2002, 2009) analyse 
the effects of fiscal policy with a VAR approach relying on sign restrictions on impulse 
  
42 
 
responses. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) firstly use the SVAR model to estimate the effects of 
fiscal policy shocks. They constructed a SVAR model for the US economy to see the effects 
of unexpected government spending and tax revenue within the system. With this model, they 
exploit decision lags in policy making to separate out the automatic response of fiscal policy 
to GDP. Giodano et al. (2007) study the effects of disaggregated fiscal variables on real 
private GDP
18
 in Italy using a SVAR model. Later, Tenhofen et al. (2010) investigate the 
impacts of fiscal policy shocks on the German economy with a SVAR model. They analyse 
the effects of both aggregated and disaggregated fiscal variables on GDP, including the sub-
components: private consumption and investment. Burriel et al. (2010) also analyse the 
effects of fiscal policy on the US economy and the Euro area as a whole with a SVAR model. 
Following the SVAR model of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Unal (2011) estimates the 
dynamic effects of government spending and net tax shocks on prices, interest rates, GDP and 
its private components, in four OECD countries - the US, Canada, the UK and France - using 
a SVAR approach. 
  
                                                 
18
 ‘Real private GDP’ is defined as ‘real GDP minus real government consumption’ (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; 
Giodano et al., 2007) 
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3.2.2.2 The Effects on Output  
There has been a considerable increase in study about the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks on output, especially research examining the output multiplier, since the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008. The empirical findings seem to be quite different depending on the 
methodology used.   
In the narrative approach, the effects of expansionary fiscal policy shocks are 
estimated by mixing time series data on government spending with a dummy of an abnormal 
fiscal event in the equation of GDP. Many studies using this approach provide very similar 
results - that expansionary fiscal policy shocks increase GDP, while decreasing private 
consumption and the real wage
19
. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) insist that both total GDP and 
private GDP respond positively to a military build-up for several years, whereas there are 
decreases in private consumption and the real wage. Edelberg et al. (1999) also find similar 
results to those of Ramey and Shapiro (1998). Recently, Barro and Redlick (2011) have 
estimated the effects of fiscal policy shocks on GDP growth rate by measuring the multiplier 
of each fiscal variable. They find that the estimated multiplier for temporary defence 
spending is around 0.4 contemporaneously, and 0.6 when cumulated over 2 years. They also 
find that the estimated multiplier for permanent defence spending is higher by around 0.2 
than that for temporary defence spending. However, all the estimated multipliers are less than 
1, regardless of the property of the spending. Unlike many previous researchers using the 
                                                 
19
 Theoretically, the neoclassical model predicts the GDP rise because of the increased labour supply. And it 
also argues that if government spending increases, households expect the rise in future taxes, so, they downsize 
their consumption and increase their labour supply, which finally causes a reduction in the real wage. 
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narrative approach, Yang et al. (2012) find that expansionary fiscal policy shocks increase 
GDP, private consumption and private investment. 
The SVAR approach is an attractive model for finding the dynamic relationship 
between GDP growth and fiscal policy shocks. Fatás and Mihov (2001) insist that 
government spending is followed by strong and persistent increases in consumption even 
though theoretically government spending should increase working hours and lead to a 
decline in consumption due to a negative wealth effect. In particular, they suggest that 
compensation of government employees is a highly effective way to boost output and private 
consumption, while government investment has little effect on output. Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) find that government spending shocks increase GDP. As for the sub-components of 
GDP, private consumption increases following government spending shocks, whereas private 
investment decreases. The positive reaction of private consumption is hard to harmonize with 
the neoclassical view of fiscal policy, and the negative reaction of investment is hard to 
harmonize with the new Keynesian view.  
After Blanchard and Perotti (2002), there were many more studies using the SVAR 
model. Perotti (2004) draws a comparison between the effects of government investment and 
government consumption. He argues that we cannot guarantee the superiority of government 
investment shocks over government consumption shocks in enhancing the economy. He 
insists that government investment is likely to reduce private investment. Holding a different 
view from supporters of the Golden Rule
20
, he tries to provide evidence that the popular 
                                                 
20
 Golden rule supporters insist that a government should borrow money only when it has a special need for 
investment, not for just consumption. This is based on the idea that government’s borrowing may increase the 
real interest rate, which causes the reduction in private investment, finally leads to a slowdown of GDP growth. 
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argument for government investment as a growth engine may be wrong
21
. According to 
Giodano et al. (2007), a shock to government purchases of goods and services has sizable 
effects after three quarters, going to zero after two years, while public wages have no 
significant effect on output. The results are consistent with those of Tenhofen et al. (2010), 
but are contrary to the findings of Fatás and Mihov (2001). Tenhofen et al. (2010) find that 
aggregated government spending shocks increase output in the short run, whereas the effects 
of a one-off government spending shock disappear after a few quarters. According to the 
results of their estimation, private consumption shows positive response to a government 
spending shock, while private investment does not respond significantly. As for 
disaggregated government spending, government employment expenditure does not have a 
significant effect, but government operating expenditure has a clear and persistent positive 
effect on output. Unal (2011) adds analysis of the effects of net tax components on the 
economy. He finds that GDP falls in response to net tax increase, while it goes up in response 
to government spending shocks. He also shows that net tax components affect economic 
variables differently according to the structure of the economy.  
 
3.2.2.3 The Effects on the Labour Market  
There are several recent papers that try to measure the effects of government 
spending on labour markets, especially on employment. For example, Burnside et al. (2004) 
estimate the effects of a fiscal policy shock on key macroeconomic aggregates including 
GDP, hours worked, and the real wage. Adopting Ramey and Shapiro’s (1998) narrative 
                                                 
21
 Devarajan et al. (1996) also insisted that current government spending might have more positive and 
significant growth effects than capital government spending. 
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approach and identifying exogenous changes in fiscal policy, they formulate a four-variable 
VAR model, including three fixed set of variables - GDP, government spending, and labour 
income tax rates - and a set of extra variables which are added one at a time - hours worked, 
the real wage, consumption, and investment. They find that the onset of Ramey-Shapiro’s 
government spending episodes leads to an increase in hours worked with a delayed, hump-
shaped trajectory, while it leads to a decrease in the after-tax real wage.  
Monacelli and Perotti (2008) also measure the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the 
labour market, focusing on two sectors: the non-financial corporate business, and 
manufacturing. They adopt both the SVAR approach and Ramey-Shapiro’s narrative 
approach to identify government spending shocks. Based on a six-variable VAR model,
22
 
they find that when there are fiscal policy shocks, the real product wage rises in both the non-
financial corporate business sector and the manufacturing sector, and the real consumption 
wage also rises by less than 1 per cent point at the peak in both sectors.  
Pappa (2009) estimates the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the labour market using 
the US annual aggregated and disaggregated data covering 48 states from 1969 to 2001. 
Employing a SVAR model and identifying fiscal shocks by sign restrictions
23
, he traces the 
                                                 
22
 The six variables consist of five fixed set of variables and one added variable. The five fixed set of variables 
are government spending on goods and services, GDP, private consumption, private investment, and the Barro-
Sahasakul average marginal tax rate on labour income. One variable is added from the following three variables: 
the mark-up, the real consumption wage, the real product wage.  
  
23
 ‘Sign restriction’ methodology assumes that government consumption, investment, and employment must 
increase GDP and deficits in both of the neoclassical model and the new Keynesian model. The advantages of 
this methodology are that it is based on theory, it can be used to any frequency data, and it can avoid the 
endogeneity problem. 
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effects of fiscal shocks on labour market variables such as employment and the real wage.    
In the analysis using annual aggregated data, he finds that the rises in government 
consumption, government investment, and government employment increase both the real 
wage and employment, at least contemporaneously. The results of estimation using state data 
are generally consistent with those obtained from aggregated data, except for the case of 
government employment shocks. That is, the responses of the real wage and employment to 
government consumption, government investment, and government employment shocks are 
all positive. But, the response of employment to government employment shocks is 
insignificant. He suggests that this is caused by substantial heterogeneity of employment 
response in each state. One third of states show total employment reduction when there are 
government employment shocks (Pappa, 2009). 
Recently, Monacelli et al. (2010) studied the transmission mechanism for a fiscal 
policy shock to the labour market. These researchers also use a SVAR model, adding dummy 
variables based on actual forecasts following Ramey (2009) or Romer and Romer (2007). 
They find that an increase in government spending leads to a fall in the unemployment rate 
multiplier, a significant rise in total hours worked, and a significant rise in the real product 
wage. They also find that the hours per employed individual change insignificantly and job-
finding probability shows a positive response to a government spending shock.  
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3.3   Methodology 
3.3.1 Three-Variable Baseline SVAR Model  
As all three variables in the baseline SVAR have a unit root and there are 
cointegrating relationships between variables (see Section 3.4.3), a vector error-correction 
model (VECM) or level VAR model can be applied to measure the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks. However, when estimating a VAR with a number of variables, it is hard to find 
economically interpretable cointegration vectors (Tenhofen et al., 2010). Therefore, we use a 
level VAR to measure the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks.   
As we are using a small sample, the number of variables in the VAR model has to be 
limited. Moreover, in order to compare our estimation results with those of previous literature, 
we start our analysis with a three-variable SVAR model, following Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002). The baseline SVAR model consists of three variables
24
:  government spending (  ), 
net taxes (  ), and real GDP (  ). The reduced-form VAR is formulated as follows. 
(3.1)      β(L)     +  , 
where    is a 3 x 1 vector of endogenous variables, β(L) is a 3 x 3 matrix lag 
polynomial, and    is a 3 x 1 vector of reduced-form innovations.    is assumed to be 
normally distributed white noise with a constant covariance matrix  (    
 )    . In the 
baseline SVAR specification,    (         ) , and     (   
     
     
 
)  . 
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 All variables are the log of real values per capita. So, price factor is already reflected in the model. 
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Institutional information is used to impose restrictions on the baseline SVAR model. 
The VAR model using a Cholesky decomposition ordering is added to compare the results 
with the baseline SVAR. Three dummy variables are included in the model, considering the 
potential effects of the 1980 economic downturn caused by the 1978 second oil shock, the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis is included as a dummy because it is assumed that the crisis may cause sudden changes 
in policy and lead to evolution that will last a long time. Lags are used in the autoregressive 
model to capture the effects of evolution in the variables (Marcellino, 2006). 
3.3.2 Extended VAR model 
The extended VAR model
25
 adds several variables of interest to the baseline VAR. 
Following the strategy of Burnside et al. (2004)
26
, the effects on a number of variables are 
examined by rotating the additional variables in the model. For example, private consumption 
of non-durables and services (  ) and private investment (  ) are included when estimating 
the effects of fiscal policy shocks on output and its sub-components. Then, one or two 
variables are drawn in rotation from the following four variables when estimating the effects 
on the labour market: manufacturing employment (  ), total hours worked (  ), the real wage 
rate (  ), and the unemployment rate (  ). In the extended VAR model, a simple Cholesky 
decomposition ordering is used to impose restrictions on the model. This is based on the 
assertion that for the VAR model with a large number of variables, a Cholesky decomposition 
ordering can deliver almost accurate impulse responses, even though the shocks are 
anticipated (Mertens and Ravn, 2010; Rafiq, 2013).  
                                                 
25
 We can add other variables related to exports, the exchange rate, the interest rate, and stock market volatility. 
26
 They design a VAR model using a fixed set of variables and rotating other variables of interest one by one.  
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3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Data Source and Frequency 
3.4.1.1 Data Source 
The three-variable baseline SVAR model uses both annual and quarterly data on 
government spending (  ), net taxes (  ) and GDP (  ). The extended VAR model includes 
private consumption (  ), private investment (  ), and four labour-market-related variables 
(i.e., manufacturing employment
27
 (  ), total hours worked (  ), real wage rate (  ), and the 
unemployment rate (  )). All variables are in the form of the log of real values.   
Annual data on fiscal policy, such as government spending and net tax revenues, are 
obtained from the databases of both the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the IMF and 
the MOSF of Korea. Quarterly data on fiscal policy are obtained from the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance (MOSF). The GFS is used to collect government spending data, and 
missing observations are compensated for by the information offered by the MOSF. GDP is 
taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. Even though the OECD 
provides GDP and the GDP deflator data, it does not have population data. So, for data 
consistency, time series data from the IFS is used. The period considered is from 1972 to 
2010. Labour market data are obtained from the statistics and database of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) and the Ministry of Employment and Labour (MOEL) in Korea. 
In particular, quarterly Korean labour market data are extracted from the Report on the 
Labour Force Survey of Establishments produced by the MOEL survey database system.  
                                                 
27
 Following Ramey (2011), manufacturing employment is included as one of the main variables in the labour 
market because it takes the largest part of total employment in the industry (i.e., 17.1 per cent as of 2008). Even if it 
does not cover employment of whole economy, it can reflect the situation of the labour market in the major industry.  
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3.4.1.2 Data Frequency 
Many of the studies that use a SVAR model prefer to use quarterly data rather than 
annual data because the endogeneity problem of discretionary fiscal policy can be removed 
by using higher-frequency data. It is based on an assumption that discretionary fiscal policy 
can react to any macroeconomic change at least a quarter later (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 
On the other hand, the assumption supposes that policy makers can adjust fiscal policy in 
response to unexpected changes in GDP within a year (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012).  
However, this assumption also has its limitation. Because of the difficulty of 
obtaining quarterly data, quarterly data for the variables are interpolated in many studies, 
which may cause bias and imprecision in estimation. Moreover, quarterly data used in a 
SVAR model suffers from a fundamental problem that its estimated shocks are likely to be 
anticipated by one or two quarters by the private sector (Perotti, 2008). Recognizing this 
point, Perotti (2008) uses long-run annual data with non-interpolated quarterly data in his 
analysis, which makes the results of estimation more legitimate and persuasive. 
Ramey (2009, 2011) advocates an analysis of fiscal policy using annual data instead 
of quarterly data to overcome the anticipation problem. Based on annual variables, the 
estimated government spending shocks have a better chance of being unanticipated if it is 
assumed that most of government spending movements can be anticipated by one or two 
quarters. This is supported by the argument that a country’s fiscal stance is usually reviewed 
less frequently because substantive changes in government revenue or spending policy 
require legislative review as part of the annual budget planning exercise (Romeu and 
Kawakami, 2011).  
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In this context, basically, annual data are used in our models to measure the effects 
of fiscal policy shocks. The annual data sample starts from 1972 and ends in 2010. The main 
reason for using annual data is based on the idea that fiscal decisions are made on a yearly 
basis in the budget. That is, even if there is a possibility that supplementary budgets and other 
policy decisions are implemented several times during one year period, yearly budget 
includes most of the important policy measures. Quarterly data are also used in a robustness 
check to see if the results of estimation are consistent with those using annual data analysis. 
The quarterly data sample starts from the first quarter of 1994 and continues to the fourth 
quarter of 2010. 
 
3.4.2 Data Description 
All the data are in log of real values, and per capita terms are used to remove any 
bias resulting from demographic factors. Following the definition of fiscal variables in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
28
 fiscal variables, such as government spending and net taxes, 
are carefully defined.  
                                                 
28
 ‘Net taxes’ and ‘government spending’ are chosen as the two fiscal variables based on the belief that, ‘in the 
short run, fiscal policy works mainly through the effects of government spending and taxes on aggregate 
demand and the effects of aggregate demand on output’ (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, p1332).  
  
53 
 
3.4.2.1 Government Spending29  
According to the GFS, the total expenditure of central government consists of 
current expenditure and capital expenditure. Current expenditure is composed of the purchase 
of goods and services, interest payments, and subsidies and other current transfers. In this 
research, government spending is defined as the purchases of goods and services, both 
current and capital. So, interest payments and subsidies and other current transfers in current 
expenditure are excluded from the scope of government spending. This alternative definition 
of government spending is the sum of government consumption and investment, which has 
been adopted by most recent studies in the literature (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).   
This classification is based on the fact that government spending on goods and 
services may have different effects from the other ones. That is, government spending on 
goods and services directly changes the aggregated demand of the economy, while transfers 
and interest payments make effects via real disposable income, which could be partially 
saved by households (Burriel et al., 2010). 
Looking at government spending, current spending has taken a greater proportion 
than capital spending, except in 1999. Capital spending has shown much wider fluctuations 
during the last four decades. We can note that capital spending significantly increases during 
economic crises, such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis. This is due to the government’s fiscal expansion in the wake of the financial crises. 
Government spending as a share of GDP has decreased gradually during the last four decades. 
                                                 
29
 ‘Government spending’ is defined in order to exclude transfer payments and interest payments, which change 
over the economic business cycle.  
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Figure 3.1 Government Spending in Korea 
Government Spending  Sub-components of Government Spending 
  
 
Note: Government spending is in log of real value, and per capita term 
 
3.4.2.2 Net Taxes 
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), net taxes are defined as ‘the sum of 
personal tax and non-tax receipts, corporate profits tax receipts, indirect business tax and 
non-tax accruals, and contributions for social insurance, less transfer payments to persons and 
interest paid by the government. Transfer payments and interest payments are excluded from 
total current government revenue because they are considered as negative taxes’ (Blanchard 
and Perotti, 2002). For instance, transfer payments are assumed to be redistributed to the 
private sector and are not regarded as a resource withdrawal from the private (Tenhofen et al, 
2010). 
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Table 3.1  Contents of Government Revenue and Government Spending 
Item Contents 
Total Current Government Revenue 
Current taxes receipts +  
Contributions for government  
social insurance +  
Income receipts on assets +  
Current transfer receipts + 
Current surplus of government enterprises 
Total Current Government Spending 
Consumption expenditures + 
Current transfers + 
Interest payments + 
Subsidies - 
Wage accruals  
less disbursements 
 
In conclusion, ‘net taxes’ are defined as ‘total current government revenue less 
current transfers and interest payments on government debt’. ‘Current transfers’ include ‘all 
expenditure items except public consumption, public investment and interest payments 
(Burriel et al., 2010). 
Figure 3.2 illustrates net taxes during the last four decades.  As mentioned above, net 
taxes are measured by subtracting current transfers to households and interest payments from 
total current government revenue. Net taxes show a gradual increase, even though there are 
some fluctuations in several periods. For example, net taxes significantly decrease in the late 
1980s, due to the huge tax reform to boost the economy. And there were another two big fall 
of net taxes right after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
However, the net taxes-to-GDP ratio has gradually increased. 
 
  
56 
 
Figure 3.2  Net Taxes in Korea 
 Net Taxes Net Taxes/GDP (%) 
  
Note: Net Taxes is in log of real value, and per capita term 
 
3.4.2.3 GDP and Its Components 
Korea has experienced a very high level of economic growth over the last four 
decades. Figure 3.3 shows that GDP increased significantly, while there are two reductions, 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. 
Figure 3.3 GDP in Korea 
 
Note: GDP is in log of real value, and per capita term 
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Figure 3.4 illustrates the changes in the sub-components of GDP: private 
consumption and private investment. Private consumption,   , is defined as household 
consumption expenditure, including the consumption of non-profit institutions serving 
households. Private Investment,   , is private gross fixed capital formation, which is 
calculated as gross fixed capital formation less government capital spending. Both sub-
components have upward trends, showing significant decreases in the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  
Figure 3.4 GDP and Its Components 
 
Note: GDP and its components are in log of real values, and per capita terms 
 
3.4.2.4 Labour Market Variables 
The main interest with the labour market is how key variables respond to fiscal 
policy shocks. Manufacturing employment,   , is an index number of full-time equivalent 
employment in the manufacturing sector with 2005 = 100. It increased significantly up until 
the early 1990s, peaked in 1991, and has fluctuated around the index number 100 ever since. 
It is notable that manufacturing employment has decreased three times in the early 1980s
30
, in 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, and in the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. The real wage 
                                                 
30
 In the early 1980s, the global economy experienced a serious downturn due to the second oil shock in 1978. 
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rate,   , is an index number (2005 = 100) which represents wage rate or earnings per worker 
employed per specified time period (monthly). This is calculated by using the nominal wage 
and the consumer price index. The second column of Figure 3.5 shows the changing process 
of the real wage rate,   . This has increased in a faster rate, except for the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Total hours worked,   , is the average 
for establishments that have five or more employees. This series was obtained by using 
28,000 sampled establishments with five or more employees across all industries, excluding 
the agriculture, fisheries and forestry sectors. Total hours worked,   , has decreased 
continuously since 1994. However, there were two big falls in total hours worked caused by 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The unemployment rate 
of whole economy,     has been quite stable, except for the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It is 
calculated by dividing the number of unemployed by the size of the labour force. 
Figure 3.5  Labour Market Variables in Korea 
Note: All the variables are in log of real values 
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3.4.3 Unit Root Tests and Cointegration Tests 
3.4.3.1 Unit Root Tests 
There is the possibility that economic and financial time series may contain at least 
one unit root
31
, being non-stationary; although some series are stationary and some series 
possibly contain two unit roots. Under this circumstance, using time series data is likely to 
cause significant errors, such as spurious regression problem. Therefore, as a first step, the 
stationarity property of any time series used should be checked.  
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, 
Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test are used. The ADF test has the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity, whereas the KPSS test has the null hypothesis of stationarity. By testing for a 
unit root using the two methods with different assumptions, the robustness of the unit root 
tests can be strengthened. In considering Figure 3.6, it is assumed that only GDP has a 
deterministic time trend, the others have stochastic time trends. So, both a deterministic time 
trend and an intercept are included in the test equation for GDP, while only an intercept is 
included in the test equation for other variables, such as government spending and net taxes
32
. 
The optimal lag lengths are selected as zero using the Schwarz information criterion (SIC).   
 
                                                 
31
 Technically speaking, ‘unit root’ refers to the root of the polynomial in the lag operator. ‘Unit root’ indicates 
that a given time series is not stationary.  
32
 The results of unit root tests are the same even if it is assumed that GDP, government spending and net taxes 
have the same type of time trend: deterministic time trend or stochastic time trend. 
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Figure 3.6 GDP, Government Spending and Net Taxes 
 
Note: All the variables are in log of real values, and per capita terms 
 
Table 3.2 displays the results of unit root tests for both the level and the first 
difference of each of the three variables in the baseline SVAR model. As expected, all of 
three level variables have a unit root, and so follow a non-stationary process. In other words, 
we can say that three variables are integrated of order one, i.e. I(1). According to the results 
of the ADF test, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for all three level variables cannot be 
rejected, even at the 10 per cent significance level. The KPSS test rejects the null hypothesis 
of stationarity for all three level variables, presenting the same information as the ADF test.
33
   
After all the level variables have been differenced, no unit root will be found in the 
first differenced variables. For all the first differenced time series, the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity is rejected even at the 1 per cent significance level.  
                                                 
33
 We also performed unit root tests with various options – only intercept, intercept and trend, or neither. In each 
case, every variable has a unit root and is not stationary.  
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Table 3.2  Unit Root Tests Results of Baseline VAR Variables 
  Test statistics 
 
Variables 
Levels First difference 
verdict 
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS 
GDP      
Real -1.988 0.187** -6.251*** 0.142* I(1) 
Log (Real) -0.648 0.183** -5.536*** 0.102 I(1) 
Government Spending      
Real -2.139 0.757*** -6.773*** 0.461* I(1) 
Log (Real) 1.465 0.764*** -6.558*** 0.487** I(1) 
Net Taxes      
Real 0.842 0.732** -6.122*** 0.296 I(1) 
Log (Real) -1.767 0.764
***
 -6.500
***
 0.325 I(1) 
Notes:  1. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
            2. In a KPSS test, the spectral estimation is Bartlett kernel and Bandwidth is selected by Newey-West’s method. 
            3. The optimal lag lengths are selected as zero using the SIC. 
 
3.4.3.2 Cointegration Test 
  Engle and Granger (1987) suggested that a linear combination of a number of non-
stationary series can be stationary. These non-stationary time series are said to be 
‘cointegrated if there is a stable long-run relationship between them by moving together over 
time even though individually each variable is non-stationary’ (Gujarati, 2004). We can say 
that ‘a cointegrating relationship is a long-term equilibrium, because cointegrating variables 
are able to diverge from their relationship in the short run, but their ties would get back in the 
long run’ (Enders, 2010, p356). 
In this context, if there is no cointegration, we can construct a model of stationary 
variables by taking the first difference of the non-stationary variables. On the other hand, if 
there is a cointegrating relationship between the variables, we can estimate a level SVAR 
model without taking any difference on the variables. We conduct cointegration tests in two 
ways: one is Engle-Granger’s residual test, and the other is Johansen’s cointegration test. 
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 Firstly, using the ADF test on the logarithm of the ratio of net taxes to government 
spending, i.e., ln (net taxes / government spending), it is possible to see if there is a 
cointegrating relationship between the two variables. The null and alternative hypotheses for 
the unit root test are as follows. 
(3.2)         ̂    ( )  vs.       ̂    ( ) 
Thus, the null hypothesis assumes a unit root, while the alternative hypothesis 
assumes no unit root. Under the null hypothesis, therefore, a stationary linear combination of 
the non-stationary variables has not been found. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it can be 
said that a cointegrating relationship exists between variables.  
Figure 3.7 shows the log of net taxes over government spending. According to the 
ADF test, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent significance level. We can conclude 
that there is a cointegrating relationship between net taxes and government spending. 
Figure 3.7 Gap between Government Spending and Net Taxes 
 
Table 3.3  Unit Root Tests Results of Gap 
  Notes:  1. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
              2. Gap = log of real net taxes per capita – log of real government spending per capita 
              3. In the tests, gap series are tested with both time trend and intercept 
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    Test statistics 
Variable 
Levels 
verdict 
ADF KPSS 
Gap -6.797
***
 0.132
*
 I(0) 
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Secondly, the issue of cointegration can be examined within the Johansen VAR 
framework. Although the above Engle-Granger approach is very easy to use, one of its major 
drawbacks is that it can only estimate one conitegrating relationship between the variables. 
We have three variables in our model, so more than one linearly independent cointegrating 
relationship can be witnessed. In this context, it is much more suitable to check the issue of 
cointegrating ralationship using the Johansen VAR framework.  
The baseline SVAR model uses a set of three variables, which are I(1) according to 
the unit root test above. Before executing Johansen’s cointegration test, the appropriate 
number of lags in the SVAR system should be specified. For this, considering the annual 
frequency of the data set, we presume that the appropriate number of lags is no more than 
four. The Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SIC) and 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ) suggest a VAR(1) with a constant. 
Table 3.4  VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
    Lag 
With Constant No Constant 
AIC SIC HQ AIC SIC HQ 
0 -8.913604 -8.780289 -8.867584 NA NA NA 
1 -14.97668* -14.44341* -14.79259* -14.60811 -14.20817* -14.47005* 
2 -14.79637 -13.86316 -14.47422 -14.65217* -13.85228 -14.37605 
3 -14.83753 -13.50438 -14.37733 -14.57435 -13.37451 -14.16017 
4 -14.61043 -12.87733 -14.01217 -14.41633 -12.81655 -13.86409 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
So, a VAR with 1 lag containing three variables could be set up as follows. 
(3.3)                            +     
              3x1      3x3 3x1        3x1 
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In order to use the Johansen cointegration tests, we have to change the VAR above 
into a vector error-correction model (VECM) of the form, 
(3.4)                                     
where          .  
Basically the VECM has variables in the first differenced form on the LHS, and 
lagged level terms on the RHS. As the model recommended above has only one lag length, it 
has only lagged level terms on the RHS.   is a long-run coefficient matrix. The cointegration 
test between the variables is calculated by considering the rank of the    matrix via its 
eigenvalues. The rank of a matrix is equal to the number of its eigenvalues that are different 
from zero. If the variables are not cointegrated, the rank of   will be similar to zero (Enders, 
2010, pp 385-392).  
In the Johansen approach, the trace test (      )  and maximum eigenvalue test 
(    ) are used to determine the number of cointegrating vectors (r). 
The statistics for the two tests are as follows.  
 (3.5)             ( )          (   ̂ 
 
     )   and 
 (3.6)           (     )         (   ̂   ) 
where T is the number of observations, r is the number of cointegrating vectors 
under the null hypothesis and   ̂  is the estimated value for the ith ordered eigenvalue from 
the long-run coefficient matrix   (Enders, 2010, pp 391-392). 
  
65 
 
‘       is a joint test where the null hypothesis is that the number of cointegrating 
vectors is less than or equal to r against an unspecified or general alternative that there are 
more than r’(Enders, 2010, p 391).  The test statistic       has a sequence of null alternative 
hypotheses as follows. 
           vs          
        vs          
                   
          vs          
‘     conducts separate tests on each eigenvalue, and has as its null hypothesis that 
the number of cointegrating vectors is r against an alternative of r+1’ (Enders, 2010, p 391). 
Therefore,      test statistic has null and alternative hypotheses as follows. 
          vs          
        vs          
                  
          vs          
 
We keep increasing the value of r until we no longer reject the null hypothesis.    
The results appear as in Table 3.5. In total, five models are made based on whether an 
intercept and a trend are included or not. The results across the five types of model and the 
two types of test are the same, having one cointegrating vector. 
Table 3.5  Selected Number of Cointegrating Relations (5 per cent significance level)  
 
Data Trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type 
No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 1 1 1 1 1 
Max-Eig 1 1 1 1 1 
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The results of the cointegration test after selecting ‘intercept (no trend) in 
cointegrating equation and test VAR and 1 lag length’ are shown below in Table 3.6. 
Examining the trace test, if we look at the first row below the headings, the 
statistic of 43.72 by far exceeds 29.80 - the critical value of the 5 per cent significance 
level, and we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors. In the next row, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector because the trace 
statistic 14.87 is smaller than 15.49 - the critical value of the 5 per cent significance level. 
In conclusion, we can say there is one cointegrating vector in our VAR model. The 
maximum eigenvalue test confirms this result too.  
Table 3.6  Johansen Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Test  
 
Trace Test(      ) 
Number of 
cointegrating vector 
  Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 
5% Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
None *  0.541499  43.71886  29.79707  0.0007 
At most 1  0.311664  14.86653  15.49471  0.0620 
At most 2  0.027923  1.047852  3.841466  0.3060 
Maximum Eigenvalue Test(    ) 
Number of 
cointegrating vector 
  Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
5% Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
None *  0.541499  28.85233  21.13162  0.0034 
At most 1  0.311664  13.81867  14.26460  0.0587 
At most 2  0.027923  1.047852  3.841466  0.3060 
Note: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5 per cent significance level 
          **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
The effects of fiscal policy shocks are estimated by focusing on the responses of 
output and the labour market, respectively.  
3.5.1 The Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks on Output 
3.5.1.1 The Effects of Aggregated Government Spending Shocks on Output 
First, the responses of output to aggregated government spending shocks are 
estimated using the three-variable baseline SVAR model, which includes real government 
spending (  ), real net taxes (  ), and real GDP (  ).  The reduced-form VAR is as follows.  
(3.7)      β (L)     +  , 
The reduced-form residuals of government spending and net taxes (  
 
 and   
 ) is 
linear combinations of the three components: ‘(1) the automatic response of government 
spending and net taxes to innovations in GDP - e.g., unanticipated changes in taxes in 
response to output innovations for given tax rates, (2) the systematic discretionary response 
of policymakers to innovations in the other endogenous variables - e.g., tax rate reductions 
implemented systematically in response to recessions, (3) random discretionary fiscal policy 
shocks’ (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2008). So, the relationship between the 
reduced-form residuals (  ) and the structural shocks (  ) can generally be shown in a 
matrix-form, B      . 
(3.8)  [
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where    [
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A and B show the linear relationships between the structural shocks and the reduced-form 
residuals.    is assumed to be orthogonal to each other in order to investigate the impact of an 
isolated shock.  
If restrictions are imposed on the baseline VAR model using Cholesky 
decomposition ordering, matrix equation (3.8) is changed into matrix equation (3.9). 
(3.9)  [
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] 
The ordering is assumed to be as follows: government spending first, net taxes next 
and GDP last. 
Meanwhile, if restrictions are imposed on the baseline VAR model using 
institutional information, matrix equation (3.8) is changed into matrix equation (3.10). 
(3.10)  [
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] 
The variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form innovation has six elements, while 
the equation (3.10) has nine coefficients to be identified. So, some restrictions should be 
imposed on the coefficients to make a system of equation (3.10) identified. The first 
restriction is     . Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we define government 
spending as the sum of government consumption and government investment. So, transfer 
  
69 
 
payments and interest payments, which will vary over the business cycle, are excluded from 
government spending in our study. As automatic stabilisers on the spending side operate 
through transfers, it can be assumed that there is no automatic feedback from changes in GDP 
to government spending (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002)
34
. The next restriction is the value of 
the elasticity
35
         . This figure is based on the estimation of Kim et al. (2009)
36
. The 
last restriction is     , which is drawn by assuming that government spending decisions 
come first. If government spending decisions come before any other variables, then a change 
in tax decisions has no effect on government spending
37
. 
Now, matrix equation (3.10) can be written as follows. 
(3.11)  [
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]    [
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] 
 The effects of aggregated government spending shocks on GDP are similar 
regardless of the identification method: Cholesky decomposition ordering or institutional 
information.  
Figure 3.8 shows the impulse responses of GDP to government spending shocks in 
the three-variable baseline SVAR model. It shows that when using Cholesky decomposition 
ordering, the positive effects of government spending shocks on GDP are significant at the 
                                                 
34
 Progressive income taxes also may play a role as an automatic stabiliser on the revenue side. 
35
    is defined as            
  
 
  where T=    is the level of net taxes,       is the elasticity of the  
   category 
of net taxes to its own tax base and      is the elasticity of the tax base of the  
  category of net taxes to GDP 
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 
36
 According to the national fiscal management plan (2009) of Korea, the value of the elasticity is 1.12. The 
results are similar to those using value of 1.09. 
37
 Korea government designs its spending for the next fiscal year based on anticipated revenue. Therefore, 
successive changes in taxes are not likely to affect government spending in the fiscal year.  
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two standard error confidence bands for about three years after the shocks. When using 
institutional information restrictions, the estimated results of B       are as follows.  
(3.12)   [
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]    [
      
         
      
] [
  
 
  
 
  
 
] 
Figure 3.8 The Responses to Aggregated Government Spending (Baseline SVAR)  
  
 
Second, the responses to aggregated government spending shocks are estimated 
using an extended five-variable VAR model that includes government spending, net taxes, 
GDP, private consumption and private investment. Cholesky decomposition ordering is used. 
Figure 3.9 shows impulse responses from the five-variable VAR model. GDP, 
private consumption and private investment all display positive responses to aggregated 
government spending shocks. The response of GDP is significant, but the responses of the 
sub-components of GDP (i.e., private consumption and private investment) are trivial and 
insignificant. The results of impulse responses are generally consistent with the forecasts 
from the standard new Keynesian approach.    
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Figure 3.9 The Responses of GDP to Aggregated Government Spending  
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3.5.1.2   The Effects of Disaggregated Government Spending Shocks on Output 
This section investigates the effects of sub-components of fiscal policy on output, 
private consumption and private investment. To do so, the five-variable VAR model is 
extended to a six-variable VAR model by splitting government spending into two 
components. 
3.5.1.2.1 The Effects of Current and Capital Government Spending Shocks 
First, aggregated government spending is split into current government spending and 
capital government spending
38
. In the six-variable VAR model, aggregated government 
spending is dropped and replaced by current government spending and capital government 
spending. 
                                                 
38
 This is based on the economic classification of government spending in the GFS. 
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As shown in Figure 3.10, sub-components of aggregated government spending have 
different effects on GDP and its components. After a current government spending shock, 
GDP shows a slightly negative response for about two years. Private consumption decreases 
for about five years, turning into a positive trend thereafter. On the other hand, private 
investment increases after a current government spending shock, but only to an insignificant 
extent. In conclusion, the responses to a current government spending shock are negative and 
insignificant. The results suggest that current government spending crowds out private 
consumption for the time being, but it generates a motive for higher private investment. 
Unlike the results for a current government spending shock, the responses of all macro-
economic variables to a capital government spending shock are positive and significant. A 
capital government spending shock has positive effects on GDP and its components: private 
consumption and private investment. The positive effects are small but significant. Through 
this, it can be conjectured that the positive effects on GDP and its components of total 
government spending stem from the effects of capital government spending rather than those 
of current government spending. 
It should be noted that private consumption responds differently to capital 
government spending shocks and current government spending shock. The negative response 
of private consumption to a current government spending shock is not consistent with the 
new Keynesian predictions that government spending boosts private consumption and private 
investment. The positive response of GDP to a capital government spending shock is in line 
with theoretical predictions by Baxter and King (1993), who found significant and positive 
output multipliers for government investment depending on the productivity parameter of 
public capital (Tenhofen et al., 2010). 
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Figure 3.10 The Responses of GDP to Current/Capital Government Spending   
  
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of GDP to CURRENT SPENDING
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of GDP to CAPITAL SPENDING
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PRIVATE CONSUMPTION to CURRENT SPENDING
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PRIVATE CONSUMPTION to CAPITAL SPENDING
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PRIVATE INVESTMENT to CURRENT SPENDING
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PRIVATE INVESTMENT to CAPITAL SPENDING
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
  
74 
 
3.5.1.2.2 The Effects of Government Employment and Operating Spending Shocks 
Next, aggregated government spending is split into government employment 
spending (government wages and salaries) and government operating spending (consisting of 
other purchases of goods and services plus government capital formation). Concerning the 
effects of government employment spending, there are opposite empirical evidences in the 
previous literature. Therefore, it is meaningful to measure the effects of a government 
employment spending shock on the economy in Korea. In a six-variable VAR model, 
aggregated government spending is dropped and replaced by government employment 
spending and government operating spending. An assumption that the two sub-components of 
aggregated government spending have a zero exogenous elasticity is added. In conclusion, 
the six-variable VAR model includes government employment spending, government 
operating spending, net taxes, GDP, private consumption, and private investment.  
Figure 3.11 shows that the two sub-components of aggregated government spending 
have different effects on GDP and its components. Concerning the effect on GDP, 
government employment spending has a positive but small effect on GDP, lasting only about 
two years. Meanwhile, government operating spending has positive effects on GDP for a long 
time. In terms of the effects on sub-components of GDP, it can be said that government 
employment spending increases both private consumption and investment, but the effect is 
insignificant and fades in two or three years. Government operating spending does have 
positive and significant effects on both private consumption and private investment, and this 
is comparatively long-lasting in hump-shaped manner. This result is likely to be caused by 
capital government spending shocks in government operating spending. 
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Our empirical results for the effects of disaggregated government spending are 
consistent with the findings of Giodano et al. (2007) and Tenhofen et al. (2010), who insist 
that the compensation of public employees is not effective in stimulating the economy. 
Therefore, our results contrast to those of Fatás and Mihov (2001), who report that 
compensation of public employees is a highly effective way of boosting private consumption 
and output. 
Figure 3.11 The Responses of GDP to Government Employment/Operating Spending  
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3.5.1.3 The Effects of Net Tax Shocks on Output 
Now, the effects of net tax shocks are estimated using the same methodology as 
above. First, the impulse responses of GDP are measured using the three-variable baseline 
VAR model, identifying net tax shocks with Cholesky decomposition ordering and institution 
information restrictions. Figure 3.12 shows the impulse responses to the net tax shocks, 
where GDP responds negatively to net tax shocks, regardless of the identification method. 
 Figure 3.12 The Responses of GDP to Net Tax Shocks (Baseline VAR)  
  
Second, the responses to net tax shocks are estimated using the five-variable 
extended VAR model. As shown in Figure 3.13, GDP and its two sub-components (private 
consumption and private investment) respond negatively to net tax shocks. The negative 
effects are quite significant according to the two standard error confidence bands. 
Figure 3.13 The Responses of GDP to Net Tax Shocks (Extended VAR)  
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3.5.2 The Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks on the Labour Market 
 
3.5.2.1 The Effects of Aggregated Government Spending Shocks on the Labour Market 
As can be seen from the theoretical literature review, there are big differences in 
views on the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the labour market. The neoclassical model 
predicts a decrease in employment and the real wage, while the new Keynesian model 
predicts the opposite results, with the assumption of price stickiness or monopolistic 
competition. 
Our baseline specification includes the following variables: government spending, 
net taxes, GDP, and private consumption. To this fixed set of four variables, each of two 
labour market variables is added in turn.  In our estimation, the four labour market variables 
can be put into two groups: (1) group 1 - manufacturing employment,   , and the real wage 
rate,   , (2) group 2 - total hours worked,   , and unemployment rate,   . 
It is possible to estimate responses to a fiscal policy shock of one per cent of GDP 
from a six-variable VAR model that includes government spending, net taxes, GDP, private 
consumption, an employment variable and a real wage variable.  
Figure 3.14 shows the main results of estimation. The government spending shock is 
expressed as per cent points of GDP. 
According to the results, manufacturing employment responds positively for about 
four years to a government spending shock. The positive responses are small but significant 
for the first two years, at the two standard error confidence bands. The real wage rate also 
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shows positive responses to government spending shocks with an inverted U-shaped 
trajectory. Like manufacturing employment, the responses of the real wage rate are 
significant for a while. Total hours worked and unemployment rate fall following government 
spending shocks. Except for the response of total hours worked, the results are consistent 
with the theoretical view of the new Keynesian approach where government spending moves 
the labour supply and the demand curve outwards, raising the real wage.       
Figure 3.14  The Responses of the Labour Market to Aggregated Government Spending  
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3.5.2.2 The Effects of Disaggregated Government Spending Shocks on the Labour Market 
3.5.2.2.1 The Effects of Current and Capital Government Spending Shocks 
Now, the effects of disaggregated government spending shocks on the labour market 
are estimated, which requires a six-variable VAR model. Four fixed set of variables are as 
follows: current government spending, capital government spending, net taxes, and GDP. 
Each of two labour market variables is also included, in turn. Figure 3.15 illustrates the 
impulse responses of the labour market variables to each disaggregated government spending 
shock.  
Figure 3.15  The Responses of the Labour Market to Current/Capital Government Spending  
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As shown in Figure 3.15, when there is a current government spending shock, 
unemployment rate and total hours worked fall, while manufacturing employment and the 
real wage rate rise. It is notable that the real wage rate significantly increases in an inverted 
U-shaped trajectory after a current government spending shock. In response to a capital 
government spending shock, unemployment rate falls and the other labour market variables 
respond positively, as expected. Judging by the results explained above, we can suggest that 
capital government spending has more positive effects on the labour market in terms of job 
creation than does current government spending. 
 
3.5.2.2.2 The Effect of Government Employment and Operating Spending Shocks  
It is meaningful to take a look at the distinction between government employment 
spending and other government operating spending on the labour market. Therefore, to see 
the effects of government employment spending shocks on the labour market, two variables 
should be changed in the six-variable VAR model used in Section 3.5.2.2.1. Current 
government spending and capital government spending are replaced by government 
employment spending and government operating spending. Finally, the new six-variable 
VAR model includes government employment spending, government operating spending, net 
taxes, GDP, manufacturing employment and the real wage rate. Also, the results of  the new 
six-variable VAR model are estimated after replacing manufacturing employment and the 
real wage rate by total hours worked and unemployment rate.  
Figure 3.16 shows the results of estimation. The first column of Figure 3.16 displays 
the responses of private manufacturing employment, the real wage rate, total hours worked 
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and the unemployment rate to a government employment spending shock. The second 
column shows the responses of the same four variables to a government operating spending 
shock. Both government spending shocks have a negative wealth effect on the private 
consumer, which increases manufacturing employment and total hours worked. The positive 
effects of government employment spending on manufacturing employment are insignificant 
and disappear quite quickly, becoming negative after a year. A government employment 
spending shock increases the real wage rate, total hours worked and the unemployment rate 
but all are insignificant. As for the effects of government operating spending, this spending 
leads to a significant increase in private manufacturing employment displaying an inverted U-
shaped trajectory. As with a government employment spending shock, the real wage rate 
increases significantly in response to a government operating spending shock. Meanwhile, 
the responses of total hour worked and the unemployment rate to a government operating 
spending shock are insignificant. 
The results of estimating the VARs are generally consistent with Tenhofen et al. 
(2010), who argue that a government employment spending shock does not have significant 
effects on the economy. The results contrast with those of Pappa (2005) and Perotti (2008), 
who find positive responses by private employment and the real wage to a government 
employment spending shock. According to their research, the responses of private 
employment are less strong than those of the real wage. Our results are also in line with those 
of Linnemann (2009). Linnemann makes his estimations using a three-variable VAR with 
government employment, private employment and GDP as the variables. He finds that private 
employment responds positively to a government employment shock.  
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Figure 3.16  The Responses of the Labour Market to Government Employment and Operating Spending 
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3.5.2.3 The Effects of Net Tax Shocks on the Labour Market 
Figure 3.17 shows the impulse response of the labour market variables to net taxes 
shocks. Unlike a government spending shock, a net tax shock generally has negative effects 
on the labour market. When there is a net tax increase by one per cent of GDP, manufacturing 
employment shows a negative and significant response. Total hours worked also responds 
negatively to a net tax shock, but the responses are insignificant. Meanwhile, the response of 
the real wage rate to a net tax shock changes from positive to negative, and the response is 
insignificant. It is notable that the unemployment rate shows a significant decrease for a year 
after a net tax shock. 
Figure 3.17  The Responses of the Labour Market to Net Tax Shocks  
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3.6 Robustness Checks 
This section undertakes a few robustness checks. First, it is checked whether 
disaggregated government spending has the same effects on GDP regardless of the analysis 
methodology. So, the effects of disaggregated government spending on the economy are 
measured using the four-variable SVAR model. Second, the effects of fiscal policy shocks 
are measured using quarterly data and see whether the results are consistent with those of 
estimation using annual data. Third, the effects of fiscal policy shocks considering monetary 
policy are checked. By measuring the effects of fiscal policy shocks with different 
methodology, different data frequency and control variables, the robustness of the analysis 
can be strengthened. 
3.6.1 The Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks Using Four-Variable SVAR Model 
In a specification of disaggregated government spending in the four-variable SVAR 
model, we can include both current government spending and capital government spending 
instead of aggregated government spending in the three-variable baseline SVAR model.  
If restrictions are imposed on the four-variable VAR model using Cholesky 
decomposition ordering, the matrix equation is as follows. 
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Meanwhile, if restrictions are imposed on the four-variable SVAR model using 
institutional information, the estimated results, with the matrix form, are shown as follows. 
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Table 3.7 displays the estimated coefficients of the contemporaneous relationships 
between the vairalbes. Both current government spending and capital government spending 
affect GDP positively, but only the effects of capital government spending on GDP are 
significant. A net tax shock has significant and negative effects on GDP. Meanwhile, shocks 
on both current government spending and capital government spending have small but 
significant positive effects on net taxes.   
Table 3.7  Estimation of the Effects of Disaggregated Government Spending   
 Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistic p-value 
  
     
 
 0.10 0.07 1.43 0.11 
  
     
 
 0.32 0.08 4.01 0.02 
  
     
 
 -0.06 0.06 0.91 0.36 
  
     
  0.03 0.01 3.40 0.01 
  
     
  0.01 0.01 1.70 0.08 
 
Figure 3.18 shows the impulse responses of GDP to both current government 
spending and capital government spending shocks and net tax shocks. The results are very 
similar, regardless of the identification methods. Current government spending has positive 
but weak effects on GDP. Capital government spending has positive and persistent effects on 
GDP. That is, capital government spending has stronger and longer-lasting effects on GDP 
than current government spending. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Burnside et al.(2004), Pappa (2009) 
and Favero and Giavazzi (2007). This strengthens the robustness of the estimation results 
arrived at using an extended VAR model in Section 3.5.1.2. 
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 Figure 3.18  The Response of GDP to Disaggregated Fiscal Policy Shocks 
 
 
 
3.6.2 The Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks Using Quarterly Data  
It is worthwhile looking at the effects of fiscal policy shocks using quarterly data, 
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quarterly data starting from 1994:1, and ending with 2010:4. The macroeconomic variables in 
terms of GDP, private consumption and investment are from the IFS of the IMF. The source 
for the fiscal variables is the MOSF in Korea. The quarterly data include cyclical movements 
that repeat every quarter. But if we had removed these cyclical seasonal movements from a 
series and extracted the underlying trend component of the series by seasonal adjustment, as 
the US Census Bureau’s X12-ARIMA procedure does, we might have lost some meaningful 
information. So, we use raw quarterly data instead of using a seasonally adjusted data set
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 The results are similar in the case of using a seasonally adjusted and linearly detrended data set. 
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3.6.2.1 The Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks on Output  
3.6.2.1.1 The Effects of Aggregated Fiscal Policy Shocks  
To estimate the effects of aggregated fiscal policy shocks on output, a three-variable 
baseline VAR model is used following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Figure 3.19 displays the 
results. The finding is that government spending shocks raise real GDP, but the impact is 
insignificant. As for the effects of net tax shocks, the graph depicts that output reacts 
negatively to a net tax increase, but the impact of this is also insignificant.   
Figure 3.19  The Response of GDP to Fiscal Policy Shocks (Baseline VAR, Quarterly Data) 
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investment decreases when faced with government spending shocks. The responses are in 
line with the previous evidence of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which shows positive 
consumption and negative investment responses to government spending shocks. In response 
to net tax shocks, both private consumption and private investment react insignificantly. The 
results are also consistent with Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Generally, the results are 
similar to those based on annual data, except for those that show the effects on private 
investment of government spending shocks. 
Figure 3.20  The Responses of GDP to Fiscal Policy Shocks (Extended VAR, Quarterly Data) 
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3.6.2.1.2 The Effects of Disaggregated Fiscal Policy Shocks 
The newly established VAR consists of six variables: current government spending, 
capital government spending, net taxes, GDP, private consumption, and private investment. 
Figure 3.21 shows the effects of disaggregated government spending shocks and net tax 
shocks on GDP and its components. Both private consumption and private investment react 
positively to current government spending shocks. Meanwhile, capital government spending 
has positive effects on private consumption and negative effects on private investment. The 
results are similar to those derived from annual data, except for the effects on private 
investment of capital government spending shocks. These slightly different results might be 
caused by the considerable difference of sample periods between annual data and quarterly 
data.   
Figure 3.21 The Responses of GDP to Disaggregated Fiscal Policy (Extended VAR, Quarterly Data) 
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3.6.2.2 The Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks on the Labour Market 
A five-variable VAR model is designed to see the responses of labour market 
variables to fiscal policy shocks. The five variables consist of three fixed set of variables - 
government spending, net taxes, GDP - and two extra labour market variables. To see the 
responses for the four labour market variables, two extra labour market variables are used in 
an extended VAR model. 
Figure 3.22 displays the responses of four labour market variables to fiscal policy 
shocks. First, government spending shocks increase private manufacturing employment, the 
real wage rate and total hours worked, and they decrease the unemployment rate significantly. 
However, the responses are small and short-lasting. Except for the response of total hours 
worked, the responses of other variables are the same as those obtained when using an annual 
data set.   
Second, net tax shocks decrease private manufacturing employment, the real wage 
rate, total hours worked, and the unemployment rate. The results are the same as those of 
estimation done with annual data.  
Based on the results above, we can cautiously suggest that the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks on the labour market are similar, irrespective of the data frequency and sample 
periods.   
In conclusion, the effect of fiscal policy shocks on economic activity are consistent 
with the new Keynesian model, which suggests that government spending leads to an 
increase in GDP, employment and the real wage.  
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Figure 3.22  The Responses of the Labour Market to Fiscal Policy (Extended VAR, Quarterly Data)  
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3.6.3 The Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks Considering Monetary Policy  
The effects of fiscal policy shocks depend on the economic situation and also on the 
character of other economic policy such as monetary policy. That is, the effects of fiscal 
policy shocks are changeable depending on the strength of the central bank’s offsetting 
reaction. If the central bank tries to offset any rise in real GDP, the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks are expected to be close to zero. But the results can be totally different if it is not 
possible, or there is no wish, to offset fiscal policy shocks with monetary policy. If we 
measure the effects of discretionary fiscal policy without considering monetary policy, these 
effects can be overestimated. In this context, following Ramey (2011), we measure the effects 
of fiscal policy by including the long-term interest rate as a control variable in our three-
variable SVAR model. The series of interest rates for the time period are secured from the 
OECD Economic Outlook. 
Figure 3.23 illustrates the results of estimation. When we take the interest rate into 
consideration, the response of GDP to government spending shocks becomes weak compared 
to that shown on the three-variable baseline SVAR model, but still remains positive. This 
pattern is probably due to the negative effects of high interest rates on GDP. That is, an 
increase in the interest rate may cause a reduction in investment, which finally undermines 
GDP growth. The interest rate responds positively to government spending shocks for two 
years and then turns into negative. This positive response of the interest rate is consistent with 
the theory. Figure 3.23 also shows that GDP responds negatively to net tax shocks, even if 
interest rate is added to the baseline SVAR model. The results are similar when we estimate 
the model by adding the interest rate into the extended VAR model (See Appendix 3.2). 
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Figure 3.23  The Response of Macroeconomic Variables to Fiscal Policy Shocks  
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the effects of fiscal policy shocks on output and on the 
labour market. By decomposing aggregated fiscal policy variables into disaggregated ones 
and estimating their effects on the economy, we have tried to provide policy-makers with 
much clearer information on the effects of economic policy decisions. Identification of fiscal 
policy shocks has been carried out by imposing restrictions on the VAR model using both 
Cholesky decomposition ordering and institutional information. Various robustness checks 
have also been carried out to ensure the results. 
Aggregated government spending shock has positive effects on GDP and its sub-
components (private consumption and private investment) regardless of the analysis 
methodology. The effects on GDP are significant. However, the effects on sub-components 
of GDP are relatively small and insignificant at the two standard error confidence bands.  
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A disaggregated government spending shock shows different effects on GDP and its 
sub-components. Current government spending has a negative effect on private consumption, 
while capital government spending has a positive effect on private consumption. From this, it 
can be inferred that capital government spending has more positive and long-lasting effects 
on the economy than current government spending
40
. Meanwhile, government employment 
spending, which accounts for about 50 per cent of current government spending, has positive 
effects on GDP and its components, but the positive effects are insignificant and short lasting.  
As regards the labour market, aggregated government spending shock has positive 
effects on this. Except for total hours worked, all the other labour market variables (i.e., 
manufacturing employment, the real wage rate and employment rate) respond positively to 
aggregated government spending shocks. The results are generally consistent with the view 
of the new Keynesian approach where government spending moves the labour supply and the 
demand curve outwards, raising the real wages. Meanwhile, capital government spending 
shock is likely to boost the labour market more effectively than other types of government 
spending shock. Government employment spending
41
 shock does not have positive effects on 
the labour market. In this context, it might be the right choice for the Korean government to 
have increased government spending focusing on capital formation in the wake of the 
financial crises. As for net tax shocks, the increase in net tax causes a significant fall in 
output and also shows negative effects on the labour market. 
 
                                                 
40
 This is in contrast to Devarajan et al. (1996) and Perotti (2004) that cast doubt on the superiority of 
government investment shocks over government consumption shocks in boosting the economy. 
41
  According to the definition of GFS, this is government wages and salaries which are included under current 
government spending.  
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4 Chapter 4. The Sustainability of Public Debt in Korea, the UK, and the US 
4.1 Introduction 
It may hit the spot if policy makers can discover ex ante whether the public debt of 
one’s country is sustainable or not, with great precision. Based on that accurate assessment, 
policy makers are able to establish a proper fiscal policy to address a potential crisis. The 
sustainability of public debt has once again become a current policy issue as the public debt-
to-GDP ratio in many countries has risen markedly due to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. A 
capacity to ensure the sustainability of public debt is one of the essential attributes of good 
macroeconomic policy, along with price stability, low unemployment and balanced economic 
growth (Wyplosz, 2011). Under some circumstances, using public debt is necessary and 
effective, even if public debt increases. But, if public debt is not sustainable, it can create 
serious problems. The accumulation of public debt with continuing budgetary deficits may 
trigger a need for higher long-term interest rates in order to issue additional sovereign bonds 
in the markets, which eventually places a heavy burden on a country. So, an efficient 
government may balance its budget inter-temporally by setting the current market value of 
public debt equal to the discounted sum of expected future surpluses, because there are 
limitations on its borrowing and it faces a present-value borrowing constraint (Quintos, 1995).  
Despite the increasing importance of the sustainability of public debt, it seems to be 
quite difficult to define the concept simply and to measure it directly without errors. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on defining the concept of sustainability of public debt and 
finding appropriate methods of calculating public debt sustainability in different countries. 
Sustainability of public debt is to be examined for three selected countries - Korea, the UK, 
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and the US - which have different economic conditions
42
. By applying various econometric 
methods, a possible measurement error can be removed or minimized and the robustness of 
the estimating results may be achieved.  
The sustainability of public debt in the three selected countries is examined using the 
following tests: (1) Johansen’s cointegration tests between the variables, such as the 
dependent variable and independent variables, (2) An Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
bounds tests to check the existence of cointegrating relationship between the variables, and (3) 
A modified Bohn’s tests with a fiscal reaction function43 to investigate whether the primary 
surplus responds positively to changes in public debt. This chapter will contribute on several 
points to developing the debates on the public debt sustainability. First, as well as Johansen 
tests, ARDL bounds tests are added to investigate a long-run relationship between the 
variables, which is essential to secure sustainable public debt. Second, considering the 
existence of non-stationary variables in the derived model, Bohn’s original  model of fiscal 
reaction function is modified using dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) methodology.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews previous 
literature. Section 4.3 explains several econometric methodologies. Section 4.4 describes the 
data, including some stylized facts about fiscal variables in each country. Section 4.5 presents 
empirical results. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.  
                                                 
42
 Countries are selected by taking into account the comparability, representativeness and feasibility of the data. 
Many previous studies on debt sustainability use US data. The US represents countries over $40,000 per capita 
GDP, the UK represents countries between $30,000 and $40,000 per capita GDP, and Korea represents 
countries under $30,000 per capita GDP. In particular, Korea also represents rising nations in terms of economic 
growth, and the UK represents advanced countries that suffer from a recent rapid rise in debt. Time series data 
for the three countries are more available and credible than for other countries.  
43
 Even if the debt-to-GDP ratio is declining, it is difficult to say that the decline is due to sensible policy design. 
So, it is worthwhile exploring how governments react to the accumulation of debt in difficult economic 
circumstance. The fiscal reaction function designed by Bohn measures whether governments do corrective 
actions when the debt-to-GDP ratio begins to rise (Bohn, 1998). This is the real value of Bohn’s tests. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Theoretical Approach 
4.2.1.1 The Definition of Public Debt and Government Deficit 
The definition of public debt varies a great deal according to its usage. Public debt in 
this chapter is defined as debt owed by the general government
44
. That is, we narrow down 
the definition of public debt to one of debt related to the general government
45
, which 
includes the state and local government. In this context, government debt is the same term as 
public debt.  
Public debt consists of internal debt which is owed to domestic lenders within the 
country and external debt which is owed to foreign lenders. Another classification of public 
debt can be done by the duration of repayment. In this point of view, public debt is not 
homogeneous. That is, the duration of short-term debt is usually one year or less, that of long-
term debt is more than ten years, and that of medium term debt falls between former two 
boundaries.  
On the other hand, the annual government deficit refers to the difference between 
total government revenue and expenditure in a single year, that is, it shows the increase in 
debt over a particular year. 
                                                 
44
 Central government, states or provincial governments, and municipal or local governments are included in the 
general government sector. 
45
 Within the general government sector, central government consists of the institutional unit(s) of central 
government plus those non-market non-profit institutions (NPIs) that are controlled by central government.  
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4.2.1.2 The Concept of the Sustainability of Public Debt 
As the sustainability of public debt is a forward-looking concept, it cannot be 
assessed with certainty (Wyplosz, 2011). It is worth defining the concept of the debt 
sustainability in order to discuss the sustainability of particular policies encountered in 
practice even though the definition might be imprecise.  
Since the sustainability of public debt was first suggested by Domar (1944), major 
theoretical developments of the concept have been advanced by Barro (1974, 1979), and 
Bohn (1991, 1995, 2007). Domar (1944) finds that the faster GDP grows, the lighter will be 
the burden of government debt. He argues that the sustainability of public debt should be 
secured by increasing GDP rather than merely by reducing public debt. Barro (1974, 1979) 
provides theoretical explanations of the determinants of government deficits by re-examining 
the Ricardian equivalence theorem. He shows that a government can temporarily increase a 
deficit in the short and medium term in order to smooth the tax rate over time and minimize 
the distortionary effects of taxation. He insists that as long as the government satisfies the 
IBC, the debt policy is sustainable regardless of the existence of a short-term deficit. Bohn 
(1991) argues that even if the interest rate on government bonds may be below the growth 
rate of the economy, fiscal policy is sustainable only when the government satisfies the IBC, 
which depends on the probability distribution of fiscal variables across states of nature.  
The IMF’s definition of a sustainable public debt is as follows: ‘a debt is sustainable 
if it satisfies the solvency condition without a major correction, given the costs of financing 
(IMF, 2002, p5)’. Debt solvency is accomplished when the present value of future primary 
  
100 
 
surpluses
46
 is expected to be large enough to reimburse the debt, the principal and the interest. 
That is, debt solvency is obtained when the current debt does not exceed the present 
discounted value of future revenue minus non-interest expenditure (Wyplosz, 2011). The 
IMF definition of sustainability asks two more difficult qualifications for solvency. The first 
qualification is ‘no major correction’ in the primary balance47. There should not be severe 
expenditure cuts or a large revenue increases. The other one is ‘no increase in the cost of 
financing’. Considering that financing costs are so changeable and unpredictable over time, 
the IMF definition of sustainability is vague (Wyplosz, 2011).  
So, it is reasonable to define the sustainability of public debt as a debt solvency 
condition, as mentioned above. That is, we can say that a fiscal policy satisfies the 
sustainability of public debt if the present value of future primary surpluses is expected to 
equal the initial debt. This result is based on the condition that the present discounted value of 
the future stock of debt is expected to converge to zero. Therefore, the sustainability of public 
debt rules out Ponzi schemes
48
 in which debt is continually rolled over (Trehan and Walsh, 
1988, p208). In this context, the concept of sustainability of public debt can be described in 
two steps as follows.  
                                                 
46
 ‘Primary surplus’ equals tax revenues net of non-interest government spending. 
47
 ‘Primary balance is government net borrowing or net lending excluding interest payment on consolidated 
government liabilities’. 
48
 ‘Ponzi schemes’ are namely cheating investment operations where returns of investment are paid to existing 
investors with the funds of new investors. Ponzi schemes usually lure new investors by offering higher returns 
than any other investment agency. Sometimes, Ponzi schemes encourage existing investors to ‘roll over’ 
promised payments by offering higher investment returns.   
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4.2.1.2.1 Single Period Government Budget Constraint  
The analysis of the public debt sustainability can be undertaken from the budget 
identity that links the deficit to non-interest government spending,   , tax revenues,   , and 
public debt,   . The flow of government budget constraint for a single period, t, can be 
written as follows.  
 (4.1)     + (     )           ,  
where    is the nominal non-interest government expenditure - that is, the primary 
government expenditure,    is the nominal government tax revenue (excluding seigniorage
49
), 
   is the gross stock of public debt at the end of period t, and    is the nominal interest rate of 
the public debt issued for the previous period. The equation (4.1) can be rewritten as (4.2): 
 (4.2)             + (     )     
where        is the primary deficit. The stock of public debt at time t (  ) is the 
sum of pre-existing public debt (    ) with its interest payment (      ) and primary budget 
deficit (      ).  
Public debt per se is not enough to measure the financial burden. Instead, the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio can be a proper indicator of the financial burden because GDP is the basis 
of redemption of a public debt.  
                                                 
49
  The reduction in the deficit by money-financing of the central bank is ruled out here because it will 
ultimately lead to high inflation that is not accepted by economic players. 
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Generally speaking, the form of ratio to GDP is much more useful to interpret the 
relationships between the variables, because an analysis based on ratio to GDP can 
effectively reflect the situation of growing economies. That is, by using GDP ratio data, 
growth trends can be eliminated. Moreover, it can address potential heteroscedasticity 
problems that may happen when level data are used (Bohn 1991, p344). In this context, we 
can rewrite (4.2) to (4.3) by dividing (4.2) by nominal GDP (=    ).    is the GDP deflator 
and     is the real GDP. 
(4.3)   
    
  
(      )
    
  
(     )    
    
  
(      )
    
 
(     )        
    
    
        
    
                  
(      )
    
 
(     )
(     )(     )
    
        
      
                  
(      )
    
 
(     )
(     )
    
        
 
where 1 +    equals (     )(     ),   = 
        
    
 is a real GDP growth rate, and  
   = 
        
    
 is an inflation rate.  
(4.3) can be simplified as following equation (4.4). 
(4.4)          + 
(     )
(     )
     
where      
  
    
  and      = 
(      )
    
  .  
It is worthwhile taking a brief look at debt dynamics. We can obtain a change of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio by subtracting       from both sides of (4.4). 
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(4.5)           + 
(      )
(     )
     
Based on equation (4.5), we can infer that the debt-to-GDP ratio increases when the 
primary deficit-to-GDP ratio (   ) increases or the real interest rate (  ) is larger than the 
GDP growth rate (  ). It is notable that if the GDP growth rate is large enough compared to 
the interest rate (     ), a government can operate a primary deficit without increasing the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. This means that considerable or frequent primary deficits might not 
directly result in an unsustainable fiscal policy (Bohn, 1998, p960). Moreover, in a situation 
that the real interest rate is larger than the GDP growth rate (     ), even the primary 
surplus (    < 0) cannot ensure the decrease or stability of the debt-to-GDP ratio (Bohn, 
1998, p960).  
As Bohn (1988) suggests, whenever the interest rate of one’s economy exceeds its 
growth rate, the debt accumulation process becomes seriously unstable. On the other hand, 
when the interest rate is lower than the growth rate, the debt-to-GDP ratio is stable and 
sustainable
50
. However, in the long run, the latter argument is unrealistic because growth rate 
is likely to be caught up by the real interest rate (Wyplosz, 2011, p18). In the short run, the 
lower interest rate than growth rate allows many countries to run down the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
 
                                                 
50
 The real interest rate can be lower than the growth rate while one’s economy grows rapidly (e.g., China over 
the last decade) or while one’s economy is experiencing accelerating inflation (Wyplosz, 2011, p18). 
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4.2.1.2.2 The Inter-Temporal Budget Constraint (IBC) 
The IBC can be created by rewriting equation (4.1) for the subsequent periods and 
solving the single period government budget constraint equation forward recursively.  
(4.6)      
         
∏ (      )
 
   
 
           ∏
    
(      )
 
    
The crucial element in the IBC is the second term of the right-hand side of the 
equation (4.6). When the limiting value of ∏
    
(      )
 
     equals zero (      ∏
    
(      )
 
     
  )51, the present value of the existing stock of nominal public debt (  ) will be the same as 
the present value of future primary surpluses. If we assume that the nominal interest rate (  ) 
is stationary, with a mean of i,    can be defined as follows. 
(4.7)         (     )     
Assumption (4.7) implies the following.   
                                 .    
The present value borrowing constraint becomes as follows. 
(4.8)      
         
(   ) 
 
    +       
    
(   ) 
 
                                                 
51
 If the limit term does not converge to zero, the government is bubble-financing its expenditures, financing for 
the old matured bonds by issuing new bonds to market (if the government can finance its deficit by issuing new 
sovereign bonds without any limit, it can be said that the government uses a sort of Ponzi scheme). 
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 A sustainable fiscal policy needs to ensure that the present value of the stock of 
public debt (      
    
(   ) 
) goes to zero as s goes to infinity, which means the absence of 
Ponzi games
52
. Under a no-Ponzi condition like this, the present value of future primary 
surpluses is equal to the current values of the stock of public debt (Afonso and Rault, 2010). 
As mentioned before, it is much more useful to express all the variables in terms of 
ratios of GDP. 
(4.9)   
    
 
(      )
    
 + 
(     )    
    
  
(      )
    
 +  
(     )
(     )
    
        
  
Assuming the real interest rate to be stationary, with a mean of r, and a constant real 
GDP growth rate of g, the budget constraint is given as follows. 
(4.10)     (
   
   
)               ] +       (
   
   
)       
where    = 
  
    
 ,    
  
    
    
  
    
   We assume r >  because if the long-run 
growth rate of GDP exceeded the long-run interest rate, sustainability of fiscal policy would 
not be an issue. When r >  , it is necessary to introduce a solvency condition. Equation (4.10) 
leads to (4.11.b) if the no-Ponzi condition (4.11.a) is satisfied. We can describe equation 
(4.11.a) as the ‘transversality condition (TC)’53. The TC implies that fiscal policy will be 
sustainable if the present value of future primary surpluses, as a ratio of GDP, matches the 
                                                 
52
 Under the condition of Ponzi games, a government can refinance its debt by continuously issuing new bonds 
without redeeming the debt. 
53
 West’s (1984) study of stock price volatility refers to a condition analogous to (4.11) as the ‘transversality 
condition’ (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986, p7). 
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inherited stock of public debt under the no-Ponzi condition. The TC and IBC can be written 
as follows. 
 (4.11.a)           (
   
   
)   ,   
 (4.11.b)     (
   
   
)               ].  
One implication of the IBC (4.11.b) is that all public debt should be returned by 
equal present value of future primary surpluses.  
In a similar fashion, we can say that successive primary budget deficits can be 
sustainable as long as the real growth rate   exceeds the real interest rate r (Domar, 1944). In 
a dynamically inefficient economy, where r <  , government can run a Ponzi-scheme 
permanently. For instance, if we impose    =      (i.e., the debt-to-GDP ratio is constant), 
equation (4.10) can be rearranged as follows. 
(4.12)      (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)               ] 
The left-hand side of (4.12) is negative, because      and [  (
   
   
)    . As a 
result, the right-hand side (i.e., the present value of primary surpluses) should be negative for 
the equality to hold. This means that a government can run permanent primary deficits with 
the debt-to-GDP ratio holding constant. 
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4.2.2 Empirical Studies 
In the empirical literature on public debt sustainability, there have basically been 
three main approaches. The first is based on the univariate time series properties of public 
debt: that is, applying unit root tests. The second is based on the long-run relationship 
between two variables (bivariate approach): that is, applying cointegration tests. Both 
approaches suggest possible ways to test the sustainability of public debt under the IBC. Unit 
root tests and cointegration tests provide useful tools for gaining insight into the long-run 
implications of public debt. Finally, the last approach is the estimation of fiscal reaction 
function, i.e., applying Bohn’s test.  
4.2.2.1 Unit Root Tests 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) undertake stationarity test of the primary budget surplus 
as a sufficient condition for sustainable fiscal policy. Starting with TC, they test the null 
hypothesis of no-Ponzi condition (NPC)            (
 
   
)     against the alternative of 
the existence of a speculative term [          (
 
   
)    . At first, they assume a constant 
interest rate and a constant violation of the IBC (i.e.,    > 0) using equation (4.13) as follows.  
(4.13)     (
 
   
)               ] + (
 
   
)      
where     
  
    
  (
 
   
)           ],     = 
  
    
 ,    
  
    
    
  
    
   
They argue that the null hypothesis of the IBC is valid if and only if   = 0. When 
  = 0,    will be stationary because (
 
   
)               ] follows a stationary process. 
This means that the debt policy is sustainable if   ~ I(0) and  (
 
   
)               ] ~ I(0). 
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These researchers adopt a non-stochastic constant positive ex post real interest rate 
(    =   > 0) in the model. Based on empirical unit root tests, they conclude that the US 
government’s deficit and the stock of debt are stationary. This result means that postwar US 
deficits are largely consistent with the idea that the government budget should be well-
balanced in present-value.  
But the credibility of the results for the stationarity of the deficit and the debt are 
very weak. They reject the hypothesis of a unit root only by adopting a 10 per cent 
significance level. If the 5 per cent significance level is selected, the unit root hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. And tests of long-run behaviour on the basis of 22 years of annual data 
may be expected to have low power (Trehan and Walsh, 1988). Moreover, their study has 
several limits because the research is restricted to non-stochastic fluctuations in real interest 
rates (which are assumed ex-post constant and positive) and does not consider the structural 
breaks in fiscal debt policy. 
Wilcox (1989) develops Hamilton and Flavin (1986)’s work, deriving the condition 
for sustainable fiscal policy which suggests that the discounted value of public debt should 
converge to zero in the infinite future. Contrary to many previous tests, he allows for 
stochastic variation in the real interest rate. He avoids assumptions about the expected real 
rate process by discounting government debt back to a fixed reference date (1960) using ex-
post real rates and examining the behaviour of the resulting discounted debts series. Unlike 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Wilcox (1989) argues that the IBC can be satisfied even if the 
undiscounted value of the debt is I(1) because the non-stationarity of the debt might just 
reflect the fact that deviations of the debt from the future primary surpluses might last into the 
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long run, but not permanently. He defines a sustainable fiscal policy as one that would lead 
the forecast trajectory for the discounted value of the debt to zero under the indefinite time 
horizon. Moreover, he finds a significant structural change in the US fiscal policy in 1974, 
and concludes that the IBC was satisfied before 1974, but not after 1974. The results are 
contrary to the conclusions of Hamiltion and Flavin (1986). 
4.2.2.2 Cointegration Tests 
After Wilcox (1989), many studies have used alternative tests based on a 
cointegrating relationship between government spending and revenue (See literature such as 
Trehan and Walsh, 1988, 1991; Hakkio and Rush, 1991; Quintos, 1995). This test is based on 
the following hypothesis. When total government spending (inclusive of interest payment on 
debts) and tax revenue all are I(1), if their linear combination is I(0), then the two variables 
are moving close each other, which satisfies the IBC condition.  
Before Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), most studies had examined the relationship 
between net-of-interest expenditure and revenue, that is, the behaviour of the net-of-interest 
deficit. However, Trehan and Walsh suggest a cointegration test between total government 
spending (inclusive of interest payment on debts) and tax revenue. The stationarity of the 
deficit inclusive of interest payments (             ) is both necessary and sufficient for 
the government’s inter-temporal budget balance. If expenditure including interest (   
     ) and tax revenue (   ) are cointegrated with a cointegrating vector (1 -1), then the IBC 
is satisfied. Through this test, they find that the US government’s budget is consistent with 
the IBC condition. After showing the limitation of Dickey-Fuller unit root tests on (   
        ), they adopt the Engle-Granger approach to test the inter-temporal budget balance 
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instead. According to the Engle-Granger tests, government expenditure including interest 
payments and government revenues are cointegrated because the residuals obtained from the 
regression of          on    is stationary. Moreover, by using Stock-Watson tests (1988), 
they provide stronger evidence that the US government’s budget is balanced over time.  
Hakkio and Rush (1991) extend Trehan and Walsh’s approach. Their model is 
similar to Trehan and Walsh’s (1991) model, because they assume that fiscal policy can be 
sustainable if total expenditure (              )
54
 and tax revenue (   ) are I(1) 
respectively , and the two series are cointegrated with the vector (1, -1). That is, if     and    
are cointegrated with vector (1, -1), the two series cannot drift too far apart because their 
difference (           ) is stationary. However, their study is different from previous 
ones on several points. First, unlike previous studies (e.g., Haug, 1991; Smith and Zin, 1991), 
they allow for fluctuations in the interest rate by using stochastic and stationary real interest 
rates (i.e.,                  (    
  ),    ). Of course, a stationarity restriction on the real 
interest rate is not a good approximation to the true data generating process. Second, as well 
as testing the cointegrating relationship between real government spending and revenue, they 
also examine normalized real government spending and revenue using real GNP and 
population to take a growing economy into consideration. Third, they impose an exogenous 
structural break. Based on this, they use several different sample periods to test the view that 
deficits have become a problem only in specific periods. For instance, they test for 
cointegrating relationships over the whole sample (from 1950:2 to 1988:4) and over sub-
                                                 
54
 Total expenditures (   ) denotes total government spending on goods and services, transfer payments, and 
interest payments on debt (         ).    is the value of government purchases of goods and services plus 
transfer payments. 
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samples that run from 1964:1 to 1988:4, and from 1976:3 to 1988:4, respectively. There is a 
cointegrating relationship between     and    using the whole sample, but no cointegration 
in the sub-samples. That is, Hakkio and Rush find that while the US government’s inter-
temporal budget is balanced for the period from 1950 to 1988, this is not the case for the 
sample periods beginning in 1964 and 1976. 
Quintos (1995) tries to refine and extend the concept of the sustainability condition. 
In addition to a strong sustainability condition, he introduces a ‘weak’ sustainability 
condition. Under the strong sustainability condition, which is suggested by Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988) and Hakkio and Rush (1991), the present value of 
expected future debts converges to zero at an infinite point because of the cointegrating 
relationship between revenue and with-interest expenditure. He shows that with the weaker 
condition, cointegration is not a necessary but a sufficient condition for a strict interpretation 
of deficit sustainability. The weak sustainability condition also allows the present value of 
expected future debts to converge to zero, but at a slower rate than the strong version does. 
According to the weak sustainability condition, when the total deficit (              
  ) process is integrated or even mildly explosive, which means    ~ I(2)  or     ~ I(1), the 
deficit will still be sustainable as long as the growth rate of debt does not exceed the growth 
rate of the economy. In summary, Quintos calls the    ~ I(2) case ‘weak’ sustainability, as 
distinct from ‘strong’ sustainability in the case of    ~ I(1). As for the structural break, it is 
notable that, unlike Hakkio and Rush and Wilcox, who choose structural breaks exogenously, 
Quintos picks the break endogenously using a sequential Chow tests with I(1) processes. He 
identifies the endogenous structural breaks at 1975:2 and 1980:4, and supports Hakkio and 
Rush and Wilcox’s conclusion that cointegration holds only for the pre-break period. 
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However, with the concept of a ‘weak’ sustainability condition, he also shows that the deficit 
can be sustainable even in the post-break period, although the strong deficit sustainability 
condition of Hakkio and Rush (1991) is not satisfied. He finds that the US fiscal debt is 
sustainable even though there is no cointegrating relationship between total government 
spending (         ) and tax revenues (  ) in the 1970s and 1980s. This conclusion is 
based on the fact that the debt processes satisfy ‘weak’ sustainability conditions even though 
they fail to meet ‘strong’ sustainability conditions. 
4.2.2.3 Bohn’s Fiscal Reaction Function Test 
Bohn (1991) casts doubt on the validity of the above mentioned traditional 
sustainability tests (e.g., unit root tests and cointegration tests). He points out that the 
traditional sustainability tests explicitly or implicitly assume that the rate of return on 
government debt is ‘on average’ above the rate of economic growth, which does not hold in 
the long-term period.   
He insists that a cointegration test between government expenditure (  ) and tax 
revenues (  ) does not provide proper information about sustainability.  Related to this, Bohn 
has no faith in the idea that the stationarity of debts or deficits by itself can provide decisive 
evidence of sustainability (Bohn, 1991, p20). He thinks that the judging a policy to be 
unsustainable on the basis of unit root and cointegration tests is inappropriate. In line with 
this thinking, Bohn (2007) argues that standard unit root and cointegration tests are not 
adequate methods to estimate the sustainability of public debt. He proves that if the relevant 
debt variable is stationary after any finite number of differencing operations (i.e., a debt 
series is integrated of order m (    ( )) for any finite m  ), then debt satisfies TC and 
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debt, tax revenues, and government spending satisfy the IBC. He also proves that the IBC is 
satisfied if tax revenues and with-interest government expenditure are difference-stationary of 
an arbitrary order, without any cointegration requirement (Bohn, 2007, p1838). He thinks all 
the cointegration conditions suggested by previous studies are sufficient for the TC but far 
stronger than necessary. In other words, he thinks a lack of cointegration between variables 
does not prevent a series’ consistency with the IBC (Bohn, 2007, p1843).   
Against this backdrop, Bohn derives a new fiscal reaction function and implements 
it to check the sustainability of government policy. This new methodology is based on the 
corrective reaction of adjusting a primary surplus in response to changes in debt. It is notable 
that his test model does not rely on a relationship between interest rates and growth rates. In 
other words, it does not require government bond returns or safe interest rates above the 
economic growth rates (Bohn, 1991, p9). The baseline fiscal reaction function is as follows.  
(4.14)                        ,  
where   (      ) is the primary surplus,     
  
    
 is tax revenues divided by 
GDP,    
  
    
 is non-interest government spending divided by GDP,    =
  
    
,    is a set  of 
other determinants of the primary surplus such as cyclical components of output and 
temporary government spending,    is an error term, and            . He uses the 
variables scaled by GDP to avoid potential distortion by the series’ severe heteroscedasticity 
levels.  
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As for the determinants(  ) of the non-debt components of a primary surplus, Bohn 
(1998) adopts Barro’s (1979, 1986) tax smoothing model55, extracting main two variables - 
the level of temporary government spending (GVAR) and a business cycle variable (YVAR) - 
as control variables. By doing this, he tries to address potential problems of omitted variables 
bias. Finally, equation (4.14) can be rewritten as the following equation (4.15). If the debt (  ) 
and the primary surplus (   ) are both non-stationary while    is stationary, a simple 
regression of    on    can be interpreted as a cointegrating regression without having to 
model the    process explicitly. On the other hand, if    and    do not have unit roots, a 
regression of    on    must be estimated with a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
methodology. 
(4.15)                                   , 
where          (     
 )   ⁄ ,       (       
 ⁄ )  (  
   ⁄ )    
  is normal real 
government spending,       
   is temporary real government spending,    is current real 
GDP,   
  is trend real GDP,        
 ⁄  is a temporary shortfall of output, and    is current 
real government spending.   
Based on this linear model, Bohn (1998) suggests that one can find direct evidence 
for corrective action
56
 by examining the response of the primary non-interest budget surplus 
                                                 
55
 Barro’s tax smoothing model considers an optimizing government that minimizes the cost of taxation by 
smoothing marginal tax rates over time. So, tax smoothing suggests that temporary government expenditure and 
temporary declines in GDP (e.g., in the tax base) trigger higher than normal budget deficits. (Bohn, 2005, p28) 
According to this theory, the tax rate should be designed on the basis of permanent non-interest government 
expenditure, while transitory expenditure fluctuations should be financed by issuing government bonds. That is, 
the key point of tax smoothing hypothesis is that tax rate should depend only on permanent government 
spending and on the level of public debt. (Bohn, 1998, p951)  
56
 Reducing non-interest government expenditure or raising tax revenues are good examples of corrective action. 
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(  ) to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio (  ). That is, he points out that a strictly positive and 
at least linear response of the primary surplus to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio turns out to 
be sufficient to guarantee a sustainable fiscal policy.  
Going beyond the linear model, Bohn (1998) also examines potential nonlinearities 
in the relationship between the primary surplus and the debt-to-GDP ratio. He tries to find out 
whether or not primary surplus responds more sensitively when the debt-to-GDP ratio are 
particularly high. By adding powers of   , such as (   ̅)
  and (   ̅) , and estimating the 
model, he finds that the marginal response of primary surplus to the changes in debt is 
significantly positive. Moreover, he shows that the marginal impact of debt-to-GDP ratio on 
the primary surplus increases as the debt-to-GDP ratio mounts. This means that the marginal 
response of primary surplus to debt is insignificant at low debt-to-GDP ratio, whereas it is 
significant at higher debt-to-GDP ratio. Since then, there have been several other studies 
supporting Bohn’s argument. For instance, Sarno (2001) confirms the non-linear feature of 
debts dynamic by using a smooth transition autoregressive model. Judging from the findings 
of Bohn (1998), standard univariate unit root tests may have little power to reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Bohn’s test also has its limitation in providing a reason for the continuous increase 
in public debt in the advanced countries from 1970 to the early 1990s (Persson and Tabellini, 
2000). Moreover, Bohn’s test does not reflect the fact that governments’ primary deficits are 
likely to be affected by changes in the political systems and the decision- making processes.  
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4.3 Methodology  
Three different methodologies are used to analyse the sustainability of fiscal policy. 
The first is unit root tests for the related variables.  The second is cointegration tests, which 
include Johansen’s cointegration tests and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds 
tests. The last is Bohn’s test of the fiscal sustainability. All the tests focus on fiscal stability 
from a long-run perspective.  
4.3.1 Unit Root Tests 
Firstly, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are 
undertaken on the levels and first differenced data
57
. All the variables are denoted both in real 
terms and in ratios to GDP. The ADF and PP tests examine the null hypothesis of a unit root 
against a trend-stationary alternative
58
. These unit root tests are criticized for their bias 
towards non-rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root in the presence of structural breaks 
and low power for near-integrated processes. The Zivot and Andrews (1992) tests are added, 
which allow for endogenously determined structural break in the series. This test determines 
the structural break by utilizing a grid search over a range of possible breakpoints and 
choosing the year when the unit root t-statistic is minimized (Lusinyan and Thornton, 2012).  
 
                                                 
57
 Many economic and financial time series show trending behaviour or non-stationary properties in the mean. 
Thus, it is necessary to remove trends from the data or to transform them to a stationary form prior to analysis. 
Unit root tests are performed to examine the non-stationary properties of macroeconomic and financial time 
series before making an empirical analysis. 
58
 The PP test is robust with regard to heteroscedasticity but ignores autocorrelation beyond a fine lag window. 
The ADF test includes an autoregressive correction but ignores heteroscedasticity (Bohn, 2005, p11).   
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4.3.2 Cointegration Tests  
4.3.2.1 Johansen’s Cointegration Tests 
Several cointegration tests can be used to see if there is cointegration between 
variables and to find the number of cointegrating relationships. Engle-Granger tests, which 
examine the stationarity of the residual of a regression, can be used to test the former issue. If 
the residuals do not have a unit root through these tests, it means that there is evidence 
supporting the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the variables, because the 
linear combination is stationary. Meanwhile, Johansen’s cointegration procedure can be used 
to find the number of cointegrating relationships between the variables.  
In a first step, Engle-Granger (1987) tests
59
 can be applied to see if there is a 
cointegrating relationship between total government expenditure-to-GDP ratios and total 
government revenue-to-GDP ratios. This method is based on the OLS residuals from the 
cointegrating regression for each country and examines the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration. If there is a cointegrating relationship, that implies the consistency of the fiscal 
policy with the IBC (Prohl et al., 2009)
 60
. In the second step, Johansen cointegration tests 
can be conducted to examine the number of cointegrating relationships. Johansen (1988) and 
Johansen and Juselius (1992) suggest the method with which to test the number of 
cointegrating relationships and to determine whether a group of non-stationary time series are 
cointegrated or not. Johansen’s cointegration tests are widely used in the case of multivariate 
                                                 
59
 Engle-Granger tests are based on the premise that if two processes which are integrated of order 1 are 
cointegrated, then the residuals obtained from regressing one on the other should be stationary. 
60
 Alternatively, we can test the cointegrating relationship between the ratios of government debt to GDP and 
primary surplus to GDP. The results are exactly the same. 
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analysis, because this test is an extended version of the Dickey-Fuller unit root test for the 
multivariate case. There are two types of cointegration rank test statistics - trace statistics and 
maximum eigenvalue statistics – which use procedures developed by Johansen.  
4.3.2.2 Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bounds Tests 
In the case of non-stationary variables, the standard OLS regression may cause a 
spurious regression problem
61
, which produces incorrect inferences. In this situation, it is 
necessary to check whether there is cointegrating relationship between the variables. Several 
cointegration tests exist; Engle and Granger’s (1987) two-step approach, Johansen’s (1991) 
VAR cointegration test approach, and Pesaran et al.’s (1996, 2001) Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds test approach. 
Among these tests, the ARDL bounds test approach has advantages over the 
Johansen’s approach and Engle and Granger’s approach. Engle and Granger’s two-step 
approach can be used only when all the variables are integrated of the same order, I(1). If the 
variables are mixed with different orders of integration – e.g. I(1) and I(0), the ARDL bounds 
tests should be used because it can examine the cointegrating relationship between variables 
that have different orders of integration. Unlike Engle and Granger’s approach, the ARDL 
bounds tests do not have any endogeneity problem. The ARDL bounds tests also have an 
advantage over Johansen’s cointegration tests. First, the ARDL bounds tests make it possible 
                                                 
61
 Spurious regressions can be called ‘nonsense correlations’. If two variables are trending over time, a 
regression of one on the other could have a high R
2
 even if the two are totally unrelated. Therefore, if standard 
regression techniques are applied to non-stationary data, the end result could be a regression that looks good 
against standard measures, but which is really valueless (Enders, 2010, p196).In regressions of independent 
random walk variables, the usual t-ratio does not possess a limiting distribution but diverges with increasing 
sample size, thus increasing the probability of incorrect inferences as the sample size increases (Phillips, 1986) 
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to estimate consistent coefficients for I(0) variables, even in small samples, which Johansen’s 
cointegration tests do not. In this context, Mah (1999) and Narayan (2005) support the 
robustness and superiority of the ARDL bounds tests against Johansen’s cointegration tests. 
However, there is a weakness in the ARDL bounds test in that it can only be used in a single 
equation and on the assumption of one cointegrating relationship. In this point, the ARDL 
bounds test is less general than Johansen’s multivariate cointegration test.  
Considering the advantages mentioned above, the ARDL bounds test is also applied 
in this chapter. The ARDL bounds test can be applied as follows. Above all, the following 
unrestricted error-correction model (UECM) has to be estimated to see if there is a long-run 
relationship among the variables (Pesaran et al., 2001).  
(4.16)                                                   
                            
 
            
 
              
 
               
 
               
where    are long-run coefficients;    is an intercept; t is a time trend;   ,   ,   , and 
   are short-run coefficients; and    is an error term. The appropriate number of lag lengths is 
selected by the AIC. 
To investigate the long-run relationship, following Pesaran et al. (2001), an F-test 
(Wald test) is used. Pesaran et al. (2001) provide an asymptotic critical values for two set 
bounds - the lower critical bound (LB) and the upper critical bound (UB). LB is based on the 
assumption that all the variables in the ARDL model are I(0), while UB is based on the 
assumption that all the variables in the ARDL model are I(1). If the F-statistic is higher than 
the UB critical value, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected, which means the 
existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables. On the other hand, if 
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the F-statistic is less than the LB critical value, the null hypothesis of no integration cannot 
be rejected. If the F-statistic is between the UB and LB critical values, it is difficult for the 
test to give a conclusion on the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the variables 
(Pesaran et al., 2001).  
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is                    and the 
alternative one is                               . If the null hypothesis is rejected, this 
may be interpreted as showing that there is a cointegrating relationship between the 
variables;   ,     ,      , and      . The equation (4.16) is an error-correction version of 
the ARDL model of order (m, n, o, p).  It is assumed that the numbers of lags of three 
independent variables are the same (i.e., n=o=p). If the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected, the long-run coefficients can be estimated by the following general ARDL model.  
(4.17)              
 
             
 
               
 
           
                               
 
               
 
4.3.3 Modified Bohn’s Test 
The main goal of Bohn’s test is to see if governments adjust their primary surplus to 
changes in government debt. The equation (4.18) of Bohn’s test is actually a fiscal reaction 
function, which is theoretically based on Barro’s (1979, 1986) tax smoothing hypothesis. 
Bohn’s test is based on the idea that fiscal policy is sustainable if governments undertake 
corrective action in response to changes in public debt by adjusting their primary surplus 
rather than taxation.  
 (4.18)                                                 , 
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where   (      ) is the primary surplus,     
  
    
 is tax revenues divided by 
GDP,    
  
    
 is non-interest government spending divided by GDP,   =
  
    
 is the ratio of 
   to GDP,    is the year-end market value of a government’s public debt, exclusive of 
holdings by central government and trust funds or the central bank (Barro, 1986, p203). The 
additional variables can be defined as         (     
 )   ⁄ ,       (       
 ⁄ )  
(  
   ⁄ )     is current real government spending,   
  is normal real government spending 
exclusive of interest payments, (     
 ) is temporary real government spending,    is 
current real GDP,   
  is trend real GDP, and (       
 ⁄ ) is a temporary shortfall in output.    
is an error term (Barro, 1986, pp198-199). Following Bohn (1998, 2005), control variables 
GVAR and YVAR
62
 are included in equation (4.18) as the non-debt determinants of the 
primary surplus. Long-term trend series, such as   
  and   
 , can be obtained by implementing 
a HP filter (Details of a HP filter is given in Section 4.5.4). 
It is necessary to explain more about       and       theoretically. For the 
variable      , debt-to-GDP ratio rises when there is an increase in temporary real 
government spending (    ). Empirically, temporary government spending occurs during 
wartime via the unusually high military build-up. It is negative rather than zero during 
peacetime (Barro 1986, p200). That is, the debt-to-GDP ratio tends to fall during peacetime, 
and rise sharply during the (infrequent) large wars. 
                                                 
62
 GVAR and YVAR indicate temporarily high government expenditure and recession in the economy, 
respectively. A primary surplus may respond to these factors (Bohn, 1998).  
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For the variable      , the debt-to-GDP ratio rises when real output (y) is below 
‘normal output (  )’ – that is to say, when y/     1.  However, if there are permanent shifts 
in the level of output, it is difficult to measure the temporary shortfall in output
63
.  
Bohn’s original test has its limit, in that equation (4.18) is estimated with a simple 
OLS methodology, regardless of the order of integration of each variable. If the variables are 
all stationary I(0), then OLS can be used to estimate the coefficients of  the equation (4.18). 
However, if some of the variables are non-stationary I(1)
64
, then OLS should not be used 
because of a spurious regression problem. To avoid a spurious regression problem, Stock and 
Watson’s (1993) DOLS is employed to estimate the equation. Stock and Watson DOLS 
model is specified as follows. 
(4.19)                                           
 
               
where q is the lead length, and r is the lag length.  
Leads and lags in a DOLS model play a role in making its stochastic error term 
orthogonal to all past innovations in the stochastic regressors. In this estimation, lead and lag 
length is specified automatically by using the AIC. 
 
                                                 
63
 To address this problem, Barro (1986) uses the unemployment rate,   , as a proxy variable  for the shortfall in 
output, (1     /  
 ). According to his argument, this variable will be useful even in the case of permanent shifts 
in the level of output. He assumes a stable relationship between the shortfalls in output and the deviation of the 
unemployment rate from a fixed natural rate of unemployment as follows. (1     /  
 ) =  (      
 ), where 
  
 is the natural unemployment rate. Then, he calculates YVAR.        (      
 )   (  
    ), where     is the 
unemployment rate for the total labour force (Barro 1986, p205).  
64
 In our model,    and    are non-stationary I(1), whereas      and       are stationary I(0) (See 4.5.4). 
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4.4 Data Description and Some Stylized Facts  
4.4.1 The Properties of the Data 
The sample countries used are Korea, the UK and the US. The main data sources are 
the IMF
65
, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
United Nations (UN), the World Bank, official government homepages and the central bank 
of each country
66
. Annual data are used. Taking into consideration the availability of the 
variables, the sample period begins in 1972 and ends in 2010. During this period, even 
though there may have been two structural breaks - the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2008, there is no reason to separate or exclude these structural 
breaks from the data period as a whole to avoid distortion.  
Both expansion and contraction periods are considered at the same time in order to 
examine the relationship between public debt and primary surplus. We use GDP scaled time 
series data to reflect the effects of economic growth on fiscal variables. The GDP scaled time 
series provides more credible information about the fiscal series than raw real data, because it 
is likely to eliminate growth trends and potentially possible heteroscedasticity (Bohn, 2005, 
p14). The GDP ratio data also may give a better view of a government’s fiscal policy than a 
real data by reducing standard deviation of the data (Bohn, 2005, p2).  
                                                 
65
 To be more precise, the main data sources are the IFS, GFS and WEO. 
66
 UK: the UK Debt Management Office, HM Treasury, National Savings & Investments, the Bank of England 
and the Office for National Statistics; US: the United States Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), the United States Treasury; Korea: the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), the Bank of 
Korea (BOK) 
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Government debt (  ) is the debt owed by a general government, which covers both 
central government
67
 and state or local government sectors. It is notable that government debt 
is a burden of the taxpayers indirectly because the government extracts its revenue from 
much of the population. Government revenue (  ) and non-interest government expenditure 
(  ) are taken from the unified budget (consolidated fiscal balance), which includes social 
security and other trust fund accounts as well as transfers (Bohn, 1998, p2). Total surplus 
(   ) refers to the difference between government revenue and expenditure in a single year, 
that is, the decrease of debt over a particular year. Primary surplus (  ) is the difference of 
government revenue and non-interest government expenditure. 
 
4.4.2 Some Stylized Facts about Fiscal Variables 
4.4.2.1 Korea 
Government expenditure in Korea has fluctuated showing a trend of gradual rise.     
It was between 17 per cent and 20 per cent until the Asia Financial Crisis in 1997; it then 
jumped up to 22.4 per cent in 1998 and has stayed above 21 per cent, reaching a peak of 25.3 
per cent in 2009 to boost a depressed economy. Government expenditure, despite the 
government’s involvement in the activities of the private sector, is relatively low compared to 
that of the UK and the US.  
                                                 
67
 Central government consists of the institutional unit(s) of a central government plus those non-market non-
profit institutions (NPIs) that are controlled by the central government.  
  
125 
 
As for government revenue, owing to the constant efforts of the Korean government 
to raise revenue, it has significantly increased from 13 per cent in the early 1970s to 25 per 
cent in 2007. But it has decreased since 2008 because of the sluggish economic growth. 
Korea recorded a consolidated budget deficit (total deficit) of 3.4 per cent of GDP in 
1998, the biggest annual fall since 1972. But, the consolidated budget balance became 
positive from 2000 and peaked at 3.6 per cent of GDP in 2002, remaining positive until 2009. 
Fluctuations in the consolidated budget balance have increased after the Asia Financial Crisis 
in 1997; but the trend of the primary surplus
68
 has been the same as that for the total surplus. 
Generally speaking, the consolidated budget balance
69
 of Korea is in a better condition than 
that of the other countries such as the UK and the US.  
Government debt has increased very fast during these periods, even though its ratio 
to GDP is still comparatively lower than that of other countries. It has increased from 19 per 
cent of GDP in the early 1970s to 34 per cent of GDP in 2010. The main factor responsible 
for the increase in government debt is a persistently rising government spending and the 
financial cost to public funds of restructuring the financial sector after the two financial crises 
in 1997 and 2008.  The abrupt rise in government debt is a burden to the Korean government 
because of the snowballing interest payment on debt, and this has eventually disturbed the 
country’s sound economic growth.  
                                                 
68
 Primary surplus equals total surplus minus interest payment by the government. 
69
 In relation to the consolidated budget balance in Korea, it has been argued that it is desirable to exclude the 
balance of the National Pension Fund (NPF) and net lending by the government to avoid any overstatement in 
assessing the financial soundness of the government. But, in this chapter, we do include NPF balance and net 
lending in the consolidated budget balance in order to compare the results of the three countries using the same 
standards. 
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Figure 4.1  The Main Fiscal Variables of Korea 
  
Real value GDP ratio 
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4.4.2.2 The United Kingdom 
Figure 4.2 shows the trends in the main fiscal variables during the last four decades 
in the UK. The main feature on the revenue side for the UK was the decline in revenue in the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s and in the 2008 global economic crisis, followed by a rapid 
increase thereafter. The UK government revenue and expenditure generally display a high 
degree of co-movement over the sample period. The series have not diverged markedly, so 
there seems to be no need to take account of possible structural breaks in fiscal policy.  
As for government expenditure, there are the three marked periods of increase in 
government spending – in the early 1980s, the late 1980s / early 1990s, and the 2008-2009. 
These periods of rapid growth mainly reflect downturns in the economy, which led both to a 
shrinking GDP and to higher cyclical government expenditure. In the early 1980s and in the 
second half of the 1990s, government spending declined as the economy strengthened; but it 
picked up again during the final years of the sample period because of a structural increase in 
social benefits and pension payments (Emmersen et al., 2003). During this period, there 
existed some degree of ‘displacement effect70’ as government spending did not decrease that 
much even after the economic downturns finished.  
After the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the UK government put up a massive 
amount of public funds to bail out the banking sector. Thereafter, government debt soared 
and fiscal soundness declined drastically.  
                                                 
70
 Peacock and Wiseman (1961, 1979) mention this concept pointing out that government spending is likely to 
fall back after wars but to level much higher than those of pre-war. They suggest that wars loose constraints on 
politicians’ preference to raise taxes as much as they want and offer excuse of higher level of non-military 
spending once war finishes. Change of expectations of public regarding government’s provision also contributes 
to the increase in non-military spending after war. 
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Figure 4.2  The Main Fiscal Variables of the United Kingdom 
   
 Real value (billions, £)  GDP ratio (%) 
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4.4.2.3 The United States 
 
Historically, the US government debt has increased during wars and recessions, but 
the debt has subsequently decreased. In recent decades however, as can be seen in Figure 4.3, 
large budget deficits and increases in debt have occurred at the same time, which has led to 
concern about the long-term sustainability of the federal government’s fiscal policies.  
The US government revenue has not changed significantly. On the other hand, the 
government expenditure has fluctuated much more than revenue.  In particular, there were 
substantial increases during the early 1980s, the early 1990s and from 2008 to 2010 (the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008). As a result, government debt shows a huge 
increase from 40 per cent of GDP in the early 1970s to 100 per cent of GDP in 2010. 
Government debt rose rapidly in the 1980s. The main reason of this was that Ronald 
Reagan’s economic policies lowered tax rates and increased military spending, while in 
Congress the Democrats blocked attempts to reverse spending on social programmes. In 
1990s, due to the decreased military spending and increased taxes (in 1990, 1993 and 1997) 
of the Clinton administration, government debt fell dramatically. However, in the early 2000s, 
debt picked up again due to the Bush tax cuts and increased military spending caused by wars 
pursued in the Middle-East. It is notable that there was a huge increase in government 
spending in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, which led to a considerable 
increase in government debt.  
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Figure 4.3  The Main Fiscal Variables of the United States  
 
Real value (billions. $) GDP ratio (%) 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1 Unit Root Tests 
The necessary first step in testing whether government debt is sustainable is to 
determine the time series properties of the fiscal variables. To this end, two sets of unit root 
tests - ADF and PP tests - are used to examine the stationarity properties of the levels and 
first differences of the fiscal variables. Moreover, Zivot-Andrews (1992) tests for the unit 
root null hypothesis with a structural break are applied as well. Zivot-Andrews tests assume 
the null hypothesis as I(1) with one endogenously determined structural break. The fiscal 
variables consist of government expenditure net-of-interest (  ) , total government 
expenditure including interest payment (   +      ), government revenue (  ), total surplus 
(   ), primary surplus (  ) and government debt (  ). 
The results of different unit root tests for the variables of the three countries are 
shown in Table 4.1. Narrowing down the analysis of the variables scaled by GDP, all the tests 
are done for levels, first differences and second differences.  
The results can be summarized in four points. First, the series of government debt-
to-GDP in all three countries are I(1), with the results being the same when a structural break 
is considered using Zivot-Andrews test. That is, the series in levels behave like unit roots 
processes, while for the first differences the unit root can be strongly rejected in all three 
countries. Second, the series of total government expenditure, non-interest expenditure and 
government revenue are I(1)  both in levels and when considered as a ratio to GDP in all 
three countries. Third, as for the surplus (or deficit), the results are similar between countries. 
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Both total surplus and primary surplus follow I(1) in all three countries. Fourth, in the case of 
      and      , unit root tests reject the null hypotheses of the unit root. So they are all in 
a stationary process, I(0).  
Table 4.1  The Results of Unit Root Tests of Fiscal Variables  
A. Korea 
Test 
Variables 
Levels 1
st
 difference 2
nd
 
difference 
(ADF) 
Zivot-
Andrews 
Verdict 
ADF PP ADF PP 
Government Debt (  ) -0.23 (1) 0.11 -4.30
***(0) -4.30*** -8.90*** -2.02 I(1) :All 
Total expenditure  
(   +      ) 
-1.81 (0) -1.81 -6.83***(0) -6.83*** -6.60*** -4.28 I(1) :All 
Non-interest expenditure 
(  ) 
-1.97 (0) -1.97 -7.11***(0) -7.07*** -6.82*** -4.68* I(1) :All 
Total revenue (  ) -0.77 (0) -0.74 -5.81
***(0) -5.81*** -4.71*** -3.51 I(1) :All 
Total surplus (   ) -2.63(1) -3.38
** -5.13***(3) -13.03*** -6.03*** -4.64* 
I(0) :PP, 
ZA 
I(1):ADF  
Primary surplus (  ) -2.93
*(0) -2.94* -5.76***(1) -13.88*** -5.94** -4.64* I(1) :All 
Temporary government 
expenditure (     ) 
-3.91***(3) -5.11*** -3.81***(3) -8.34*** -4.47*** -4.86** I(0) :All 
Cyclical shortfall in GDP 
(     ) 
-3.47**(0) -3.29** -5.55***(1) -11.79** -6.48*** -5.33** I(0) :All 
Notes: 1. *, ** and *** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
            2.  The numbers in parentheses are the number of lagged differences based on AIC (maximum number of lag=12). 
            3.  The null hypothesis of the ADF and PP tests is I(1). The null hypothesis of the Zivot-Andrews test (maximum  
            lag=12) is I(1) and alternative is I(0) with one structural break. All series are tested with an intercept. 
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B. United Kingdom 
Test 
Variables 
Levels 1
st
 difference 2
nd
 
difference 
(ADF) 
Zivot-
Andrews 
Verdict 
ADF PP ADF PP 
Government Debt (  ) -1.20 (1) -1.23 -3.30
**(0) -3.30** -8.72*** -1.24 I(1) :All 
Total expenditure  
(   +      ) 
-3.25**(1) -1.73 -3.98***(0) -3.68*** -6.62*** -4.88* 
I(0) :ADF, 
ZA 
I(1) :PP 
Non-interest expenditure 
(  ) 
-2.91*(1) -1.55 -5.08***(1) -3.56** -5.54*** -5.02** 
I(0) :ADF, 
ZA 
I(1) :PP 
Total revenue (  ) -2.93
*(0) -2.73* -6.59***(0) -7.29*** -5.13*** -4.12 I(1) :All 
Total surplus (   ) -2.47 (1) -1.93 -4.77
***(0) -4.77*** -8.04*** -3.00 I(1) :All 
Primary surplus (  ) -2.19 (1) -1.58 -4.84
***(0) -4.85*** -7.62*** -3.22 I(1) :All 
Temporary government 
expenditure (     ) 
-4.09***(1) -3.29** -4.89***(0) -4.76*** -8.82*** -4.61* I(0) :All 
Cyclical shortfall in GDP 
(     ) 
-4.29***(1) -2.64** -5.41***(1) -5.23*** -6.82*** -4.75* I(0) :All 
 
C. United States 
Test 
Variables 
Levels 1
st
 difference 2
nd
 
difference 
(ADF) 
Zivot-
Andrews 
Verdict 
ADF PP ADF PP 
Government Debt (  ) -0.43 (1) 0.47 -2.53*(0) -2.43* -5.35*** -4.56 I(1) :All 
Total expenditure  
(   +      ) 
-1.57 (1) -0.81 -4.35***(0) -4.35*** -7.69*** -1.73 I(1) :All 
Non-interest expenditure 
(  ) 
-1.07 (1) 0.34 -4.43***(0) -4.42*** -6.28*** -0.78 I(1) :All 
Total revenue (  ) -3.29**(1) -2.26 -5.11***(0) -5.45*** -5.04*** -4.69 
I(0) : ADF 
I(1) : PP, 
ZA 
Total surplus (   ) -2.40 (1) -1.26 -4.34***(1) -4.09*** -5.47*** -4.19 I(1) :All 
Primary surplus (  ) -2.15 (1) -1.06 -4.40***(1) -4.22*** -4.91*** -4.00 I(1) :All 
Temporary government 
expenditure (     ) 
-3.50**(1) -3.12** -5.04***(1) -7.72*** -8.53*** -4.54* I(0) :All 
Cyclical shortfall in GDP 
(     ) 
-4.49***(1) -2.68** -5.02***(0) -5.81*** -7.30*** -4.70* I(0) :All 
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4.5.2 Johansen’s Cointegration Tests 
 
Even if each individual fiscal variable is non-stationary, a model imposing a 
stationary linear combination between variables can produce meaningful results. Therefore, 
the long-run properties of time series, which implies the presence of a cointegrating 
relationship should be tested. As all the GDP ratio series are at most I(1), Johansen’s 
cointegration tests can be applied.  
It should be noted that a standard cointegration-based sustainability test regards the 
absence of a cointegrating relationship between total government revenue (      ) and total 
government expenditure (       +      ) as evidence of a lack of long-run sustainability of 
fiscal policy
71
.  
Firstly, before using Johansen’s cointegration tests, the test for the VAR lag 
structure needs to be carried out in order to know the appropriate number of lag lengths in the 
model. By employing a multivariate information criterion, the lag order of each country can 
be determined. Table 4.2 shows the results of the test for the lag structure. According to the 
results, the lag order of Korea is one, while that of the UK and the US is two. 
 
 
                                                 
71
 Alternatively, we can test the cointegrating relationship between government debt (  ) and primary surplus 
(   ). The results of estimation are exactly the same. 
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Table 4.2  The Results of the Test for VAR Lag Order Selection  
 
A. Korea 
Lag 
With constant No constant 
AIC SIC HQ  AIC SIC HQ 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
8.547379 
5.799805* 
5.907529 
5.904419 
5.934119 
 8.636256 
6.066436* 
6.351915 
6.526558 
6.734013 
8.578059 
  5.891846* 
 6.060931 
 6.119181 
 6.210242 
n.a. 
  5.774295* 
 5.949602 
 5.984060 
 6.083411 
n.a. 
  5.952049* 
 6.305110 
 6.517322 
 6.794427 
n.a. 
  5.835656* 
 6.072323 
 6.168142 
 6.328854 
 
B. United Kingdom 
Lag 
With constant No constant 
AIC SIC HQ  AIC SIC HQ 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
-9.845794 
-11.49908 
 -11.66892* 
-11.59690 
-11.54280 
-9.756917 
 -11.23245* 
-11.22453 
-10.97476 
-10.74290 
-9.815113 
-11.40704 
 -11.51551* 
-11.38213 
-11.26667 
n.a. 
-11.41828 
 -11.59765* 
-11.50889 
-11.45037 
n.a. 
-11.24053 
 -11.24214* 
-10.97563 
-10.73935 
n.a. 
-11.35692 
 -11.47493* 
-11.32481 
-11.20492 
 
C. United States 
Lag 
With constant No constant 
AIC SIC HQ  AIC SIC HQ 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
-11.49770 
-13.16711 
 -13.34472* 
-13.15375 
-13.14173 
-11.40883 
 -12.90048* 
-12.90034 
-12.53161 
-12.34184 
-11.46702 
-13.07507 
 -13.19132* 
-12.93898 
-12.86561 
n.a. 
-13.08583 
 -13.20551* 
-12.98889 
-12.97114 
n.a. 
-12.90807* 
-12.85000 
-12.45563 
-12.26013 
n.a. 
-13.02447 
 -13.08279* 
-12.80481 
-12.72570 
Notes : 1. * indicates lag order selected by this criterion 
             2.  AIC: Akaike information, SIC: Schwarz information, HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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According to the Johansen approach, the trace test (       )  and maximum 
eigenvalue test (    ) are used to determine the number of cointegrating vectors (r).  The 
two test statistics are as follows.  
       (4.20)             ( )          (   ̂ 
 
     ) 
  and  
        (4.21)           (     )         (   ̂   ) 
where T is the number of observations, r is the number of cointegrating vectors 
under the null hypothesis and   ̂  is the estimated value for the ith ordered eigenvalue from 
the long-run coefficient matrix (Enders, 2010, pp 391-392). 
‘       is a joint test where the null is that the number of cointegrating vectors is less 
than or equal to r against an unspecified or general alternative that there are more than r’ 
(Enders, 2010, p 391). The test statistic       has a sequence of null alternative hypotheses as 
follows. 
        vs         
        vs         
        
          vs         
 
‘     conducts separate tests on each eigenvalue, and has as its null hypothesis that 
the number of cointegrating vectors is r against an alternative of r+1’ (Enders, 2010, p 391). 
Therefore, the      test statistic has null and alternative hypotheses as follows. 
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        vs         
        vs         
        
          vs         
 
It is necessary to keep increasing the value of r until we no longer reject the null 
hypothesis. The results appear below in Table 4.3. Five models are implemented based on 
whether an intercept and a trend are included or not. But the results across the five types of 
model and the type of test (‘trace’ or ‘max’ statistics) are the same, indicating one 
cointegrating vector. 
Table 4.3  Selected Numbers of Cointegrating Relations (10 per cent significance level)   
Data Trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type 
No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
A. Korea 
Trace 1 1 1 0 2 
Max-Eig 0 0 1 1 2 
B. United Kingdom 
Trace 0 0 0 0 2 
Max-Eig 0 0 0 0 0 
C. United States 
Trace 0 1 1 0 2 
Max-Eig 0 1 1 0 0 
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The results of the cointegration tests after selecting ‘intercept (no trend) in 
cointegrating equation and test VAR and 1 or 2 lag length’ are displayed in Table 4.4. 
As for Korea, if we look at the first row under the headers, the trace test statistic of 
14.55 narrowly exceeds 13.43 - the critical value of the 10 per cent significance level; and so 
the null of no cointegrating vector is rejected. In the next row, the null of at most 1 
cointegrating vector cannot be rejected because the trace statistic 2.09 is smaller than 2.71 - 
the critical value of the 10 per cent significance level. In conclusion, it can be argued that 
there is one cointegrating vector in the VAR model of Korea, and the maximum eigenvalue 
test confirms this result. For the US, as for Korea, the trace test and maximum eigenvalue test 
indicate one cointegrating vector at the 10 per cent significance level. However, in the case of 
the UK, the results are a little bit different. Examining the trace test, as can be seen in the first 
row after the headers, the test statistic of 13.42 is marginally smaller than 13.43 - the critical 
value of the 10 per cent significance level, and so the null of no cointegrating vectors cannot 
be rejected. As a consequence, it can be suggested that there is no cointegrating vector in the 
VAR model for the UK. The maximum eigenvalue test has the same result as that of the trace 
test - no cointegrating vector.   
Based on unit root tests and Johansen’s cointegration tests, we reach a conclusion 
that the Korean and US governments’ inter-temporal budgets are balanced. That is, the fiscal 
policies of two countries are sustainable for the period from 1972 to 2010, while the UK 
government’s inter-temporal budget is not balanced, which means that the fiscal policy of the 
UK is not sustainable.  
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Table 4.4  The Results of Johansen’s Cointegration Tests  
A. Korea 
Trace test(      ) 
Number of 
cointegrating vector  
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 10 % Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.285835 14.55325 13.42878 0.0689 
At most 1 0.055114 2.097549 2.705545 0.1475 
Maximum eigenvalue test(    ) 
Number of 
cointegrating vector 
Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
10 % Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.285835 12.45570 12.29652 0.0947 
At most 1 0.055114 2.097549 2.705545 0.1475 
B. United Kingdom 
Trace test(      ) 
Number of 
cointegrating vector  
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 10 % Critical Value Prob.** 
None  0.280865 13.42560 13.42878 0.1001 
At most 1 0.042306 1.556185 2.705545 0.2122 
Maximum eigenvalue test(    ) 
Number of 
cointegrating vector 
Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
10 % Critical Value Prob.** 
None 0.280865 11.86942 12.29652 0.1156 
At most 1 0.042306 1.556185 2.705545 0.2122 
C. United States 
Trace test(      ) 
Number of 
cointegrating vector  
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 10 % Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.323970 16.82835 13.42878 0.0313 
At most 1 0.061340 2.342179 2.705545 0.1259 
Maximum eigenvalue test(    ) 
Number of 
cointegrating vector 
Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
10 % Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.323970 14.48617 12.29652 0.0461 
At most 1 0.061340 2.342179 2.705545 0.1259 
Notes: 1. * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 10% significance level 
            2. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
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As a model of economic and financial time series which have a cointegrating 
relationship, the vector error-correction model (VECM)
72
 can be used to look at both the 
long-run and the short-run effects between total government revenue and total government 
expenditure. The VECM is a two-step method. In the first step, the cointegrating relationship 
between total government revenue and total government expenditure is estimated by using 
the OLS method for each individual country. The estimated parameters of variables explain 
the long-run relationship of cointegrating equations. In a second step, the lagged residual 
from the regression in the first step is added as one part of the explanatory variable to 
estimate the VECM model. That is, the VECM is estimated by using the residual from the 
OLS as an error-correction term implied by the cointegrating equation. Thus, the VECM with 
two lags (VECM(2)) of two variables     and     is as follows.  
(4.22)           =         
 
              
 
                 +    
                      =         
 
              
 
                 +   , 
where      (               ) is the error-correction term,    is the coefficient 
of the cointegrating vector given by       c        +   .      and     are the error terms. The 
coefficients,   and   , show the effect of the error-correction term. The coefficients, 
           and            indicate the short-run response of the lagged variables. 
                                                 
72
 The advantage of the VECM is that the super-consistency of the estimator of cointegrating relationship allows 
the application of the standard tests on significance of the coefficients in the regression because all variables in 
the model are stationary (Toda and Phillips, 1993). The trade-off of this approach is that only the existence and 
the sign of the long-run effect can be examined, and its magnitude cannot be interpreted (Canning and Pedroni, 
1999). 
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The results of the estimated coefficients from the VECM(2) of equation (4.22) are  
presented in Table 4.5. For Korea, the lagged differences in total government revenue (∆trt-i, 
i=1,2) or total government expenditure (∆tet-i, i=1,2) do not have significant individual effects on 
changes in current total government revenue (∆trt) or in total government expenditure (∆tet) 
in the short run. In other words, the coefficients of the cross-lagged terms are not significant 
in affecting changes in current government revenue and expenditure. On the other hand, the 
error-correction term (ECt-1)
73
 plays a significant role in raising current total government 
expenditure (∆tet). The sign of the speed-of-adjustment coefficient of ECt-1 is in accordance 
with convergence toward a long-run equilibrium. It can be interpreted that a temporary 
increase in total government revenue in the previous period, causing disequilibrium in the 
long-run relationship between government revenue and expenditure, is likely to lead to the 
augmentation of total government expenditure in the current period. On the other hand, the 
disequilibrium of the long-run fiscal balance, caused by the total government expenditure 
shock in the previous period, does not have any significant effect on changes in current total 
government revenue.  
The US case can be interpreted in the same way. An increase in total government 
expenditure for the previous term (∆tet-1) has a significantly negative effect on changes in 
current total government revenue (∆trt). Likewise, the ECt-1 has a significantly negative effect 
on changes in current total government revenue (∆trt). It can be interpreted that if there is a 
temporary increase in total government revenue in the previous term, short-run adjustments 
may be made by decreasing current total government revenue. The ECt-1 also has a positive 
effect on changes in current total government expenditure, but the effect is not significant.  
                                                 
73
 ECt-1 is the lagged value of the residual from the equilibrium relationship using trt as a dependent variable. 
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Table 4.5  Estimates of the VECM(2)  
A. Korea 
1) Cointegrating relationship 
             
***
          
           [-6.58837] 
   EC(Error-Correction Term)                        
2) VECM(2) estimates 
Dependent variables 
Regressors 
          
Constant 
0.002491 
[ 1.50025] 
-0.000389 
[-0.15772] 
       
0.046029 
[ 0.24343] 
0.064978 
[0.23164] 
       
-0.063889 
[-0.33944] 
0.165975 
[0.59440] 
       
0.016528 
[ 0.11694] 
 0.378149
* 
[1.80336] 
       
0.110590 
[ 0.88672] 
0.076331 
[0.41254] 
      
-0.001965 
[-0.02223] 
     0.401178
*** 
[3.05910] 
B. United States 
1) Cointegrating relationship 
                      
          [-0.07413] 
   EC(Error-Correction Term)                           
2) VECM(2) estimates 
Dependent variables 
Regressors 
          
Constant 
 0.000374 
[ 0.29344] 
 0.001726 
[ 0.99577] 
       
 0.299299 
 [1.66606] 
 0.001178 
 [ 0.00483] 
       
 0.112568 
 [0.63245] 
 0.053128 
[0.21962] 
       
 0.239921 
[1.43471] 
  0.334063 
[1.73672] 
       
0.089131  
[0.47488] 
-0.094241  
[-0.36944] 
      
   -0.505705
*** 
[-3.33569] 
0.024952 
[0.11662] 
Notes: 1. The corrected t-statistics are in [  ] (Enders, 2010, p427). 
            2. The sample spans are from 1972 to 2010. 
            3. ***, ** and * denote that the estimated coefficients are significant at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
           4.       denotes estimated cointegrating residuals from cointegrating vector. 
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4.5.3 ARDL Bounds Tests  
The results of the bounds tests are shown in Table 4.6. Four variables (  ,     , 
     , and      ) are considered in this bounds tests. After selecting the appropriate 
number of lag lengths using the AIC, F-statistics are calculated to investigate a cointegrating 
relationship.  
Table 4.6  F-statistics for Testing the Existence of a Cointegrating Relationship  
Country 
         Symmetric lags 
No. of variables
1
 
1 2 Cointegration 
Korea 4 
5.47** 
<6.93 > 
3.67 
<7.59> 
Yes 
UK 4 
1.82 
<7.99> 
0.65 
<8.04> 
No 
US 4 
5.00** 
<11.41> 
3.90 
<11.48> 
Yes 
Notes: 1. The critical value bounds are given in Pesaran et al.(2001), Table CI(v) (unrestricted intercept and unrestricted  
                time trend). The lower bound(FL) and upper bound(FU) are as follows: 
significance  10%  5%  1% 
No. of variables  FL FU  FL FU  FL FU 
3  3.47 4.45  4.01 5.07  5.17 6.36 
4  3.03 4.06  3.47 4.57  4.40 5.72 
5  2.75 3.79  3.12 4.25  3.93 5.23 
 
               If F > FU, the null of no-cointegration between 4 variables can be rejected; if F < FL, the null cannot be rejected,  
               and thus no long-run relationship exists. If FL<F<FU, the inference is inconclusive. 
            2.  ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
            3. The numbers in < > are the value of AIC, the shaded columns denote the best specification suggested by AIC. 
 
In the case of Korea, the AIC suggests that the most appropriate number of lags is 1 
and the calculated F-statistics exceed the upper critical bound at the 5 per cent significance 
level. So the null hypothesis of no-cointegration can be rejected at the 5 per cent significance 
level. In conclusion, we can conclude that there is a cointegrating relationship between the 
variables for Korea.  
  
144 
 
By applying the same steps to the other two countries, the UK and the US, we can 
select the most appropriate number of lag lengths and check whether or not a cointegrating 
relationship exists. The AIC suggests that the models with 1 lag are the most appropriate in 
both countries. According to the results of the bounds tests, there is no cointegrating 
relationship between the variables in the case of the UK, while a cointegrating relationship 
exists in the case of the US.  
Now that there is a cointegrating relationship between the variables in Korea and the 
US, we can estimate the long-run coefficients of the two countries based on the following 
ARDL model specifications. 
(4.23)               
 
             
 
               
 
           
                                 
 
               
The estimation results of long-run coefficients are shown in Table 4.7. The signs of 
the coefficients are mostly in line with economic theory
74
. The primary surplus responds 
positively to government debt in a significant manner in both Korea and the US, although the 
effects are not that large. For instance, the results illustrate that a 1 per cent increase in debt 
induces an increase in the primary surplus of around 0.1 per cent in Korea and 0.01 per cent 
in the US. And, the coefficients on temporary government spending are significantly negative 
at the 5 per cent or 10 per cent significance level in the two countries. The coefficients for 
temporary output shortfall are also negative but insignificant.  
 
                                                 
74
 According to Barro’s tax smoothing theory, temporary government expenditures (GVAR) and temporary 
declines in GDP (YVAR) may cause higher budget deficits, which means a decrease in primary surplus. 
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Table 4.7  Estimates of the Long-run Coefficients in ARDL Model 
                                               
Dependent variable:     Coefficient 
Explanatory variables   Korea US 
Intercept(β0) -2.56** (0.02) -2.52(0.30) 
Government debts(β1) 0.10***(0.00) 0.01**(0.03) 
Temporary government spending(β2) -2.05**(0.02) -4.40*(0.08) 
Temporary output shortfall(β3 ) -0.83(0.55) -3.24(0.19) 
F-statistics 
47.09*** 
(0.00) 
115.49*** 
(0.00) 
Adjusted  R2 0.918 0.965 
 Notes: : 1. The Newey and West HAC covariance is used. The Newey and West corrected t-statistics are used. 
              2. ***,** and * denote the rejection of the null  at 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively, and the numbers in (  ) 
               are p-values. 
              3. The number of lags in the ARDL specification is determined by the AIC. ARDL order of (1,0,0,0) for the two 
               countries 
 
The goodness of fit of the ARDL model is relatively high. To confirm this, four 
diagnostic tests are implemented: (1) the Ramsey regression specification error test (RESET) 
for general misspecification, (2) the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation in residuals, 
(3) the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in residuals, and (4) Jarque-Berra test for 
normality of residuals. The ARDL model passes all diagnostic tests for misspecification error 
with incorrect functional form, serial correlation in residuals, heteroscedasticity in residuals, 
and normality in residuals.  
Table 4.8  The Results of Diagnostic Tests  
Diagnostic test Statistics Korea US 
Model 
specification 
F-statistic of  
Ramsey RESET test 
F(1,27)=2.12 
(0.140) 
F(1,27)=0.003 
(0.954) 
Normality 
  -statistic of  
Jarque-Berra test 
  ( )=4.112 
(0.124) 
  ( )=3.457 
(0.178) 
Serial correlation 
F-statistic of  
Breusch-Godfrey test 
F(1,27)=0.274 
(0.605) 
F(1,27)=0.133 
(0.178) 
Heteroscedasticity 
F-statistic of  
Breusch-Pagan test 
F(9,28)=0.657 
(0.739) 
F(9,28)=0.494 
(0.865) 
    Note: The numbers in (  ) are p-values.  
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4.5.4 Modified Bohn’s Test 
As the variables that we consider are mixed with different orders of integration, e.g. 
I(0) and I(1)
75, modified Bohn’s DOLS models are used to estimate the effects of government 
debt on primary deficit. 
(4.24)                                             
 
               
where          (     
 )   ⁄ ,       (       
 ⁄ )  (  
   ⁄ )     is current real 
government spending,   
  is normal real government spending,      
  is temporary real 
                                                 
75
 The summary of the unit root tests is shown in the table below. As for    and   , ADF and PP tests cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, meaning that    and    are in non-stationary process I(1). On the 
contrary, in the case of       and      , ADF and PP tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, so they 
are in stationary process I(0).  
The table shows the properties of the variables in modified Bohn’s tests. 
 
Variable Definition Measurement ADF/PP Unit root tests 
   
Primary surplus scaled by 
GDP 
      
   is real government revenue 
divided by real GDP;    is real non-
interest government expenditure 
divided by real GDP 
KOR I(1) 
UK I(1) 
US I(1) 
   
Government debt scaled by 
GDP 
    ⁄  
   is real government debt;    is 
real GDP 
KOR I(1) 
UK I(1) 
US I(1) 
      
Degree of temporary real 
government expenditure 
(     
 )   ⁄  
   and   
  are real government 
expenditure and its trend, 
respectively 
KOR I(0) 
UK I(0) 
US I(0) 
      
Degree of cyclical shortfall 
in GDP 
(       
 ⁄ )  (  
   ⁄ ) 
   and   
  are real GDP and its trend, 
respectively 
KOR I(0) 
UK I(0) 
US I(0) 
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government spending,    is current real GDP,   
  is trend real GDP, and        
 ⁄  is a 
temporary shortfall in output (Barro, 1979, pp948-949; Barro, 1986, pp198-199; Bohn, 1998, 
p951; Bohn, 2005, p28).  
Temporary or cyclical components are obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter. The HP filter is a smoothing method that is widely used to obtain a smooth estimate of 
the long-term trend component of a series – e.g.,   
  and   
 . It extracts a non-linear trend 
component from the time series by minimizing a weighted average of the variability in the 
trend and its deviations from actual data. For example, the HP filter chooses   
  to minimize 
following function L. 
(4.25)  L   (     
 )        ((    
    
 )  (  
      
 ))       , 
where    and   
  are the logs of observations and trend respectively, T is the number 
of observations and   is a smoothing parameter. The larger  , the smoother the trend and 
finally the bigger the cyclical component
76
.  
The results of DOLS estimation on the equation (4.24) are presented in Table 4.9.  
Estimation results show that the primary surplus of Korea and the US responds positively to 
                                                 
76
 The HP filter, which decomposes a given time series into a trend component and a cyclical component by 
solving an optimization problem, is used to detrend the data although it is often remarked that the HP filter may 
generate spurious cyclical patterns. The figure 100 is applied for   in the equation (6.2) because annual data are 
used in this chapter (see Hodrick and Prescott (1980) and Fisher et al. (1996)). When the variables are I(1), 
detrending with a linear time trend may be better than detrending with the HP filter. But, for time series data 
which have the characteristics of dynamic growth patterns, detrending with the HP filter may be more useful 
than detrending with a linear time trend because the HP filter is not a fixed filter but a flexible detrend method.  
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an increase in government debt. The results imply that the fiscal policies of Korea and the US 
have historically been sustainable. On the other hand, there is no significant positive response 
of the primary surplus to the increase in government debt in the UK. This result implies that 
the UK fiscal policy has not been sustainable. 
 
Table 4.9  DOLS Estimation Results: Determinants of the Primary Surplus  
⃰ Dependent variable: primary surplus     
Coefficient 
Country            R
2 
Adj.R
2 
S.E. D.W 
Korea 
-0.9127 0.0838
*
 -0.9012
**
 -0.3287 
0.74 0.65 0.76 1.83 
(-1.02) (1.76) (-2.37) (-0.53) 
UK 
0.0089 0.0022 -0.0056 -0.0134 
0.88 0.81 0.01 1.79 
(0.26) (0.03) (-0.97) (-1.11) 
US 
-0.0082 0.0359
**
 -0.0036 -0.0119 
0.94 0.86 0.01 1.80 
(-1.03) (2.71) (-0.45) (-1.54) 
Notes: 1. The Newey and West corrected t-statistics are noted in (  ). The DOLS standard errors (S.E.) are corrected for 
            heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using the Newey and West (1987) procedure.  
            2. ***, ** and * denote that the estimated coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
            3. Leads and lags are fixed with 1 respectively. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
For most countries, the total amount of government debt has risen sharply in the 
recent years after the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. This renewed interest in the problem of 
the public debt, i.e., the sustainability of public debt, all over the world. This chapter has 
estimated the fiscal sustainability for Korea, the UK and the US using three different 
methodologies. 
According to standard Johansen’s cointegration tests, there is a cointegrating 
relationship between total government spending and total government revenue in Korea and 
the US, but not in the UK
77
. It is notable that the long-run relationship between government 
spending and revenue in the US is very weak compared to that in Korea. The ARDL bounds 
tests give similar results to those of the Johansen’s cointegration tests. And, finally, modified 
Bohn’s tests with DOLS, which estimate the response of primary surplus to government debt, 
also support the conclusions of the other methodologies. 
Based on the results of the various estimations above, we can suggest that policy 
makers should seriously consider consolidated budget planning, i.e., tightening up austerity 
measures in the face of sharp and speedy rises in government debt in order to secure the 
sustainability of public debt. However, it is equally important for a government to be careful 
when implementing austerity measures at a time of economic crisis, because sudden austerity 
measures can lead to a domestic demand reduction and further economic decline.  
                                                 
77
 We have to think why the situation in the UK is different. There can be several possibilities: (1) Capital 
government spending in the UK was not very productive, (2) The sources of revenue via taxation were not 
adequate, (3) Public debt was channelled into government consumption rather than government investment, (4) 
Financial crisis affected the UK labour market more adversely than in Korea and the US. 
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CHAPTER 5   
THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION 
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5 Chapter 5. The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation 
5.1 Introduction 
The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 caused large government deficits and, as a result, 
led to an increase in government debt. The main reason for the large government deficits is 
the mix of a slowing economy and an increasing need for government spending. Many 
counties are currently trying to find a balance between existing current crisis policy and 
returning to a sustainable path for public finances without hurting an economic recovery 
based on the hypothesis of expansionary fiscal consolidation. Not all countries have accepted 
this expansionary fiscal consolidation hypothesis, and there is still a strong disagreement over 
the necessity for harsh and abrupt austerity measures. 
Historically, there have been consistent efforts to provide the evidence in favour of 
expansionary fiscal consolidation. The possibility of ‘non-Keynesian expansionary effects’ 
resulting from restrictive fiscal policies was first raised by Barro (1974), who introduced the 
concept of ‘Ricardian Equivalence’. This issue drew much more interest after Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990) provided evidence of expansionary fiscal consolidation in Denmark (1983-86) 
and Ireland (1987-89). Since then, many studies have followed in an attempt to find robust 
evidence of the transmission channels of expansionary fiscal consolidation
78
. 
Several examples have recently been observed that trigger doubt about the 
appropriateness of fiscal consolidation and raise suspicion that these activities undermine the 
economy. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the UK began a fiscal 
austerity programme to reduce its deficit from the third quarter of 2010. Conservative 
politicians in the UK argued that fiscal consolidation could enhance growth, and they 
                                                 
78
 Sutherland (1997) insisted that fiscal expansion had a contractionary effect on economy in time of higher debt. 
  
152 
 
underlined the need to avoid rising debt costs as a key motivation in undertaking this. 
However, in the last quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012, the UK suffered from the 
first double dip recession for 37 years. The economy of the UK unexpectedly slumped by 0.2 
per cent of GDP in the first quarter of 2012. This followed a fall of 0.3 per cent in the final 
quarter of 2011. The situation of Ireland was similar to the UK. Ireland began reducing its 
fiscal deficit at the end of 2008. At the time, the IMF projected a 1 per cent growth for 2009. 
But the result was, on the contrary, a 10 per cent decline (Weisbrot and Montecino, 2010). 
In this context, this chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature that has 
investigated the conditions under which fiscal consolidation is effective in enhancing 
economic growth and reducing public debt (or fiscal deficit). After that, empirical estimations 
are undertaken to see if fiscal consolidation can boost a depressed economy, and to find out 
the main determinants of successful fiscal consolidation using the newest econometric 
methods and panel datasets from 18 OECD countries. To do this, a policy action-based 
approach, proposed by the IMF (Leigh et al., 2011), is used to determine fiscal consolidation 
episodes in the OECD countries, and the concept of debt-to-GDP ratio is used to identify 
successful fiscal consolidation episodes. Moreover, unlike many previous studies, this 
chapter addresses the endogeneity problem in the analysis by using a dynamic panel GMM 
model. In this way, the chapter will contribute to uncovering the effects of fiscal 
consolidation on economic growth and the main factors of successful fiscal consolidation.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effects of fiscal consolidation. Section 5.3 describes identification 
of fiscal consolidation and model specification. Section 5.4 explains the data. Section 5.5 
shows empirical results. Section 5.6 tests the robustness of the results. Section 5.7 concludes.  
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5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Theoretical Approach 
Keynesian analysis insists that fiscal consolidation inevitably leads to a contraction 
of aggregate demand and reduces GDP. It disagrees with the non-Keynesian effects that fiscal 
austerity is necessary to overcome the economic crisis even if the world’s economy remains 
deeply depressed. Keynesians argue that if an economy performs well following government 
spending cuts, this is actually because the business cycle has picked up, or because 
government monetary policy happens to be more expansionary at the time.  
Over the last two decades, there has been dissent from the Keynesian view described 
above. Using the cases of Denmark and Ireland, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)
79
 suggest that 
fiscal consolidation can be expansionary, because the GDP of these two countries increased 
after fiscal tightening. Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2012) also show that spending-based 
reduction has caused a smaller recession, and sometime caused growth in GDP.  
There are several channels to explain how fiscal consolidation may not be 
recessionary or may sometimes be expansionary. Theoretically, expansionary effects of fiscal 
consolidation can go through both the demand and the supply side (Figure 5.1).  
On the demand side, the first channel is a rapid reduction of interest rates. If a 
government reduces its spending and gets the deficit down, people worry less about the future 
and apply a lower risk premium to the country’s government debt. That is, a reduction in the 
interest rate can stimulate aggregate demand through both private investment (McDermott 
                                                 
79
 Blanchard (1990) extrapolates from Giavazzi and Pagano’s analysis to suggest that fiscal consolidation can 
raise investment, aggregate demand and output. 
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and Wescott, 1996) and private consumption, due to the positive wealth effect in the private 
sector (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). Moreover, a decrease in interest rates can lead to an 
increase in the values of stocks and bonds, which increases consumers’ financial wealth, and 
triggers a private consumption and investment boom. In this way, fiscal adjustment may have 
a significant effect on interest rates.  
The second channel is taxes. If a government cuts its spending, it gives a signal that 
future taxes will be lower, or at least not be raised. This expectation of future tax reduction 
encourages people to increase private consumption and investment (Bertola and Drazen, 1993; 
Prammer, 2004).  
The third channel is depreciation. If the currency of a country is depreciated after a 
fiscal consolidation, it can improve the country’s competitiveness in exports. There is one 
good example of this phenomenon. When Ireland implemented fiscal consolidation in the 
1980s, depreciation followed the fiscal consolidation, which increased the country’s 
competitiveness and resulted in expansionary fiscal consolidation.  
Another possibility concerns the effect on investment confidence. There may be a 
significant effect on investment confidence when a country announces a credible fiscal 
consolidation
80
. In countries like the US, an increase in confidence among investors is very 
important for reducing the negative effects of fiscal consolidation. If a government reduces 
uncertainty about the future course of fiscal policy by demonstrating a clear fiscal and 
regulatory stance, investors will be less hesitant about putting their money in the country 
(Alesina and Ardagna, 2010, 2012).  
                                                 
80
 This is opposite to crowing-out effect which decreases private investment caused by expansionary 
government spending. 
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On the supply side, the expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation work through the 
labour market. The first part of this channel is the private-sector wage-depressing effect. That 
is, if public sector wages are kept down, this may be followed by wage-depressing 
agreements in the private sector of the economy. This can be called a spill-over effect in the 
labour market. Finally, this may increase competitiveness, which improves productivity
81
.  
The second channel is taxes. If a government cuts its spending, it signals tax 
reductions in the future. This expectation of future tax reductions will encourage employees 
to increase their labour supply. If employees expect higher taxes in the future, this will 
discourage them from increasing the labour supply, which can be said to be a distortionary 
cost of taxation (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010, 2012). In the same vein, an increase in taxation 
on workers will cause those in the private sector to demand the higher pre-tax real wage. This 
will mean higher labour unit costs for firms and a considerable loss of competitiveness.  
Despite the various types of theoretical support for expansionary fiscal consolidation, 
as mentioned above, opposition to the idea of non-Keynesian expansionary effects has been 
growing ever since many countries tried to implement austerity measures early in 2010. For 
instance, Krugman (2010) strongly disagrees with the idea that fiscal consolidation can have 
expansionary effects and argues that non-Keynesian effects are not based on either evidence 
or careful analysis, but on sheer speculation by the policy elite. In Ireland’s case in the 1980s, 
in which government spending cuts and tax increases were followed by economic growth, he 
points out that Ireland’s expansionary fiscal consolidation was not caused by the positive 
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 This argument is controversial because there is a big literature going in the opposite direction. For example, 
Blundell et al. (2013) show that the UK’s productivity went down when the real wages were reduced during the 
recession of 2007-11.   
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effects of fiscal consolidation but by the drastic move from a trade deficit to a trade surplus. 
Moreover, he insists that because of the austerity measures, Europe’s troubled debtor nations 
are suffering greater economic decline than necessary and confidence is plunging instead of 
rising. Baker (2010) also insists that fiscal consolidation measures in the US will result in 
further contraction of the US economy. He argues that while a budget deficit can basically 
lead to higher interest rates, investment reduction and lower productivity growth when the 
economy is in a normal condition, it can boost the recessionary economy in both the short 
term and the long term when the economy is facing a serious downturn. Recently, Cottarelli 
and Keen (2012) have pointed out that the speed of fiscal consolidation is very important if 
these are to be effective. They argue that insufficient fiscal consolidation could lead to a loss 
of market confidence and a fiscal crisis, potentially killing growth; but too rapid and too 
much fiscal consolidation will hurt growth directly. 
As Briotti (2005) mentioned, several assumptions are to be satisfied in the 
theoretical rationale for non-Keynesian expansionary fiscal consolidation. First, taxes must be 
distortionary. The larger the tax increases, the larger the distortionary effects are. Under this 
assumption, the delay of fiscal consolidation may cause great negative effects on future 
output via consumers’ expectation of future tax-rise. On the other hand, timely fiscal 
consolidation can improve consumers’ expectations of future income. Second, consumers 
should be forward-looking, with rational expectations, and not liquidity-constrained; thus 
higher expected income can be translated into higher effective demand. Third, fiscal 
consolidation should win people’s credibility. Finally, in order to create optimism, fiscal 
consolidation must be unexpected (Briotti, 2005, p12). However, we have to point out that 
even if the existence of non-Keynesian expansionary fiscal consolidation effects is 
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theoretically reasonable, it is very hard to get empirical evidence because of the difficulty in 
building credibility with people. In real life, for a government to gain credibility from the 
people seems to be a particularly slow and difficult process. So, it is necessary to take a look 
at the results of empirical study, checking the relevance of these theoretical assumptions.  
Figure 5.1  Several Channels of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation (non-Keynesian View) 
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5.2.2 Empirical Approach  
5.2.2.1 Identifying Fiscal Consolidation Episodes 
For empirical studies, it is important to identify a correct notion of fiscal 
consolidation. Due to the arbitrariness of the different definitions of fiscal consolidation 
episodes, the periods identified as exceptional fiscal consolidation episodes differ from study 
to study. As the definition and measurement of fiscal consolidation episodes are not fully 
agreed on, there is no universally accepted methodology for identifying them. Two 
approaches can be considered in respect of the identification of fiscal consolidation episodes: 
one is the CAPB-based approach; the other is the policy action-based approach. The CAPB is 
calculated by taking the actual primary balance (non-interest government revenue minus non-
interest government spending) and subtracting the estimated effect of business cycle 
fluctuations on the fiscal accounts (IMF, 2010). There are three approaches: (1) Hodrick–
Prescott filter, (2) Elasticity approach by OECD and IMF, and (3) Blanchard Fiscal Impulse 
(BFI) (See Appendix 5.1 for details). 
5.2.2.1.1 The CAPB-Based Approach 
This approach identifies fiscal consolidation episodes by using a statistical concept, 
which is the change in the CAPB. The CAPB removes two components from the government 
budget balance: (i) interest payments, which cannot be directly influenced in the short run by 
government fiscal policies; and (ii) any component of the government balance that is the 
result of a business cycle (McDermott and Wescott, 1996). It is based on the assumption that 
changes in the CAPB reflect policymakers’ decisions to adjust taxes and government 
spending. But, depending on the criteria of size and persistence, there are many differences in 
the ways that change in the CAPB is defined as a fiscal consolidation episode. (See Table 5.1) 
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Alesina and Perotti (1995) define a fiscal consolidation episode as a year in which 
the BFI
82
 is between -1.5 and -0.5 per cent of GDP, or a year in which the BFI is less than      
-1.5 per cent of GDP. Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) define fiscal consolidation episodes as 
years of cumulative changes in the CAPB that are at least 5, 4, 3 per cent points of GDP in, 
respectively, 4, 3 or 2 years, or 3 per cent points in one year. Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and 
Giudice et al. (2007) define a fiscal consolidation episode as a year in which the CAPB 
changes by at least 2 per cent points of GDP, or a period of two consecutive years in which 
the CAPB changes by at least 1.5 per cent points of GDP per year in both years. Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010) define a fiscal consolidation episode as a year in which the CAPB improves 
by at least 1.5 per cent points of GDP.  
Alesina and Ardagna (2012) consider only multi-year consolidations, allowing for 
the possibility of small reductions in the primary deficit in a particular year, provided that this 
happens in a period of consecutive years when there are sizable improvements in the fiscal 
balance. They define a fiscal consolidation episode as a two-year period when the CAPB 
improves in each year and the cumulative improvement is at least 2 per cent points of GDP, 
or a three or more year period when the CAPB improves in each year and the cumulative 
improvement is at least 3 per cent points of GDP. They use such multi-year criteria to include 
adjustments that are small but prolonged over several years. On the other hand, Afonso (2010) 
defines a fiscal episode as a period when either the change in the CAPB is at least one and a 
half times the standard deviation in one year; or when such a change is at least one standard 
deviation on average in the last two years.  
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 Blanchard Fiscal Impulse (BFI) = (gt(Ut-1) - tt) - (gt-1 - tt-1), where gt  is non-interest government spending of 
GDP, tt is total revenue of GDP, and Ut  is the unemployment rate. (The detail can be seen in Appendix 5.1) 
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5.2.2.1.2 Policy Action-Based Approach 
Pointing out the shortcomings
83
 of the CAPB-based approach, the IMF (2010) and 
Leigh et al. (2011) first use an alternative measure - a policy action-based approach - in 
identifying fiscal consolidation episodes. This alternative measure is on the same lines as the 
narrative method pioneered by Romer and Romer (1989) and developed by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1998), Ramey (2011), and Romer and Romer (2010) for monetary policy and fiscal 
policy. This approach identifies fiscal consolidation episodes directly from historical 
documents such as budget reports, presidential speeches, central bank reports and 
congressional reports, focusing on fiscal policy changes (tax rises or government spending 
cuts) motivated by the desire to reduce the primary deficit. Fiscal consolidations motivated 
primarily by restraining domestic demand are not included in the episodes.  
The IMF (2010) and Leigh et al. (2011) define fiscal consolidation episodes for a 
sample of 17 OECD countries over the period 1980-2009. Such fiscal consolidation actions 
are the response to past decisions and economic conditions rather than to prospective 
situations (Leigh et al., 2011, p4). As a result, they are likely to be uncorrelated with other 
developments influencing ouput in the short term, so are good for measuring the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation. Recently, there has been an effort to refine the 
CAPB-based approach by reflecting the advantage of the narrative method. For instance, 
Yang et al. (2012) identify fiscal consolidation episodes by incorporating size, persistence 
and country-specific heterogeneity into the CAPB-based approach. 
                                                 
83
 It can be affected, for instance, by asset price cycles (Girouard and Price, 2004) and one-off measures (Von 
Hagen and Wolff, 2006) that do not reflect the policy stance. It is also affected by the measurement issues 
surrounding the output gap (Guichard et al., 2007). 
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5.2.2.2 Defining Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation Episodes 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) define a period as an expansionary fiscal consolidation 
episode when the average growth rate of GDP in the period of the fiscal consolidation, and in 
the two years after, is greater than the average value of the same variable in all episodes of 
fiscal consolidation. Giudice et al. (2007) define a fiscal consolidation as expansionary if the 
average real GDP growth in each fiscal consolidation year, and in the two years after, is 
greater than the average real GDP growth in the two years before. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) 
define a fiscal adjustment episode as expansionary if the average growth rate of real GDP in 
the first period of the episode, and in the two years after, is greater than the value of seventy 
fifth percentile of the same variable empirical density in all episodes of fiscal adjustments. 
Alesina and Ardagna (2012) define a fiscal adjustment period as expansionary if real GDP 
growth during the adjustment period is higher than the average growth the country 
experienced in the two years before.  
It should be noted that Alesina and Ardagna (2009, 2012) consider multi-year fiscal 
adjustments as a ‘single’ episode because the time span chosen for the definition of 
‘expansionary’ and ‘success’ starts from the first year of the episode. On the other hand, 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Alesina et al. (1998) consider each year of a multi-year 
period as a single episode. This implies that, in a multi-year episode, some years can be 
expansionary, but some may be contractionary; some can be successful, but some may be 
unsuccessful. However, there is no reason to prefer one choice over the other because, despite 
the different methods of selecting expansionary and successful consolidation episodes that 
last more than one consecutive year, the results are similar in both cases (Molnar, 2012). 
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5.2.2.3 Defining Successful Fiscal Consolidation Episodes 
Generally, successful fiscal consolidation has been defined based on the degree of 
the reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, even if this is a rather arbitrary definition.  
Alesina and Perotti (1995) define a fiscal consolidation as successful if it brings 
down the debt-to-GDP ratio by at least five per cent points of GDP in the three years 
following the consolidation episode. Alesina and Ardagna (1998) define a period of fiscal 
consolidation as successful if (1) in the three years after the fiscal consolidation period, the 
ratio of the cyclically adjusted primary deficit to GDP is on average at least two per cent 
points below its value in the last year of the fiscal consolidation period, or (2) three years 
after the last year of the consolidation period, the debt-to-GDP ratio is five per cent points of 
GDP below its level in the last year of the consolidation period.  
Ardagna (2004) also defines a successful fiscal consolidation as an episode in which 
the CAPB improves, and two years after, the debt-to-GDP ratio is at least three per cent 
points lower than in the year of fiscal consolidation. This definition is the same as that of 
McDermott and Wescott (1996). Alesina and Ardagna (2010) define a period of fiscal 
consolidation as successful if the cumulative reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio three years 
after the beginning of the period is greater than 4.5 per cent points (the value of the twenty 
fifth percentile of the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio empirical density in all episodes of 
fiscal consolidation). Again, Alesina and Ardagna (2012) define a period of fiscal 
consolidation as being successful if the debt-to-GDP ratio two years after the end of the fiscal 
consolidation is lower than the debt-to-GDP ratio in the last year of the fiscal consolidation.   
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Table 5.1  Definitions to Identify Fiscal Consolidation Episodes  
  Fiscal Consolidation Successful Fiscal Consolidation Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation 
  Definition1 Definition2 Definition1 Definition2 Definition 
 
Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) 
A year when BFI is -1.5 
~ - 0.5% of GDP 
A year when BFI is less 
than -1.5% of GDP 
Three years after the 
Debt/GDP is at least 5%p 
lower than that of 
consolidation period 
  
 
Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1996) 
A period of a year when 
∑∆CAPB is at least 5,4, 
3%p of GDP in 4,3,2 
years, respectively 
A year when ∆CAPB is 
at least 3%p of GDP in 
one year  
   
 
McDermott 
and Wescott 
(1996) 
A year when ∆CAPB is 
at least 1.5%p over two 
years, and does not 
decrease in either of the 
two years 
 
A year when debt / 
potential GDP two years 
after is 3%p lower than 
the end of the fiscal 
consolidation 
  
CAPB - 
based  Alesina and 
Perotti (1997) 
A year when BFI is less 
than -1.5% of GDP 
A period of two 
consecutive years when 
BFI is at least  -1.25% 
of GDP per year 
Three years after the 
CAPB/GDP is at least 
2%p lower than that of 
consolidation period 
Three years after the 
Debt/GDP is at least 
5%p lower than that of 
consolidation period 
 
 
Alesian and 
Ardagna 
(1998) 
A year when ∆CAPB is 
at least 2%p of GDP in 
one year 
A period of two 
consecutive years when 
∆CAPB is at least 
1.5%p of GDP per year 
Three years after the 
CAPB/GDP is at least 
2%p lower than that of 
consolidation period 
Three years after the 
Debt/GDP is at least 
5%p lower than that of 
consolidation period 
The average growth rate of GDP in 
fiscal consolidation and in the two 
years after is greater than the average 
of the same variable in all 
consolidation episodes  
 
Alesina et al. 
(2002) 
A year when ∆CAPB is 
at least 2%p of GDP in 
one year 
A period of two 
consecutive years when 
∆CAPB is at least 
1.25%p of GDP per 
year 
  
The average real GDP growth in each 
consolidation year and in the two years 
after is greater than the average real 
GDP growth in the two years before 
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  Fiscal Consolidation Successful Fiscal Consolidation Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation 
 
Ardagna 
(2004) 
  
A year when the CAPB 
improves, and the 
Debt/GDP two years after 
is at least 3%p lower than 
that of fiscal consolidation 
  
 
Guichard et al. 
(2007) 
A year when ∆CAPB is 
at least 1%p of potential 
GDP in one year 
A period of two 
consecutive years when 
∆CAPB is at least 1%p 
of potential GDP with 
each more than 0.5%p 
   
 
Giudice et al. 
(2007) 
A year when ∆CAPB is 
at least 2%p of GDP in 
one year 
A period of two 
consecutive years when 
∆CAPB is at least 
1.5 %p of GDP per year 
  
The average real GDP growth in each 
consolidation year and in the two years 
after is greater than the average real 
GDP growth in the two years before 
 
Alesina and 
Ardagna 
(2010) 
A year when ∆CAPB is 
at least 1.5%p of GDP 
 
Three years after the 
Debt/GDP is at least 
4.5%p lower than that of 
the consolidation period 
 
The average growth rate of GDP in the 
first period of the episode and in the 
two years after is greater than the value 
of the 75th percentile of the same 
variable empirical density in all 
consolidation episodes  
 
Alesina and 
Ardagna 
(2012) 
A two-year period when 
∑∆CAPB is at least 2%p 
of GDP 
A three-or-more-year 
period when ∑∆CAPB 
is at least 3%p of GDP 
The Debt/GDP ratio two 
years after  is lower than 
that of the last 
consolidation 
  
 IMF (2010) 
A year when ∆(spending 
cuts + tax rises) / GDP is 
bigger than zero 
    
Action-
based Leigh et al. 
(2010) 
A year when ∆(spending 
cuts + tax rises) / GDP is 
bigger than zero 
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5.2.2.4 Empirical Studies   
Compared with empirical studies on the effects of expansionary fiscal shocks, there 
are not many studies on the effects of fiscal consolidation. Generally speaking, when it comes 
to the effects of fiscal consolidation, the literature is divided into two views: that of the 
proponents of the Keynesian effects; and that of the proponents of non-Keynesian effects. 
Here, previous literature is reviewed focusing on the following two points: the existence of 
expansionary fiscal consolidation; and the determinants of a successful fiscal consolidation. 
5.2.2.4.1 Existence of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation 
Based on a conventional Keynesian model, many empirical studies have supported 
the idea that fiscal consolidation is not expansionary in the short run. That is, they support the 
standard implication of Keynesian models that government spending cuts or tax rises have a 
contractionary effect on aggregate demand in the short term (Leigh et al., 2011).   
Recently, the IMF (2010) examined the effects of fiscal consolidation on economic 
activity using an action-based approach instead of a CAPB-based approach, and it concluded 
that fiscal consolidation typically reduced GDP and raised unemployment in the short term. 
Meanwhile, the IMF underlines that interest rate cuts, a depreciation of the currency and a 
rise in net exports usually soothe the contractionary impact
84
. Moreover, it insists that fiscal 
consolidation, in the face of a higher perceived sovereign default risk, is likely to have a less 
contractionary effect on economic activity.  
                                                 
84
 On the contrary, Ardagna (2004) argues that expansionary fiscal consolidation is not the result of 
accompanying expansionary monetary policy or exchange rate depreciation. 
 166 
 
Likewise, Hernandez de Cos and Moral-Benito (2011) investigate the potential 
impact of fiscal consolidation on economic growth, considering the endogeneity of fiscal 
consolidation to GDP. They argue that if there is an endogeneity problem between fiscal 
consolidation and GDP growth, the positive correlation between fiscal consolidation and 
GDP growth may be the result of a positive effect from GDP growth to fiscal consolidation 
instead of the other way around. They conclude that if the endogeneity problem is considered, 
fiscal consolidation has negative effects on GDP growth in the short run. Based on this result, 
they argue that the endogeneity bias is chiefly responsible for the non-Keynesian results 
found in the previous literature. 
However, starting with Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Bertola and Drazen (1993), 
a sequence of studies finds that consolidations can be expansionary
85
. Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1990), in particular, point out the need for an academic debate on expansionary fiscal 
consolidation. Their study of the effects of fiscal policy in Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s 
finds that drastic reductions in the cyclically adjusted deficits are followed by above-average 
economic growth. Since then, many studies have sought to identify whether and under what 
conditions fiscal contractions can provoke a positive economic response. These empirical 
studies first identify periods of forceful and sizeable government spending cuts within a panel 
of OECD countries, and then offer a descriptive analysis of the sample properties of 
macroeconomic aggregates, such as GDP, before, during, and after the year of the fiscal 
consolidation episode.  
                                                 
85
 Feldstein (1982) is probably the first to find evidence of the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidation. 
Showing a negative response of private consumption to a public expenditure shock, he argues that reductions in 
public expenditure may have expansionary effects on output if they are seen as an indication of future tax cuts.   
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McDermott and Wescott (1996) also find that fiscal consolidation can have an 
expansionary effect on economic activity through various channels, such as interest rates and 
expectations. They insist that fiscal consolidation can reduce interest rate premiums, which 
promotes private investment; or they can trigger expectations of a falling future tax burden, 
which encourages consumption and investment, finally supporting economic growth.  
Estimating a probit model on expansionary fiscal consolidation, Alesina and Ardagna (1998) 
find that the composition of fiscal consolidation is much more important than its size when it 
comes to causing fiscal consolidation to be expansionary. 
Giudice et al. (2007) analyse the main determinants of expansionary fiscal 
consolidation. By comparing statistics of expansionary vs. non-expansionary fiscal 
consolidations, they find that the expansionary fiscal consolidations significantly differ from 
the non-expansionary ones in their composition: the fiscal consolidations based on spending 
cuts are more likely to be expansionary than those based on tax rises. According to the results 
of their probit regression model, the composition of fiscal consolidation and the initial value 
of the output gap play significant roles in making expansionary fiscal consolidation. On the 
other hand, the size of fiscal consolidation, the initial situation of the value of debt-to-GDP, 
the interest rates and the exchange rates are not significant factors to explain the success of 
expansionary fiscal consolidation. 
By comparing the difference in basic statistics between expansionary and 
contractionary fiscal consolidations, Alesina and Ardagna (2012) find that fiscal 
consolidations based on spending cuts have superior effects on GDP growth to those based on 
tax rises. 
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Table 5.2  Determinants of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation  
Determinant 
Literature 
GDP 
growth 
Output 
gap 
size composition 
Interest 
rates 
Exchange 
rates 
McDermott and Wescott 
(1996) 
- - x o o x 
Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998) 
- - x o - x 
Ardagna (2004) o - x o o x 
Giudice et al. (2007) - o x o x x 
Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010) 
- - x o - - - 
Alesina and Ardagna 
(2012) 
- - x o - -  
IMF (2010) o - x x o o 
Hernandez de Cos and 
Moral-Benito (2011) 
- x x x x x 
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5.2.2.4.2 Determinants of Successful Fiscal Consolidation 
 
A variety of fiscal and economic factors have been identified as potential 
contributors to successful fiscal consolidation. The following is a brief summary of the 
literature on the relationship between these factors and successful fiscal consolidation. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) suggest that the size of fiscal consolidation is not strongly 
related to their success. Rather, these researchers conclude that the composition of fiscal 
consolidation is what matters if successful fiscal consolidation is to be achieved. In particular, 
spending cuts in the areas of transfers and government wages have strong effects on reducing 
debt-to-GDP ratios. Related to the composition of fiscal consolidation, McDermott and 
Wescott (1996) show some supporting evidence that fiscal consolidation with government 
spending cuts, especially transfers and government wages, can reduce the debt-to-GDP ratios 
more successfully than can tax-based fiscal consolidation. This result is in line with the view 
of Alesina and Perotti (1995).  
Afonso and Jalles (2012) assess the determinants of successful fiscal consolidation 
using both the CAPB-based approach and the action-based approach. They find that fiscal 
consolidation is likely to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios only if economic growth is strong and the 
output gap increases. Hernandez de Cos and Moral-Benito (2012) back up the above idea by 
insisting that economic growth is the only relevant factor for budget deficit reduction. 
Alesina and Giavazzi (2012) insist that for successful fiscal consolidation, the 
composition of austerity (how) is a more important factor than the size of austerity 
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programmes (how much). This implies that fiscal consolidations achieved through spending 
cuts are less recessionary than those achieved through tax rises. Furthermore, they also argue 
that spending-based consolidations accompanied by the right policies, such as easy money 
policy
86
, the liberalisation of goods and labour markets and other structural reforms, tend to 
be less recessionary or even have a positive impact on growth. In the same vein, Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010, 2012) argue that fiscal consolidations based on spending cuts are more likely 
to reduce deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios than those based on tax rises
87
. They also insist that 
this result is robust, even if the change in the short-term interest rates or the change in the 
nominal exchange rates is considered as control variables. 
Alesina (2012) emphasizes that the focus of discussion about fiscal tightening 
should be more about the composition, quality and way of achieving fiscal adjustment than 
about the quantity of fiscal adjustment. For example, cuts in social welfare can be regarded as 
more effective than cuts in infrastructure maintenance, which cannot be delayed forever. 
Moreover, cuts in politically more delicate components of the budget, such as public 
employment and social transfer, can be a good signal of a government’s willingness to 
decrease government spending. In those cases, expectation effects and political credibility 
effects will trigger expansionary fiscal consolidation. If one focuses only on the amount of 
fiscal tightening, this may lead some countries into a dangerous situation via a vicious circle 
of raising taxes, creating a recession, reducing tax revenues, and raising tax rates even more.  
                                                 
86
 Lambertini and Tavares (2005) also support the idea that fiscal consolidation is more likely to succeed when 
using exchange rate policy simultaneously. 
87
 At first, Ardagna (2004) suggested that the success of fiscal consolidation in reducing the debt to GDP ratios 
depended on the size of consolidation and less on its composition. But later, she changed her opinion on the 
major determinants of successful fiscal consolidation. 
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Corsetti and Muller (2012) highlight the fundamental importance of sovereign risk 
for macroeconomic stability, and insist that fiscal consolidation measures can play an 
important role in bringing down deficits at a limited cost to economic activity in the situation 
of high sovereign risk. They also support the idea that fiscal consolidation may well have 
important unobserved benefits by preventing greater macroeconomic instability, which tends 
to arise in the presence of high sovereign risk. 
Table 5.3  Determinants of Successful Fiscal Consolidation
88
  
   Determinant 
Literature 
GDP 
growth 
Output 
gap 
Size Composition 
Interest 
rates 
Exchange 
rates 
Sovereign 
risk 
Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) 
- - x o - - - 
McDermott and 
Wescott (1996) 
x - o o o x - 
Lambertini and 
Tavares (2005) 
- - o o - o    - 
Ardagna         
(2004, 2012) 
o - o x - x - 
Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010) 
- - x o x x - 
Alesina and 
Ardagna (2012) 
- - x  o x x - 
Hernandez de Cos 
and Moral-Benito 
(2012) 
o o - o - - - 
Afonso and Jalles 
(2012) 
o o x x - - - 
Alesina and 
Giavazzi (2012) 
- - x o - - - 
Molnar (2012) o - x o o o - 
Corsetti and 
Muller (2012) 
- - - - - - o 
                                                 
88
 Except for these economic-related factors, there can be qualitative variables such as political system and fiscal 
rules. Molnar (2012) deals with political setting variables (e.g., elections, strong left-leaning government, and 
strong right-leaning government). Shi and Svensson (2006) also use political variables to examine the relation 
between elections and fiscal policy.    
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5.3 Methodology 
In this section, two econometric models are described after the identification of 
fiscal consolidation episodes and a definition of the features of fiscal consolidation.   
5.3.1 Identifying Fiscal Consolidation Episodes 
The CAPB-based approach has strength in the simplicity and conciseness of its 
analysis. However, this approach has several possible shortcomings.  
First, it suffers from measurement errors that are likely to be correlated with 
economic developments. Changes in the CAPB may include non-policy changes correlated 
with other developments affecting economic activity. For instance, a thriving in the stock 
market enhances the CAPB by augmenting capital gains and cyclically-adjusted tax revenues. 
Such measurement errors may offset or reduce the shrinking effects of deliberate fiscal 
consolidation. Second, it ignores the motives behind fiscal actions. There are two principle 
motives for discretionary fiscal consolidation. One is a desire to reduce the budget deficit in 
order to improve the government financial situation. The other is a desire to restrain domestic 
demand for cyclical reasons. The CAPB-based approach includes all fiscal consolidations 
regardless of their motivation. Therefore, a rise in the CAPB may reflect a government’s 
decision to raise taxes or cut government spending in order to hold back domestic demand 
and decrease the risk of overheating. In this case, using a rise in the CAPB to measure the 
effects of fiscal consolidation on economic activity may suffer from ‘reverse causality’ and 
may bias the analysis toward finding evidence of an expansionary or successful fiscal 
consolidation hypothesis (Leigh et al., 2011).  
 173 
 
In this context, the action-based approach of the IMF (2010)
89
 is used to identify 
fiscal consolidation episodes. 
5.3.2 Model Specification 
5.3.2.1 Test for the Existence of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation 
5.3.2.1.1 Baseline Model - A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis with GMM 
Panel data analysis is used in the estimation for the following IMF model (2010), as 
it has the advantage of providing more information, variability, and a greater degree of 
freedom. In panel data analysis, a dynamic panel data model involving generalized method of 
moments (GMM) is created to address the endogeneity issue
90
 which has been ignored in the 
previous literature.   
The baseline model is shown below. The autoregressive model in growth rates 
assumes that the estimated size of the action-based fiscal consolidation (ABFC) is exogenous 
and uncorrelated with changes in fiscal policy in all other periods
91
.  
                                                 
89
 It should be noted that the two approaches are exposed to the same risks. First, if a country delays fiscal 
consolidation until the economy gets better, the fiscal consolidation episode will be affected by good economic 
outcomes. Second, if a country sticks to a deficit-reduction policy and the economy falls into a recession, it may 
try additional fiscal consolidation measures. This will cause fiscal consolidation to be associated with 
unfavourable economic outcomes (IMF, 2010, p97). 
90
 In the fixed-effects dynamic panel model including lagged values of the dependent variable as regressors, it is 
known that OLS estimates are inconsistent due to the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error 
term. In this case, Arellano-Bond GMM estimator can be a good alternative method (Biorn and Klette, 1999).  
91
 There can still be an endogeneity issue related to the occurrence of fiscal consolidation, because 
macroeconomic conditions may affect the discretionary policy choices of fiscal authority. However, it should be 
noted that the budget for the current year is approved during the second half of the previous year and, even 
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(5.1)                
 
                
 
               
where      is the percent change in real GDP,         is equal to the estimated size 
of the action-based fiscal consolidation as a per cent of GDP in periods of fiscal adjustment, 
and zero otherwise,    is a vector of country-fixed effects to capture differences among 
countries’ normal growth rates,    is a vector of year-fixed effects to take account of global 
shocks, such as shifts in oil prices or the global business cycle, and     is a mean-zero error 
term. Subscript i indexes countries and subscript t indexes years (IMF, 2010, p98).  
The  s are autoregressive coefficients capturing the normal dynamics of GDP, while 
the  s92 are the direct effects (contemporaneous and lagged) of the action-based measures of 
fiscal consolidation. Lags capture the delayed impacts of fiscal consolidation on growth. This 
approach controls for lags of GDP growth to distinguish the effect of fiscal consolidation 
from that of normal GDP dynamics. The lag order of 2 is selected based on a review of the 
information criteria and serial correlation properties associated with various lag lengths.  
The difficulty of estimating this simple regression model is that the lagged 
dependent variables are correlated with the error term (   ), even if     is assumed not to be 
auto-correlated. So, a dynamic panel data model with GMM estimator can be used to address 
                                                                                                                                                        
though additional measures can be taken during the course of the year, they usually become effective with some 
delay, toward the end of the fiscal year (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009). 
92
 Following the previous panel data literature, the slope homogeneity restrictions (       for all  ) are imposed 
on the model to focus on an average estimate of the slope coefficients.  
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this problem
93
. The equation (5.1) is estimated over the entire sample period by dynamic 
panel GMM and the estimated responses for         at t, t+1, t+2 are cumulated to measure 
the effect of a 1 per cent of GDP fiscal consolidation. 
A dynamic panel data model with GMM estimator takes first differences to 
eliminate unobserved country-fixed effects and uses lagged instruments to correct for 
simultaneity in the first-differenced equations. The resulting equation is as follows.  
(5.2)                  
 
                 
 
             
The dynamic panel data model contains lagged dependent variables (which are 
endogenous variables), exogenous variables, country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects. In 
either the fixed or the random effects cases, the heterogeneity, such as country-fixed effects, 
can disappear from the model by taking the first differences of the original model above. The 
time variables    do not disappear by taking first differences. Because the time effect was not 
restricted initially,     =    remains an unrestricted time effect, which is treated as ‘fixed’ 
and modelled with a time-specific dummy variable.  
There are still correlations between the differenced lagged dependent variables, 
       , and the differenced error term,     , in the modified equation. To remove the 
correlations between the regressors and the differenced error term, the differenced lagged 
dependent variables (       ) are instrumented with the past levels of     . This approach is 
called ‘difference GMM approach’. When finding suitable instrumental variables, it is very 
                                                 
93
 We also estimate the equation (5.1) using the two-stage least-squares first-differenced estimator (FD2SLS) 
considering that Anderson and Hsiao (1981) used a version of FD2SLS to fit a panel-data model with lagged 
dependent variables. The results are similar to those of the dynamic panel GMM (See Appendix 5.6). 
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important for the instruments to be highly correlated with the lagged dependent variables but 
uncorrelated with the differenced error term,     .  
However, the application of the difference GMM estimators has tended to produce 
very unsatisfactory results if there are weak correlations between differenced lagged 
dependent variables and their instrumental variables (Mairesse and Hall, 1996). To reduce 
this problem, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest including the 
lagged first-differences as instruments for equations in levels, in addition to the usual lagged 
levels as instruments for equations in first-differences. This is commonly called as ‘system 
GMM approach’. In this chapter, we use both difference GMM approach and system GMM 
approach to strengthen the robustness of the analysis. 
5.3.2.1.2 Extension Model Specification 
In the baseline model above equation (5.1), the coefficient of         is assumed to 
be   regardless of country i, even if this assumption can be criticized because it may be too 
strong a restriction considering the different conditions of each country. The effects of fiscal 
consolidation on the economy could be different depending on the situation of each country. 
This criticism can be addressed to some degree by subdividing the ABFC into two variables 
considering the special factors influencing the effects of fiscal consolidation on the economy.  
First, to investigate the role of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the sample is divided into two 
sub-samples according to the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
found that a country’s output falls substantially as soon as its total public debt passes 90 per 
cent of GDP. Using 20 advanced economies since 1945, they found that GDP growth had 
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been between 3 and 4 per cent when public debt had been below 90 per cent of GDP, but that 
GDP growth had collapsed to an average of -0.1 per cent when public debt had risen above 
90 per cent of GDP. They argued that the relationship between public debt and real GDP 
growth gains strength for debt-to-GDP ratios above a threshold of 90 per cent of GDP. 
According to their analysis, real GDP growth rates fall over one per cent in the case of debt-
to-GDP ratios above 90 per cent. Following their argument, the two sub-samples are grouped 
by the threshold of 90 per cent debt-to-GDP ratios
94
. So, the two sub-samples are as follows: 
fiscal consolidations occurring with public debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 per cent of GDP; and 
those occurring with public debt-to-GDP ratios below 90 per cent of GDP.  
        (5.3)                
 
                   
   
                  
   
              
Second, the role of the composition of fiscal consolidation in terms of government 
spending and taxes can be investigated. So, the fiscal consolidation of the baseline model can 
be divided into two types: spending-based fiscal consolidation and tax-based fiscal 
consolidation
95
.    
         (5.4)               
 
                   
  
                  
  
              
                                                 
94
 Sensitivity analysis using alternative criteria for debt-to-GDP ratios can be seen in Appendix 5.3. 
95
 ‘Tax-based type’ is defined as a fiscal consolidation in which the contribution of tax rises to the consolidation 
is greater than that of government spending cuts, and ‘spending-based type’ is defined as a fiscal consolidation 
in which the contribution of government spending cuts is greater than that of tax rises (IMF, 2010, p98).  
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5.3.2.2 Test for the Determinants of Successful Fiscal Consolidation 
5.3.2.2.1 Random Effects Panel Probit Models 
It is important to know how to ensure successful fiscal tightening when fiscal 
consolidation is executed. As mentioned in the literature review, successful fiscal 
consolidation means a sufficiently large and persistent reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio or 
the primary budget balance. To find out the main factors of successful fiscal consolidation, a 
panel probit regression model is used. The panel probit model puts a dummy variable 
identifying successful fiscal consolidation on the left-hand side as a dependent variable, and 
puts a set of candidate determinants on the right-hand side as independent variables. The 
panel probit model estimates the likelihood of fiscal consolidation being successful 
depending on the realizations of the explanatory variables in a given period.  
Therefore, following Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Ardagna (2004), and Giudice et 
al. (2007), a panel probit regression model is used to estimate the main determinants of 
successful fiscal consolidation
96
. After determining the nature of the fiscal consolidation 
episodes as either successful or not, the possible determinants of the successful fiscal 
consolidation are assessed using the panel probit regression model. To construct a successful 
fiscal consolidation dummy, the degree of debt reduction achieved over the following three 
years is focused on. The dependent variable is a binary variable with a value equal to one or 
zero. Following Alesina and Ardagna (2010), a fiscal consolidation is considered to be 
successful and defined as being ‘one’ if the debt-to-GDP ratio for the three years after the 
                                                 
96
 Afonso (2006), Afonso and Jalles (2012) use logit models to measure the success of fiscal consolidations. 
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fiscal consolidation is at least 4.5 per cent points below the level observed immediately prior 
to the fiscal consolidation. If the degree of debt reduction achieved is less than 4.5 per cent 
points, the fiscal consolidation is considered to be unsuccessful and is defined to be zero
97
.  
Using the ‘general-to-specific’ approach, insignificant variables are excluded so as 
to keep the most parsimonious equation with the relevant variables remaining for each 
dimension (Guichard et al., 2007, p. 29). The panel probit model is constructed as follows.  
(5.5)     
           +        ,    i= 1,…,N, t=1,…,T 
where    
  is an unobserved latent variable,   is a constant,     (          
                                           )  is a vector of the independent 
variables,   is a vector of the associated parameters, and     is error terms with      (   
 ). 
While    
  is not observed, the action based fiscal consolidation (   ) is observed and 
can be taken as a surrogate of    
 .      is assigned the value of one if a fiscal consolidation is 
successful and zero otherwise. The equation (5.5) can be rewritten as follows: 
(5.6)               +        ,    i= 1,…,N, t=1,…,T 
    {
               
    
                  
  , where      is the observed fiscal consolidation. 
There is an issue of which model to use, with a choice between a random effects 
model and a fixed effects model, in estimating equation (5.6) with a panel probit model. Of 
course, there is no method to evaluate which of the non-linear models is better: a fixed effects 
                                                 
97
 Alternative values other than 4.5 per cent points cut-off have been considered in Appendix 5.5. 
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model or a random effects model (Greene, 2003). Following the suggestion made by Maddala 
(1987, pp 315-324)
98
, a random effects model is used.  
5.3.2.2.2 Marginal Effects 
A marginal effect is the effect of a unit change in an independent variable on the 
change in the probability of a dependent variable. Interpretation of the coefficients for panel 
probit models needs a degree of care. Unlike the coefficients of linear regression, the 
marginal effects of probit models cannot be measured directly.  
If an independent variable is a continuous variable, we can calculate the marginal 
effect as follows. 
(5.7)      
            
    
  
             
    
                   
where                  is the standard normal probability density function 
evaluated at              .  
In the equation (5.7),                  hinges on the value X. Usually, the means 
of the explanatory variables X are used to calculate function    
Meanwhile, if an independent variable is the dummy variable, the marginal effect 
means the effect of a change of state from 0 to 1, as follows. 
(5.8)   
          
    
                             
                                                 
98
 The fixed effects probit model does not give consistent estimates of the coefficients in the case when the 
dependent variable is observed only as a qualitative variable and there are only a few time-series observations. 
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5.4 Data Description 
5.4.1 Data for the Existence of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation Test 
Data on 18 OECD countries from 1978 to 2011 are used. The countries included in 
the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. All fiscal and macroeconomic data are from the OECD Economic 
Outlook Database No. 92. In the 18 OECD countries, fiscal consolidation episodes are 
selected according to the criterion of a policy action-based approach as described above. The 
sample size is relatively small both in terms of time series and of the cross-sectional data. The 
budgetary effects of the fiscal consolidation are scaled by GDP.  
The data for general government are used, rather than those for central government. 
This has one advantage and one disadvantage. The advantage is that the definition of general 
government is more comparable across countries. In fact, according to the OECD, general 
government includes ‘all departments, offices, organisations and other bodies which are 
agencies or instruments of the central, state or local public authorities', including 'all social 
security arrangements for large sections of the population imposed, controlled or financed by 
a government', and 'government enterprises which mainly produce goods and services for 
government itself or primarily sell goods and services to the public on a small scale'. Using 
general government data therefore avoids the problem of allocating expenditures to, say, state 
rather than local governments, or to the central administration rather than to social security 
funds, which can sometimes be difficult and unreliable in a cross-country comparison. The 
disadvantage of using general government data is that discretionary fiscal policies are usually 
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undertaken through the central government budget. However, fluctuations in the general 
government balance may reflect effects comming from local governments, which may be not 
a matter of interest (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). 
5.4.2 Data for the Determinants of Successful Fiscal Consolidation Test 
The definition and measurement of the variables used in the panel probit model are 
shown in Table 5.4. The dependent variable, s, represents a successful fiscal consolidation, 
which is a dummy variable being assigned the value of ‘1’ if the debt-to-GDP ratio for three 
years after the fiscal consolidation is at least 4.5 per cent points below the level observed 
immediately prior to the fiscal consolidation, and ‘0’ if not.  
There are nine independent variables in this probit model. Among them, spending-
based fiscal consolidation (EXP) is a dummy variable, which is assigned the value of ‘1’ if 
the change in the value for total government expenditure is bigger than that of the value for 
total revenue, and ‘0’ otherwise. The other eight variables have continuous values. As regards 
change in the CAPB (     ), the average change over a three-year period is used to capture 
the strong fiscal adjustments that are spread over several years. The output gap (OUTGAP) 
represents the cyclical conditions immediately preceding the fiscal consolidation; so it is 
constructed by averaging the output gap of years t-1 and t. Meanwhile, the exchange rate 
(     ), interest rate (    ), unemployment rate (    ), inflation rate (    ), and the 
sovereign default risk (    ) variables are all instead aimed at capturing developments both 
immediately preceding and following the fiscal consolidation. Therefore these variables are 
defined as the average per cent change between t-1 and t+1 (Giudice et al., 2007). 
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Table 5.4  The Definition and Measurement of the Variables in the Probit Model  
Variables Definition  Measurement 
Dependent variable   
       s Successful fiscal consolidation  
1 if the debt-to-GDP ratio for 
the three years after the fiscal 
consolidation is at least 4.5 per 
cent points below the level 
observed immediately prior to 
fiscal consolidation. 
(                    ) 
Independent variables   
        Yearly GDP growth rate Continuous 
           
Average change between  t-1 
and t+1 in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance  
(% of potential GDP) 
Continuous 
      EXP 
Spending-based fiscal 
consolidation 
1 if the change in the value of 
total government expenditure 
is bigger than that in the value 
of total revenue, 0 otherwise 
      OUTGAP 
Average in the output gap (% 
of potential GDP) between t-1 
and  t 
Continuous 
            
Average change in exchange 
rate between t-1 and t+1 
Continuous 
           
Average change in real long-
run interest rate between t-1 
and t+1 
Continuous 
       UNR 
Average change in 
unemployment  rate between  
t-1 and t+1 
Continuous 
       INF 
Average change in inflation 
rate between t-1 and t+1 
Continuous 
      IIR 
Average change in 
 sovereign default risk index 
between t-1 and t+1 
Continuous 
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5.5 Empirical Results 
5.5.1 Test for the Existence of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation 
5.5.1.1 Baseline Model Analysis  
5.5.1.1.1 Arellano-Bond Difference GMM Estimation 
A. The Results of Estimation 
Arellano and Bond (1991) first used the Arellano-Bond estimator by constructing 
instrumental variables in a GMM context with a dynamic panel data model. Later, Roodman 
(2006) devised more efficient Arellano-Bond estimator.   
By taking the first differences of the original model, the country-fixed effects 
(including the constant term) can be removed. It should be noted that time variables    are 
not transformed by taking first differences. 
(5.11)                
 
                
 
               
When the above equation is first differenced, it is changed as below. 
(5.12)                  
 
                 
 
             
In estimation, the maximum lag of an instrument is limited to four in order to 
prevent the number of instruments from becoming too large and to address a possible loss of 
efficiency (Baum, 2006, p234). Only lags of two to five years are to be used as GMM 
instruments in this model. The results of the estimation of the growth rate function are shown 
in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.5  The Results of the Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Difference GMM  
Dependent variable :     
Independent variables Arellano-Bond’s Coefficient Roodman’s Coefficient 
     
0.3209*** 
(0.000) 
0.1969*** 
(0.001) 
     
-0.1182* 
(0.061) 
-0.0793 
(0.119) 
      
-0.2210* 
(0.098) 
-0.3377*** 
(0.007) 
        
-0.2520** 
(0.045) 
-0.3424*** 
(0.003) 
        
0.2560 
(0.101) 
0.1608 
(0.189) 
No. of observations 543 543 
Instruments for first 
differences equation 
Standard: 
D.(abfc, labfc, l2abfc) 
GMM-type : 
L(2/5).  
Standard: 
D.(abfc, labfc, l2abfc) 
GMM-type : 
L(2/5).(L.  L2. ) 
Wald test :   (k) 
628.21 (5) 
(0.000) 
603.38 (5) 
(0.000) 
Notes: 1. The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here to save space.  
           2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
           3.  p-values are in parentheses.  
           4. The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables asymptotically distributed as    
   
           under the null of no relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding time dummies). 
 
The main result of estimation is that fiscal consolidation is not expansionary but 
contractionary. GDP growth responds negatively to contemporaneous and lagged changes in 
action-based fiscal consolidation, meaning that fiscal consolidation typically reduces GDP 
growth. The results are statistically significant at the 10 per cent significance level at the least. 
Based on the above results, we can say that the idea of non-Keynesian effects that fiscal 
consolidation stimulates economic activity even in the short run cannot be supported 
empirically. The results are in line with those of Leigh et al. (2011) who use a policy action-
based approach.   
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B. Tests for the Validity of Over-Identifying Restrictions  
The Sargan-Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions should be performed in any 
over-identified model estimated with instrumental variables techniques. If there is a strong 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the Sargan-Hansen test, we have to cast doubt on the 
validity of the dynamic panel data GMM estimates (Baum, 2013). 
The Sargan test has a null hypothesis that ‘the instruments as a group are exogenous’. 
In other words, the null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that over-identifying restrictions are 
valid. The Sargan test sets basis on the idea that the residuals should be uncorrelated with the 
exogenous variables if the instruments are exogenous. Consequently, a high p-value of the 
Sargan statistic means that the instruments are not useful. In our estimation, the null 
hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid is rejected. However, this result cannot 
be fully credible because the Sargan test is not so powerful when there are many instrumental 
variables and there is heteroscedasticity in the error term (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Roodman, 2006).   
Table 5.6  The Results of the Test for the Validity of Over-Identifying Restrictions  
Order Arellano-Bond’s Coefficient Roodman’s Coefficient 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions 
   (119)  = 348.07 
p-value =  0.000 
   (112)  = 217.02 
p-value =  0.000 
Difference in Sargan tests of 
exogeneity of instrument subsets 
  
    Sargan test excluding group:    
   (109)  = 210.40 
p-value =  0.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous):  
   (3)    =   6.62 
p-value =  0.085 
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C. Autocorrelation Test for the Differenced Error Term 
The Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test is an important diagnostic test of the 
residuals in the dynamic panel data estimation. Having a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, 
it estimates the first and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. By 
construction, the residuals of the equation (5.12),     , should be serially correlated. But if 
we assume serial independence in the original errors, the differenced residuals should not 
follow significant AR(2) process. If there is a significant AR(2) statistic, the second lags of 
endogenous variables cannot be proper instruments for current values (Baum, 2012).  
 Table 5.8 shows the results of autocorrelation test. The test for first-order serial 
correlation AR(1) process rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 1 per cent 
significance level. But, the test for the AR(2) process cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no second-order serial correlation at the 5 per cent significance level. Consequently, 
we can conclude that the instruments that we use are appropriate. This is what one expects in 
a first-differenced equation with the original untransformed error terms assumed not to be 
serially correlated (Baltagi, 2008, p158). 
Table 5.7  Arellano-Bond Tests for Zero Autocorrelation in First-Differenced Errors  
Order 
Arellano-Bond’s 
estimator 
Roodman’s  
estimator 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences 
z = -16.674*** 
(0.000) 
z =  -7.94***   
(0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
z = -1.418 
(0.156) 
z =  -1.65*  
(0.099) 
Notes: 1. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
            2. p-values are in parentheses.  
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5.5.1.1.2 System GMM Estimation 
A. The Results of Estimation 
The application of GMM estimators which take first differences to eliminate 
unobserved country-fixed effects and use lagged instruments to correct for simultaneity in the 
first-differenced equations has tended to produce very unsatisfactory results (Mairesse and 
Hall, 1996). These problems are related to the weak correlations between endogenous 
explanatory variables and their instrumental variables in the first-differenced GMM 
estimators.  
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that the lagged 
level variables are poor instruments for identifying first-differenced variables, especially if 
the level variables are following random walk processes. To reduce this problem, they 
suggest including lagged first differences as instruments for equation in levels (e.g., equation 
(5.11)), in addition to the usual lagged levels as instruments for equation in first-differences 
(e.g., equation (5.12)). This expanded approach is commonly termed system GMM 
estimation. 
The results of estimation using the system-GMM estimator are shown in Table 5.9. 
The results are the same as those of the difference GMM estimator. It should be noted that the 
system-GMM estimator produces a higher estimate of the coefficient on lagged growth rates 
because of using additional instrumental variables. This result agrees with that of Blundell 
and Bond (1998), who show that the system GMM estimator does not have the downward 
bias that Arellano-Bond’s difference GMM estimator has when the true value is high. 
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Table 5.8  The Results of the Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel Data System GMM  
Dependent variable:     
Independent variables Coefficient S.E z P>|z| 
     0.3273*** 0.0621      5.27 0.000 
     -0.0943 0.0963     -0.98 0.219 
      -0.1442*   0.0914 -1.25 0.071 
        -0.2490** 0.0788 -3.16 0.013 
        0.2134 0.1967 1.08 0.127 
No. of observations 561 
Instruments for first differences 
equation 
GMM-type: L(2/5).   
Standard: D.(abfc, labfc, l2abfc) 
Instruments for level equation 
GMM-type: LD.   
Standard: _cons 
Wald test :   (k) 
1059.51 (5) 
(0.000) 
Notes:   1. The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here to save space.  
 2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
 3. P denotes p-value.  
 4. The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables asymptotically distributed as    
  
 under the null of no relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding time dummies). 
 
 
B. Tests for the Validity of Over-Identifying Restrictions  
According to the Sargan test, the chi-square statistic is 311.71 and its p-value is 
almost zero. The null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid is rejected. 
However, as mentioned in the previous section 5.5.2.1.1, this result cannot be totally reliable 
because the Sargan test is not very powerful when there are many instrumental variables and 
heteroscedasticity in the error term (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2006).   
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C. Autocorrelation Test for the Differenced Error Term  
The test for the AR(1) process in the first differences rejects the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation at the 1 per cent significance level. The test for the AR(2) process cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation at the 10 per cent 
significance level. Hence, we can conclude that the instruments that we use are appropriate.  
Table 5.9  Arellano-Bond Tests for Autocorrelation   
Order z p-value 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences 
z = -2.888*** P=0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
z = -1.2456 P=0.213 
Note: 1. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10%   significance levels, respectively.  
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5.5.1.2 Extension to the Analysis 
In this section, the effects of sub-divided fiscal consolidation on GDP growth are 
estimated using extended models. By doing this, the strength of the factors’ influence on 
economic activity – especially, GDP growth rates - can be measured. 
First, to investigate the role of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the variable ABFC is divided 
according to the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio. An ABFC can be classified into two sub-
groups: fiscal consolidations occurring with public debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 per cent of 
GDP (        
  ); and those occurring with public debt-to-GDP ratios below 90 per cent of 
GDP (        
  ). The baseline model may be changed into the following equation. 
      (5.13)                
 
                   
   
                  
   
              
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 5.11. The results suggest that the 
effects of fiscal consolidation on GDP growth are all contractionary, regardless of the level of 
debt-to-GDP ratios. However, there are some differences in the degree of effects of fiscal 
consolidation depending on the public debt level. That is, the fiscal consolidation in low debt-
to-GDP ratios may have significant negative effects on GDP growth, while those in time 
period of high debt-to-GDP ratios have insignificant negative effects on GDP growth at the 5 
per cent significance level. Basically, the empirical results are not consistent with the non-
Keynesian effects hypothesis that fiscal consolidation can expand economic activity by 
executing fiscal austerity measures in an economic crisis. However, the results also imply 
that if fiscal consolidation is unavoidable, fiscal consolidation in the situation of high debt-to-
GDP ratios may be less harmful to economic activity. This is partially in line with the idea of 
Reinhart and Rogoff who support government’s austerity measure in time of high public debt.   
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Table 5.10  The Results of GMM Estimation Considering Difference in Debt-to-GDP Ratios 
Dependent variable :     
Independent variables Coefficient S.E z P>|z| 
     0.1874*** 0.0629 2.98 0.003 
     -0.0836 0.0523 -1.60 0.110 
         -0.0457 0.2618 -0.18 0.861 
           -0.4111* 0.2219 -1.85 0.064 
           -0.3332 0.2549 -1.31 0.191 
         -0.3856*** 0.1481 -2.60 0.009 
           -0.3568*** 0.1376 -2.59 0.009 
           0.2828* 0.1461 1.94 0.053 
No. of observations 544 
Instruments for first 
differences equation 
Standard: 
D.(abfc_hd, labfc_hd, l2abfc_hd abfc_ld, labfc_ld, l2abfc_ld) 
GMM-type : L(2/5).(L.   L2.  ) 
Wald test :   (k) 
668.29 (8) 
(0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 
in first differences 
Z=-7.46  (p-value =0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
in first differences 
Z=-1.26  (p-value =0.207) 
Notes:  1. The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here to save space.  
2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
3. P denotes p-value.  
4. The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables asymptotically distributed as    
  
under the null of no relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding time dummies). 
Second, the role of the composition of fiscal consolidation in terms of government 
spending and taxes is investigated. The ABFC is divided into two types in a baseline model: 
spending-based fiscal consolidation (       
 ); and tax-based fiscal consolidation (       
 ) 
99
.    
       (5.14)               
 
                   
  
                  
  
              
where the coefficient on           
 ,     , is the effects of a spending-based fiscal 
consolidation and the coefficient on          
 ,    , is the effects of a tax-based one.  
                                                 
99
 ‘Tax-based type’ is defined as a fiscal consolidation in which the contribution of tax rises to the consolidation 
is greater than that of spending cuts; and ‘spending-based type’ is defined as a fiscal consolidation in which the 
contribution of spending cuts is greater than that of tax rises.  
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The results of the effects of the two types of fiscal consolidation are shown in Table 
5.12, which indicates that the effects of the two types of fiscal consolidation on GDP growth 
are both negative. In particular, spending-based fiscal consolidation is less contractionary for 
GDP growth than tax-based fiscal consolidation. Based on the results, we can say that there is 
no evidence of any expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation regardless of its composition. 
We can also suggest that if fiscal consolidation is inevitable, spending-based fiscal 
consolidation may be less harmful to the economy. 
Table 5.11 The Results of GMM Estimation Considering the Composition of Fiscal Consolidation 
Dependent variable :     
Independent variables Coefficient S.E z P>|z| 
     0.1941*** 0.0633 3.07 0.002 
     -0.0793 0.0524 -1.51 0.131 
        -0.2647* 0.1495 -1.77 0.077 
          -0.2945** 0.1390 -2.12 0.034 
          0.2285 0.1489 1.54 0.125 
        -0.4962** 0.2005 -2.48 0.013 
          -0.6373*** 0.1891 -3.36 0.001 
          -0.0177 0.1991 -0.09 0.929 
No. of observations 544 
Instruments for first differences 
equation 
Standard: 
D.(abfc_hd, labfc_hd, l2abfc_hd abfc_ld, labfc_ld, l2abfc_ld) 
GMM-type : L(2/5).(L.  L2. ) 
Wald test :   (k) 
668.17 (8) 
(0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 
first differences 
Z=-7.53  (p-value =0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences 
Z=-1.10  (p-value =0.272) 
Notes:   1. The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here to save space.  
 2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
 3. P denotes p-value.  
 
The estimation results are the same when the effects of fiscal consolidation are 
investigated after dividing the variables by the level of perceived sovereign risk (The results 
can be seen in Appendix 5.4).  
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5.5.2 Tests for the Determinants of Successful Fiscal Consolidation 
The success of fiscal consolidation can be judged by the degree of stabilization of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio they achieve, despite the disadvantage of this measure
100
. The panel 
probit model is used to find the crucial determinants of successful fiscal consolidation. A 
random effects probit model is better than a pooled probit model for our analysis. This is 
easily proved by a likelihood ratio (LR) test, where the null hypothesis that there is no 
presence of random effects (i.e.,       
  (  
    ) = 0) is rejected. This indicates that the 
panel-level variance components (random effects) are relatively important.  
By performing a random effects panel probit regression model analysis, it is possible 
to investigate the role of the characteristics of fiscal consolidation in determining the 
probability of the consolidations’ success.  
The results of estimations from a pooled probit model and a random effects panel 
probit model are shown in Table 5.13. The results show that GDP growth rate ( ) is a crucial 
determinant of the success of fiscal consolidation, which is in line with the empirical 
estimates of Afonso and Jalles (2012) and Hernandez and Moral-Benito (2011). The marginal 
effect of the GDP growth rate amounts to approximately 120 per cent points. As for the size 
of fiscal consolidation, the results do not support the idea that size (∆CAPB) is an important 
factor in the success of fiscal consolidation. This is in line with the empirical estimates of 
Alesina and Perotti (1995), who suggest that the size of fiscal consolidation is not strongly 
related to the success of fiscal consolidation policy. Meanwhile, the results support the view 
that fiscal consolidation is more likely to be successful in periods of consolidation based on 
                                                 
100
 The debt-to-GDP ratio may include stock-flow adjustments that affect the level of debt which is unrelated to 
discretionary consolidations and may even reflect fiscal tricks designed to reduce debt levels in the short-term 
without improving the underlying government balance sheet. 
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government spending cuts than in periods based on tax rises. That is, the composition 
variable (   ) has a positive effect on the successful fiscal consolidation and the coefficient 
of EXP is significant at the 10 per cent significance level. These results are consistent with 
the empirical studies of Alesina and Perotti (1995) and McDermott and Wescott (1996), who 
insist that fiscal consolidation with government spending cuts can be more successful at 
reducing debt-to-GDP ratios than tax-based fiscal consolidation. Its marginal effect amounts 
to 3.5 per cent points. Fiscal consolidation is more likely to be successful in periods with a 
positive output gap (i.e., actual GDP is bigger than potential GDP). This means such a policy 
is to be more successful when the domestic economy is doing well. Consequently, we can say 
that a recessionary economic situation, indicated by a negative output gap, lowers the 
likelihood of a successful fiscal consolidation. But this estimate is not significant statistically.  
The exchange rate (     ), inflation rate (    ) and unemployment rate (    ) 
have positive but statistically insignificant effects on the success of a fiscal consolidation. On 
the other hand, the long-term interest rate (    ) and sovereign default risk (    )101 are 
significant determinants of the success of fiscal consolidation. To be more precise, an 
increase in the long-term interest rate has a negative effect on the success of fiscal 
consolidation. Judging by the marginal effects, we can infer that, on average, an increase in 
the long-term interest rate lowers the probability of fiscal consolidation being successful by 
about 4 per cent points. This result is in contrast with the empirical estimates of Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010, 2012) who suggest an insignificant role for the interest rate in the success of 
                                                 
101
 Institutional Investor Ratings (IIR) are based on assessments of sovereign risk by private sector analysts. 
They rate each country on a scale of 0 to 100, with a rating of 100 assigned to the lowest perceived sovereign 
default risk probability. 
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fiscal consolidation. Lastly, a decrease in sovereign default risk has a positive effect on the 
success of fiscal consolidation, which is significant at the 1 per cent level. Its marginal effect 
amounts to 3.6 per cent points. This result makes sense in that the possibility of decreasing 
the debt-to-GDP ratio by fiscal consolidation is likely to get higher when the sovereign 
default risk becomes lower and improves the borrowing conditions of one’s country (Corsetti 
and Muller, 2012).  
Table 5.12  A Pooled Probit Model and a Random Effects Probit Model  
Dependent 
variable:  s 
A pooled probit model A random effects probit model 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient 
Standard 
errors 
Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient 
Standard 
errors 
Marginal 
effects 
  24.678* 12.691 2.5111 24.628* 15.187 1.2056 
∆CAPB 0.049 0.198 0.0050 0.223 0.300 0.0109 
EXP 0.699** 0.349 0.0655 0.765* 0.418 0.0345 
OUTGAP 0.083 0.094 0.0084 0.130 0.122 0.0064 
∆EXCH 0.030 0.041 0.0031 0.042 0.053 0.0020 
∆INF 0.280 0.238 0.0285 0.254 0.269 0.0124 
∆UNR 0.126 0.323 0.0128 0.207 0.378 0.0102 
∆IRL -0.764** 0.319 -0.0777 -0.846** 0.391 -0.0415 
∆IIR 0.591*** 0.205 0.0601 0.735*** 0.278 0.0360 
constant -2.609*** 0.478  -3.086*** 0.779  
      0.759 0.501  
     0.366 0.306  
  
Log likelihood -46.063165 -45.147781 
Wald test for all 
regressors 
   (9) =53.49*** p-value 0.000    (9) =19.53** p-value 0.021 
LR test for         (1) =  1.83*,   p-value 0.088 
Pseudo  R
2 
0.3673  
Observations 161 161 
 Notes:  1. The marginal effects are calculated under the assumption of    = 0.  
             2. A rise in the average change of exchange rate (∆EXCH) indicates an appreciation of the Korean won. 
 3. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
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5.6 Robustness Checks 
5.6.1 Test for the Existence of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation 
The robustness of the results discussed above depends on how independent variables 
have been controlled for during estimation (Briotti, 2005). In this section, by performing 
several different tests, we recheck whether fiscal consolidation has either non-Keynesian 
effects or contractionary effects on economic activity.  
First, the two variable VAR models of GDP growth rate ( ) and the size of action-
based fiscal consolidation are estimated, allowing for the effects of a lagged growth rate and 
past action-based fiscal consolidation on current fiscal consolidation. The action-based fiscal 
consolidation variable is ordered first, followed by the GDP growth rate variable. Figure 5.2 
shows that private consumption and GDP growth respond negatively to fiscal consolidation. 
The results of the VAR model also support the view that fiscal consolidation has 
contractionary effects on economic activity: the estimated effects of 1 per cent fiscal 
consolidation of GDP on private consumption and GDP in the first two years are -0.004 per 
cent (t-statistic = -3.34) and -0.002 per cent (t-statistic = -6.29), respectively.   
Figure 5.2  The Responses to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2S.E.  
  
-.008
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Second, the effects of fiscal consolidation on the labour market can be measured by 
using a dynamic panel data GMM model. In the case of the difference GMM estimator, the 
coefficients of contemporaneous fiscal consolidation (     ) on the unemployment rate 
(UNR) are positive and significant at the 1 per cent significance level. The results of the 
system GMM estimator are similar to those of the difference GMM estimator. So, the results 
illustrate that fiscal consolidation raises the unemployment rate significantly. Moreover, the 
results support our empirical finding that fiscal consolidation has negative effects on 
economic activity.  
Table 5.13  The Results of the Dynamic Panel Data GMM  
Dependent variable :  UNR Difference GMM System GMM 
Independent variables 
Arellano-Bond’s 
Coefficient 
Roodman’s 
Coefficient 
 
       
1.2307*** 
(0.000) 
1.2526*** 
(0.000) 
1.4467*** 
(0.000) 
       
-0.5863*** 
(0.000) 
-0.5942 
(0.000) 
-0.5707 
(0.000) 
      
0.3021*** 
(0.000) 
0.2919*** 
(0.000) 
0.1237** 
(0.025) 
        
0.1047* 
(0.061) 
0.0907 
(0.101) 
0.0020 
(0.270) 
        
0.0790 
(0.187) 
0.0602 
(0.311) 
0.0770 
(0.162) 
No. of observations 543 543 561 
Instruments for first differences 
equation 
Standard: 
D.(abfc, labfc, l2abfc) 
GMM-type : 
L(2/5).UNR 
Standard: 
D.(abfc, labfc, 
l2abfc) 
GMM-type : 
L(2/5).(L.UNR 
L2.UNR) 
 
Standard: 
D.(abfc, labfc, l2abfc) 
GMM-type : 
L(2/5).UNR 
Instruments for level equation  
 Standard: _cons 
GMM-type:LD.UNR 
Wald test :   (k) 
1637.22 (5) 
(0.000) 
1672.80 (5) 
(0.000) 
5793.04 (5) 
(0.000) 
Notes: 1. The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here to save space.  
           2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
           3.  p-values are in parentheses.  
           4. The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables asymptotically distributed as    
                 
           under the null of no relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding time dummies). 
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Third, several control variables are added to address the possibility that the baseline 
equation omits variables affecting economic activity, which are correlated with fiscal 
consolidation. The omitted variables can be a number of additional non-policy factors, such 
as long-term interest rates (IRL), nominal effective exchange rates (EXCHEB)
102
, 
unemployment rates (UNR), and perceived sovereign default risk. As for the sovereign 
default risk, the Institutional Investor Ratings (IIR) index
103
 is used as a proxy measure of the 
perceived sovereign default risk, following Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) and 
Eichengreen and Mody (2004). The results are also similar to those of baseline equation
104
. It 
should be noted that the changes in interest rates, exchange rates, and unemployment rates 
help cushion or mitigate the negative impact on economic growth of fiscal consolidation. 
Table 5.14  The Results of the Arellano-Bond Difference GMM with Control Variables 
Alternatives 
 
Independent variables 
Coefficient 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     
0.1969*** 
(0.001) 
0.2024*** 
(0.001) 
0.2051*** 
(0.001) 
0.1420** 
(0.022) 
0.2934*** 
(0.000) 
     
-0.0793 
(0.119) 
-0.1049* 
(0.054) 
-0.0885* 
(0.085) 
-0.1108** 
(0.030) 
-0.1522** 
(0.027) 
      
-0.3377*** 
(0.007) 
-0.3344*** 
(0.007) 
-0.3323*** 
(0.008) 
-0.2724** 
(0.026) 
-0.3437*** 
(0.003) 
        
-0.3424*** 
(0.003) 
-0.3408*** 
(0.003) 
-0.3270** 
(0.005) 
-0.2752** 
(0.016) 
-0.1845 
(0.116) 
        
0.1608 
(0.189) 
0.1454 
(0.235) 
0.1643 
(0.181) 
0.1856 
(0.118) 
0.1587 
(0.191) 
IRL - 
-0.0018** 
(0.015) 
- - - 
EXCHEB - - 
-0.0001** 
(0.024) 
- - 
UNR    
-0.0020*** 
(0.007) 
 
IIR - - -  
0.0004 
(0.295) 
No. of observations 543 541 543 543 479 
Wald test :   (k) 603.38 (5) 693.17 (6) 684.51 (6) 736.20 (6) 853.53 (6) 
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 A rise of nominal effective exchange rates indicates an appreciation of the Korean won. 
103
  The ratings are based on assessments of sovereign risk by private sector analysts. They rate each country on 
a scale of 0 to 100, with a rating of 100 assigned to the lowest perceived sovereign default risk probability.  
104
 The results are the same when two lags of the additional control variable are implemented in the equation. 
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Note:   1. The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here to save space.  
2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
3.  p-values are in parentheses.  
4. The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables asymptotically distributed as    
   
under the null of no relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding time dummies). 
 
Fourth, the equation is also estimated after excluding lags of growth from the 
baseline equation. The conclusions are the same as those of the baseline model, as expected. 
And the different lag length of growth has little effect on the results.  
 
5.6.2 Test for the Determinants of Successful Fiscal Consolidation 
As for the estimation of the determinants of successful fiscal consolidation using a 
random effects panel probit model, different definitions of successful fiscal consolidation 
episodes do not change the results shown above.  
First, a successful fiscal consolidation is re-defined as an episode in which the 
CAPB improves and, three years after, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 3 per cent points lower than 
in the previous year of fiscal consolidation. Second, successful fiscal consolidation is re-
defined as an episode in which the CAPB improves and, two years after, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is at least 1.5 per cent points lower than in the previous year of the beginning of fiscal 
consolidation. Finally, the shorter horizon is considered to obtain more observations of 
successful fiscal consolidation. A successful fiscal consolidation is re-defined as an episode 
in which the debt-to-GDP ratio declines by at least 1 per cent point a year after the fiscal 
consolidation. The robustness checks support the conclusions obtained using the baseline 
model (See Appendix 5.5 for details).  
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5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has tried to investigate two issues related to fiscal consolidation: 
whether or not there exist expansionary fiscal consolidation; and what are the determinants of 
successful fiscal consolidation that significantly reduce debt-to-GDP ratios. The former issue 
has been investigated by using dynamic panel data analysis with GMM estimation; while the 
latter has been estimated by analysis using a random effects probit model.  
Although the existence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation is 
theoretically reasonable and attractive, it is very difficult to get empirical evidence because of 
the difficulty of gaining credibility for the policy (Prammer, 2004). As Cottarelli (2012) 
points out, a reform process on the basis of fiscal consolidation alone, in the middle of an 
economic crisis, can be exposed to the risk of becoming self-defeating. That is, fiscal 
consolidation in an economic recession may lead domestic demand to fall into line with 
consumers’ raising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, thus reducing 
national tax revenues.  
According to the estimates of dynamic panel data analysis with GMM estimation, 
fiscal consolidation is not expansionary in terms of GDP growth, but instead it is 
contractionary. Unlike the ideas put forward about non-Keynesian effects, our empirical 
estimates show that fiscal consolidation reduces the GDP growth rate significantly. That is, 
the view that fiscal consolidation may stimulate the economy in the short run cannot be 
supported. Both the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation and the Blundell-Bond 
system GMM estimation show that fiscal consolidation has significant negative effects on 
economic growth. The results are similar when the baseline model is extended by taking 
several factors into consideration. As for the results produced by extension models, it should 
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be noted that fiscal consolidation in the period of high debt-to-GDP ratios, the spending-base, 
or high sovereign risk has less negative effects on economic growth than that in the period of 
low debt-to-GDP ratios, the tax-base, or low sovereign risk.  
Using a random effects panel probit model, several important points have been 
established, as follows. First, the economic growth rate ( ) has a significant effect in 
reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio with fiscal consolidation policy. Second, fiscal consolidation 
is more likely to succeed in reducing debt-to-GDP ratio when based on government spending 
cuts (EXP) rather than on tax increases. On the other hand, the size of fiscal consolidation 
(∆CAPB) is not strongly related to the success of the policy, a result consistent with the 
empirical study of Alesina and Perotti (1995). Third, like Afonso and Jalles (2012), fiscal 
consolidation is more likely to be successful in periods with a positive output gap (i.e., actual 
GDP is bigger than potential GDP). The significance of the result is not that strong. Fourth, 
the exchange rate (     ), inflation rate (    ) and unemployment rate (    ) have 
positive but statistically insignificant effects on the success of fiscal consolidation, while the 
long-term interest rate (    ) and sovereign default risk (    ) have significant effects on 
successful fiscal consolidation.  
      On the grounds of the findings made using a panel probit model, some 
meaningful implications can be drawn. The composition of fiscal consolidation is a more 
important factor of successful fiscal consolidation than their size. Moreover, economic 
conditions, such as the GDP growth rate, long-term interest rate and sovereign default risk, 
do matter for successful fiscal consolidation. That is, economic conditions may help to 
enhance the likelihood of successful fiscal consolidation.  
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6 Chapter 6. Conclusions 
This thesis has tried to analyse both the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy and 
the sustainability of public debt. To do this, three empirical studies in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
have been performed using different, cutting-edge econometric methodologies. The first 
estimation is related to the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the macro economy. The other 
two estimations narrow the focus down to the sustainability of government debt and the 
effects of fiscal consolidation. The following section summarises the findings of this thesis, 
its policy implications, its limitations and the direction that further research might take.  
6.1 Summary of Main Findings 
First, while aggregated government spending has positive effects on output and the 
labour market, disaggregated government spending shows different effects. For instance, 
current government spending has a negative effect on private consumption, while government 
capital spending has a positive effect. As concerns the labour market, each type of 
government spending has positive effects on this. However, capital government spending is 
likely to boost the labour market more effectively than current government spending. A net 
tax rise causes a significant fall in output but shows ambiguous effects on the labour market.  
Second, according to the results of Johansen’s tests and ARDL bounds tests, there is 
a cointegrating relationship between the variables in Korea and in the US, but not in the UK. 
This means that fiscal policies in Korea and the US are sustainable, while fiscal policies in 
UK are not. It is notable that the long-run relationship between variables in the US is not 
strong compared to that in Korea. Modified Bohn’s tests with DOLS, which estimate the 
response of the primary surplus to government debt, also support the above conclusion.  
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Third, as concerns the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidation, the estimates 
of dynamic panel data GMM analysis show that fiscal consolidation is not likely to be 
expansionary for GDP growth. Both Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation and 
Blundell-Bond system GMM estimation suggest that fiscal consolidation has negative effects 
on economic growth. The results do not support the expansionary fiscal consolidation 
hypothesis. In particular, our analyses also find that fiscal consolidation in time of high debt-
to-GDP ratios, the spending-base, or high sovereign risk has less negative effects on 
economic growth than those in time of low debt-to-GDP ratios, the tax-base, or low sovereign 
risk. As concerns the main determinants of successful fiscal consolidation, a random effects 
panel probit model indicates that the economic growth rate, government spending-based 
fiscal consolidation, low long-term interest rates, and higher sovereign risk have significant 
effects on reducing debt-to-GDP ratio. On the other hand, the panel probit model suggests 
that the size of fiscal consolidation, exchange rates, and unemployment rate have positive, but 
statistically insignificant effects, on successful fiscal consolidation.  
In conclusion, the empirical results show that the new Keynesian approach describes 
reality more accurately than the neoclassical approach regardless of the methods used in both 
fiscal expansion and consolidation. The empirical results indicate that government spending 
shocks are likely to boost economic activity, private consumption, and the labour market, 
fiscal consolidation shocks tend to contract economic activity, which is the opposite of the 
non-Keynesian expansionary effects hypothesis. The empirical results also suggest that 
public debt can be sustainable in the case where a government reacts positively to a public 
debt rise by increasing the primary surplus.  
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6.2 Policy Implications 
The role of fiscal policy becomes more important in the absence of an independent 
monetary policy or exchange rate policy. The policy implications of this thesis are as follows.  
First, the new Keynesian view that active fiscal policy plays a crucial role in 
boosting a recessionary economy has proved to be accurate in economic crises. In particular, 
capital government spending has more positive and long-lasting effects on the economy than 
current government spending. From this, it can be suggested that a government should 
allocate its resources to government investment, such as infrastructure investment or research 
spending, rather than to government consumption, if it wants to increase future benefits by 
expansionary government spending. 
Second, it is necessary to tighten up a government’s budget deficit if sustainable 
fiscal policy is eventually to be achieved. According to our analysis in Chapter 5, it is 
legitimate and credible to implement fiscal consolidation measures when a government is 
suffering from high government debt. In the case of high debt-to-GDP ratios, fiscal 
consolidation seems to be less harmful to economic activity. Instead, the government can 
gain the credibility of its fiscal policy from people, even offsetting the negative effects of 
fiscal austerity measures. However, timing is vital. If a government only focuses on 
tightening up the budget deficit by cutting government spending or raising taxes in serious 
periods of economic recession, this might cause a much worse recession by reducing 
aggregate demand. A government should be more careful at a time of economic crisis when 
implementing fiscal consolidation, because austerity measures can lead to a domestic demand 
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reduction, consumers’ raising concerns about job security, and finally to a decrease in 
national tax revenue. 
Third, if a government has to use fiscal consolidation, it may be a better strategy to 
mix these with other measures, such as monetary policy and fiscal reform. The proper policy 
mix can mitigate the negative impact on the macro economy of a fiscal consolidation policy. 
Fiscal consolidation for the purpose of reducing public debt should be carried out based on 
government spending cuts rather than on tax rises, because the former is more likely to 
succeed.   
6.3 Limitations of the Study and Further Research 
This thesis has a number of limitations. The first one is a lack of data availability. 
Most relationships in this thesis are estimated using annual data and the sample period is 
relatively short. For instance, our study uses annual data over sample periods from 1972 to 
2010. This was an inevitable choice, because higher frequency data and longer sample spans 
are difficult to obtain. The use of low frequency data and small samples is unavoidable for 
this kind of study; but bias caused by having small samples in the tests can weaken the 
strength of the findings in the research. The second limitation is the use of an incomplete 
model set-up. In Chapter 5, the baseline model is constructed under a particular assumption 
that the effects of fiscal consolidation on economic growth are the same regardless of country 
(i.e., coefficient    of         equals to  ). This assumption is too strong, because the effects 
of fiscal consolidation on economic activity could be quite different depending on the 
economic conditions of each country. Even though we try to address this shortcoming by 
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dividing the independent variable by considering some special factors, this extended model 
still cannot fully cover the weakness of the baseline model’s assumption. The third limitation 
is the possibility of omitted variables. Even though a great effort has been made to include 
the various control variables that were identified in the previous literature, it is always 
possible that other factors have not been controlled for.  
Further research can be done to develop the findings and overcome the limitations of 
this thesis. These findings and limitations may illuminate several avenues to explore in future 
work. First, considering that Chapter 3 shows only the effects of aggregated net tax shocks on 
the economy, it would be better to estimate the effects of disaggregated net tax variables on 
economic activity. For instance, aggregated net taxes can be divided into main five sub-
components: corporate tax, income tax, property tax, indirect tax, and social security 
contributions. Second, Chapter 3 has looked only at the transmission mechanism for fiscal 
policy shocks in Korea. To establish the stylized facts about the effects of fiscal policy shocks, 
the same form of estimation could be extended to other developing countries and the results 
compared. Third, in Chapter 4, we estimate the sustainability of public debt without including 
qualitative variables such as changes in the political systems or the decision-making 
processes. It would be a more convincing estimation of sustainability if we were to include 
such qualitative variables in the model. Lastly, the work described in Chapter 5 could be 
further developed by adding more control variables related to the labour market and political 
issues to the dynamic panel data analysis. This would refine the precision of our estimation 
and finally produce more credible and generally applicable results on the effects of fiscal 
consolidation.    
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8 Appendices 
Appendix 2.1 
Government Debt-to-GDP ratio of Main Countries  
(% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook 2012  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia 23.8 22.5 19.5 17.1 15.1 13.2 12.0 10.9 10.0 9.7 11.8 16.9 20.5
France 59.5 58.9 57.4 56.9 59.0 63.2 65.0 66.7 64.1 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.3
Germany 60.5 61.3 60.2 59.1 60.7 64.4 66.2 68.5 67.9 65.4 66.9 74.7 82.4
Ireland 53.5 48.4 37.5 35.3 32.0 30.8 29.2 27.1 24.8 25.0 44.5 64.9 92.2
Japan 118.3 131.9 140.1 153.6 164.0 169.6 180.7 186.4 186.0 183.0 191.8 210.2 215.3
Korea 15.4 17.6 18.0 18.7 18.6 21.6 24.6 28.7 31.1 30.7 30.1 33.8 33.4
Spain 64.2 62.4 59.4 55.6 52.6 48.8 46.3 43.2 39.7 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.3
Sweden 69.1 63.6 53.3 54.1 51.8 51.0 49.9 50.0 44.8 39.7 38.4 42.0 38.8
UK 46.1 43.6 40.9 37.8 37.5 38.7 40.3 41.8 43.0 43.7 52.2 68.0 75.0
US 64.6 60.8 54.8 54.7 57.1 60.4 68.3 67.9 66.6 67.2 76.1 89.7 98.6
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Appendix 2.2 
The Trends in Interest Rates in Korea  
Interest rates belong to two categories: market interest rates and the base rate. 
Market interest rates consist of call rates, yields on CD, yields of treasury bonds and yields of 
corporate bonds. The Korean government used the call rate as the policy rate from May 1999 
to February 2008. Since then, the base rate of the Bank of Korea has been used as the policy 
rate.  Since the mid-1990s, there have been two big economic crises and one monetary policy 
regime change in Korea: the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the Global Financial Crisis in 
2008, and a monetary policy regime change from money targeting to inflation targeting in 
April 1998. During the two economic crises, the Korean government actively implemented 
monetary policy in order to overcome the crises. According to the Figure, interest rates do not 
show big fluctuations between 1999 and 2008. 
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Appendix 3.1 
Shock Identification Strategies for Measuring the Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy 
Researchers Shock identification strategy 
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg,  
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) 
VAR models with dummy variables specifying 
certain episodes (such as wars and drastic 
changes in fiscal stance) 
Mountford and Uhlig (2002, 2009) 
VAR with sign restrictions on the impulse 
response functions 
Fatás and Mihov (2000), Favero (2002), 
and De Castro (2004) 
SVAR (Cholesky decomposition) 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
Perotti (1999), and Höppner (2002) 
SVAR using institutional information and 
quarter dependence. 
 
The Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy Measured by VAR Approach in Korea 
Researchers Methodology Results 
Park, J. 
(1995) 
Single equation approaches (Feldstein 
1982 and Kormendi 1983). 
VAR (Cholesky decomposition). 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is not 
sustained by either of the single equation 
approaches. 
An impulse response of private 
consumption to government expenditure 
reveals a positive effect over a long time 
span 
Kim, 
S.(1997) 
VAR (Cholesky decomposition). 
 
Government expenditure is classified 
into six sub-groups, and their impacts on 
consumption, investment, and income 
are separately estimated. 
The impact of government expenditures 
differs significantly item-by-item. 
Government investment tends to boost 
private economic activities, whereas 
government consumption is likely to 
crowd them out. 
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Researchers Methodology Results 
Park, H., and 
J. 
Choi(1997) 
VAR with seven variables (Cholesky 
decomposition). 
The seven variables are government 
expenditure, bonds, money stock, 
interest rate, exchange rate, 
consumption, and current account 
balance. 
Not able to reject Ricardian equivalence 
theorem. 
Insignificant impact of government debt, 
and spending increase on consumption, 
interest rate, exchange rate, and current 
account balance. 
Choi, 
J.(2002) 
Estimation of asset demand functions 
with inclusion of government bonds. 
Causality analysis of a VAR system. 
 
The government debt doesn’t seem to be 
perceived as net wealth by consumers. 
Insignificant impact of government debt 
and the money stock (not high-powered 
money) on real GDP, nominal GDP, and 
GDP deflator. 
Kim, 
S.(2003) 
SVAR of all the components of national 
income identity (private consumption, 
investment, net export, and the 
remaining sectors) with dummy variable 
identifying a structural break (Cholesky 
decomposition). Fiscal variables, such as 
government consumption, investment, 
and tax revenues, are given exogenously 
in the VAR system. 
After a currency crisis, the impact of 
government expenditure on GDP 
changed signs from (-) to (+) 
During the same period, the impact of 
government investment on private 
investment as well as government 
consumption on private consumption 
changed signs from (-) to (+). 
Kim, 
S.(2005) 
SVAR of GDP, price (P) and money 
stock (M) with dummy variables 
considering a structural break (before 
and after the currency crisis). 
Fiscal variables, such as government 
consumption, investment, and tax 
revenues, are given exogenously in the 
VAR system. 
Before the currency crisis, an exogenous 
shock from government expenditure had 
a negative influence on price and the 
money stock while it had a positive 
influence on GDP. 
After the currency crisis the exogenous 
government expenditure shock had a 
negative influence on price and GDP, 
while it has positive influence on the 
money stock. 
Hur, 
S.(2007) 
SVAR of real GDP, government 
expenditure, and tax revenue (Cholesky 
decomposition, institutional information, 
expenditure within revenue). 
The effectiveness of fiscal policy is not 
significantly identified in Korea, 
regardless of policy measures such as tax 
reduction and spending increases, or of 
methods of identifying shocks. The 
results are exactly opposite to the 
generally accepted Keynesian theory. 
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Appendix 3.2 
Response of Macroeconomic Variables to Fiscal Policy Shocks 
A. The seven-variable VAR model 1: Current government spending, Capital government 
spending, Net taxes, Interest rate, GDP, Private consumption, Private investment 
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B. The seven-variable VAR model 2: Government employment spending, Government 
operating spending, Net taxes, Interest rate, GDP, Private consumption, Private investment 
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Appendix 5.1 
The Various Ways of Measuring the Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance 
(CAPB) 
The CAPB is calculated by taking the actual primary balance (non-interest 
government revenue minus non-interest government spending) and subtracting the estimated 
effect of business cycle fluctuations on fiscal accounts (IMF, 2010). There are three 
approaches to cyclical adjustment of fiscal variables.  
Hodrick–Prescott filter (Hodrick & Prescott, 1980; Kydland & Prescott, 1990). 
This smoothing approach computes the cyclically adjusted measure (  
 ) of a variable (  ) by 
the following expression:  
Min (     
 )        ((    
    
 )  (  
      
 ))        
The crucial point in the application of the HP filter is the choice of the weighting 
factor  , determining the degree of smoothness. In the case of annual data,   is set to 100.  
Elasticity approach. Cyclically adjusted series are computed on the basis of the 
elasticity of each budgetary category with regard to the potential or trend output. The 
approach has been used by the OECD, the IMF and the EC (Giorno et al., 1995; Alesina et al., 
2002). The main criticism of this approach is that the elasticities are assumed to be constant 
over time. Also, the results depend on the estimates of the potential output, specifically the 
natural rate of unemployment and the capital stock.  
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                     (      )  (    (   ̂ )    (    (    ))]       , 
where    is the total current expenditure plus gross capital accumulation less interest 
payments,    is total revenues,     is the nominal GDP,  ̂  is the growth rate of nominal 
potential GDP,   is growth rate of nominal GDP. 
Blanchard Fiscal Impulse (BFI). Blanchard (1993) proposes that the discretionary 
shock should be estimated as the difference between the actual policy and the policy that 
would prevail under the previous year’s growth rate.  
                 (  (    )    )  (         ), 
where    and    represent the GDP ratio of    and   , respectively;    is the 
unemployment rate. 
Alesina & Perotti (1995) employ the methodology and calculate what the tax 
revenues and transfer payments would have been if the unemployment rate had remained the 
same as in the previous year, suggesting that the other spending categories move 
independently of the business cycle. The fiscal impulse is then constructed as the difference 
between this unemployment-adjusted primary deficit in period t and the previous period’s 
structural budget balance. Following the method’s principle, only the fiscal impulse for 
government spending could be calculated. The BFI would be a poor measure if discretionary 
policy changes were correlated with the unemployment rate and looked as though they were 
induced by cyclical fluctuations. Additionally, the BFI is not entirely suitable for 
international comparisons because the unemployment rate is not measured in the same way in 
different countries (Neicheva, 2006).   
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Appendix 5.2 
Definitions of the Data of Previous Literature 
Variable 
Adagna  
(2004) 
Alesina and Adagna 
(2010) 
Giudice et al.  
(2007) 
    
Debt 
Government gross debt 
as a share of GDP 
Government gross debt 
as a share of GDP 
Government gross debt  
(% of GDP) 
Primary 
expense 
Transfers + 
government 
consumption + public 
investment + subsidies 
Cyclically adjusted 
primary expenditure as a 
share of GDP = Transfers 
+ ((Government wage 
expenditure + 
Government non-wage 
expenditure + Subsidies 
+ Government 
investment)/GDP) 
 
Δprimary 
expense 
  
Change in primary 
expense between t and 
t-1(% of GDP) 
Total deficit  
Cyclically adjusted total 
deficit as a share of GDP 
= primary deficit + 
(interest expenses on 
government debt/GDP) 
 
Primary 
deficit or 
CAPB 
Cyclically adjusted 
primary deficit as a 
share of GDP = 
Primary expense-Total 
revenue 
Cyclically adjusted 
primary deficit as a share 
of GDP = Primary 
expense-Total revenue 
 
ΔCAPB   
Average change 
between t+1 and t-1 in 
the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance 
(% of GDP) 
Primary 
expense 
 
Cyclically adjusted 
primary expenditure as a 
share of GDP 
 
Total revenue  
Cyclically adjusted total 
revenue as a share of 
GDP 
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Variable 
Adagna  
(2004) 
Alesina and Adagna 
(2010) 
Giudice et al.  
(2007) 
Curr. G  
Cyclically adjusted 
current expenditure as a 
share of GDP = Transfers 
+ ((Government wage 
expenditure + 
Government non-wage 
expenditure + 
Subsidies)/GDP) 
 
Transfers 
Cyclically adjusted 
transfer as a share of 
GDP 
Cyclically adjusted 
transfer as a share of 
GDP 
 
Government 
wage 
expenditure 
Government wage 
consumption 
Government wage bill 
expenditure 
 
Government 
non-wage 
expenditure 
 
Government non-wage 
bill expenditure 
 
Subsidies  Subsidies to firms  
Government 
investment 
 
Gross government 
consumption on fixed 
capital 
 
GDP Growth 
Growth rate of real 
capita GDP 
Growth rate of real capita 
GDP 
 
OUTGAP   
Output gap (% of 
GDP), simple average 
at t and t-1 
Trade 
Balance 
 
Trade balance as a share 
of GDP = (Exports of 
goods and services – 
Imports of goods and 
services)/GDP 
 
ΔInterest rate 
Short-term interest rate 
(t) – Short-term interest 
rate (t-1) 
 
Average change in the 
short-run interest rates 
between t+1 and t-1 
ΔExchange 
rate 
Rate of change of the 
nominal effective 
exchange rate 
 
Average percentage 
change in the exchange 
rates between t+1 and 
t-1 
Composition    
Sovereign 
risk 
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Data Sources  
Variable Source 
CAPB/GDP The OECD Economic Outlook Database (NLGXQA) 
Real GDP (GDPVD) 
World Band World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Database, 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database 
The OECD Economic Outlook Database  
Real Private Consumption 
(CPV) 
WDI Database, WEO Database 
The OECD Economic Outlook Database  
Real Private Investment (IPV) 
WDI Database, WEO Database 
The OECD Economic Outlook Database  
Nominal Effective Exchange 
Rate (EXCHEB) 
The OECD Economic Outlook Database  
Output Gap (GAP) The OECD Economic Outlook Database  
Unemployment Rate (UNR) 
WDI Database, WEO Database 
The OECD Economic Outlook Database  
Real Effective Exchange Rate International Financial Statistics (IFS) Database 
Long -Term Interest Rate on 
government bonds (IRL)  
The OECD Economic Outlook Database  
Short-Term Interest Rate (IRS) The OECD Economic Outlook Database  
Policy interest rates and 
10-year government bond 
yields 
Bloomberg Financial Markets, Thomson Data stream 
Institutional Investor Ratings 
(IIR) 
Institutional Investor 
Government debt-to-GDP ratio IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database 
 
Fiscal Consolidation Episodes (FCE), Based Both on the Change in the 
CAPB and on the Policy Action-Based Approach of the IMF 
Country IMF(2010) IMF(2011) FCE1 FCE2 FCE3 
Australia 
1980, 1985-88, 
1994-99 
1985-88, 1994-99 
 
1987-88 1987-88 1987-88 
Austria  
1980-81, 1984, 1996-
97, 2001-02 
1997 
1984, 1997, 2001, 
2005 
1984, 1997, 2001, 
2005 
Belgium 
1982-84, 1987, 
1990, 1992-99 
1982-85, 1987, 1990, 
199294, 1996-97  
1982-87 1982-85, 1993, 2006 1982-85 
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Country IMF(2010) IMF(2011) FCE1 FCE2 FCE3 
Canada 1980-1999 1984-97 1987, 1996-98 
1981, 1986-87, 1996-
97 
1987, 1996-97 
Denmark 1983-86, 1995 1983-86, 1995 1983-87 1983-86 1983-86 
Finland 
1984, 1988, 1992-
2000, 2006-07 
1992-97 
1976-77, 1997-98, 
2000-01 
1976-77, 1981, 1984, 
1988, 1996-97, 2000-
01 
1976-77, 1996-97, 
2000-01 
France 
1984, 1986-89, 
1991, 1995-98, 
2000, 2006-07 
1979, 1987, 1989, 
1991-92, 1995-97, 
1999-2000 
 -  
Germany 
1982-89, 1992-
2000, 2003-07 
1982-84, 1991-95, 
1997-2000, 2003-04, 
2006-07 
 -  
Greece   
1991-92, 1994, 1996-
99, 2006, 2010 
1982, 1986, 1991-92, 
1996-98, 2005-06, 
2010 
1991, 1994, 1996-97, 
2006, 2010 
Ireland 1982-88, 2009 1982-88, 2009 
1976-77, 1983-86, 
1988-89, 2010 
1976-77, 1983-84, 
1988, 2010 
1976-77, 1983-84, 
1988, 2010 
Italy 1992-98, 2004-07 1991-98, 2004-07 
1977, 1982-83, 1992-
94 
1977, 1982-83, 1992-
93 
1977, 1982-83, 1992-
93 
Japan 1997, 2003-07 
1979-83, 1997-98, 
2003-07 
1998-2000, 2005-07 1998-99, 2005-06 1999-00, 2006-07 
Netherlands  
1981-88, 1991-93, 
2004-05 
1991, 1993 1991, 1993 1991 
Portugal 
1983, 2000-03, 
2005-07 
1983, 2000, 2002-03, 
2005-07 
1977, 1983-84, 1986 
1977, 1983-84, 1986, 
1988, 1992, 1995, 
2006 
1977, 1983-84, 1986, 
1988, 1992 
Spain 1983-89, 1992-98 
1983-84, 1989-90, 
1992-97 
1987 1986, 1987, 2010 1987 
Sweden 
1983-84, 1986, 
1992-97, 2007 
1984, 1993-98 1984, 1987, 1996-99 
1976, 1983-84, 1987, 
1996-97 
1984, 1987, 1996-97 
UK 1981-82, 1994-99 1979-82, 1994-99 1981-82, 1997-2000 1981, 1997-98, 2000 1981, 1997-98 
US 
1980-81, 1985-86, 
1988, 1990-91, 
1993-94, 2000 
1978, 1980-81, 1985-
86, 1988, 1990-98 
- - - 
Korea - - - - - 
Notes: based on Afonso and Jalles (2012) 
IMF (2010) - measure computed by Leigh et al. (2010): so-called policy action-based approach in order to 
account for consolidation episodes. 
IMF (2011) – measure computed by Leigh et al. (2011). 
FCE1 - measure based on Giavazzi and Pagano (1996): the cumulative change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
budget balance is at least 5,4, 3 percentage points of GDP in 4, 3,or 2 successive years respectively, or 3 
percentage points in one year.  
FCE2 - measure based on Alesina and Ardagna (1998): the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget 
balance is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the last 
two years. 
FCE3 - measure based on Afonso (2010): A fiscal episode occurs when either the change in the cyclically 
adjusted primary budget balance is at least one standard deviation on average in the last two years. 
  
 239 
 
Summary of Fiscal Consolidation Episodes (following policy action-based 
approach of the IMF)  
 
Country Year 
     
     
Tax 
Rise 
Spending 
Cut  
Country Year 
     
     
Tax 
Rise 
Spending 
Cut 
AUSTRALIA 1985 0.45 0.00 0.45   CANADA 1990 0.86 0.57 0.29 
AUSTRALIA 1986 1.02 0.17 0.85   CANADA 1991 0.40 0.13 0.27 
AUSTRALIA 1987 0.90 0.19 0.71   CANADA 1992 0.21 -0.01 0.22 
AUSTRALIA 1988 0.10 -0.27 0.37   CANADA 1993 0.35 -0.01 0.36 
AUSTRALIA 1994 0.25 0.25 0.00   CANADA 1994 0.49 0.04 0.45 
AUSTRALIA 1995 0.50 0.50 0.00   CANADA 1995 0.99 0.18 0.81 
AUSTRALIA 1996 0.62 0.34 0.28   CANADA 1996 0.97 0.09 0.88 
AUSTRALIA 1997 0.70 0.18 0.53   CANADA 1997 0.47 0.01 0.47 
AUSTRALIA 1998 0.37 0.05 0.32   DENMARK 1983 2.77 0.92 1.85 
AUSTRALIA 1999 0.04 -0.04 0.07   DENMARK 1984 2.38 0.67 1.71 
AUSTRIA 1980 0.80 0.11 0.69   DENMARK 1985 1.54 0.77 0.77 
AUSTRIA 1981 1.56 0.50 1.06   DENMARK 1995 0.30 0.30 0.00 
AUSTRIA 1984 2.04 1.30 0.74   FINLAND 1992 0.91 0.00 0.91 
AUSTRIA 1996 2.41 0.88 1.53   FINLAND 1993 3.71 0.00 3.71 
AUSTRIA 1997 1.56 0.44 1.12   FINLAND 1994 3.46 0.69 2.77 
AUSTRIA 2001 1.02 0.90 0.12   FINLAND 1995 1.65 -0.63 2.28 
AUSTRIA 2002 0.55 0.00 0.55   FINLAND 1996 1.47 0.00 1.47 
BELGIUM 1982 1.66 0.00 1.66   FINLAND 1997 0.23 -0.70 0.93 
BELGIUM 1983 1.79 0.69 1.10   FRANCE 1979 0.85 0.85 0.00 
BELGIUM 1984 0.69 0.28 0.41   FRANCE 1987 0.26 -0.50 0.76 
BELGIUM 1985 1.61 0.73 0.88   FRANCE 1991 0.25 0.00 0.25 
BELGIUM 1987 2.80 0.00 2.80   FRANCE 1995 0.28 0.43 -0.15 
BELGIUM 1990 0.60 0.40 0.20   FRANCE 1996 1.33 0.86 0.47 
BELGIUM 1992 1.79 0.99 0.80   FRANCE 1997 0.50 0.41 0.09 
BELGIUM 1993 0.92 0.43 0.49   FRANCE 2010 0.94 0.00 0.94 
BELGIUM 1994 1.15 0.55 0.60   FRANCE 2011 1.34 0.00 1.34 
BELGIUM 1996 1.00 0.50 0.50   GERMANY 1982 1.18 0.56 0.62 
BELGIUM 1997 0.91 0.41 0.50   GERMANY 1983 0.87 0.30 0.57 
CANADA 1984 0.27 0.27 0.00   GERMANY 1984 0.18 -0.41 0.59 
CANADA 1985 1.03 0.53 0.50   GERMANY 1991 1.11 1.08 0.03 
CANADA 1986 0.99 0.84 0.15   GERMANY 1992 0.46 0.27 0.19 
CANADA 1987 0.28 0.14 0.14   GERMANY 1993 0.11 -0.07 0.18 
CANADA 1988 0.30 0.33 -0.03   GERMANY 1994 0.91 0.08 0.83 
CANADA 1989 0.31 0.24 0.08   GERMANY 1995 1.08 0.84 0.24 
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Country Year 
     
     
Tax 
Rise 
Spending 
Cut  
Country Year 
     
     
Tax 
Rise 
Spending 
Cut 
GERMANY 1997 1.60 0.50 1.10   JAPAN 2004 0.64 0.19 0.45 
GERMANY 1999 0.30 0.30 0.00   JAPAN 2005 0.28 0.06 0.22 
GERMANY 2000 0.70 -0.05 0.75   JAPAN 2006 0.72 0.45 0.27 
GERMANY 2003 0.74 0.74 0.00   JAPAN 2007 0.15 0.15 0.00 
GERMANY 2004 0.40 -0.70 1.10   KOREA 1981 0.43 0.00 0.43 
GERMANY 2006 0.50 0.00 0.50   KOREA 1982 0.04 0.00 0.04 
GERMANY 2007 0.90 0.50 0.40   KOREA 1983 1.56 1.56 0.00 
IRELAND 1982 2.80 2.54 0.26   KOREA 1986 0.35 0.35 0.00 
IRELAND 1983 2.50 2.44 0.06   KOREA 1987 0.27 0.27 0.00 
IRELAND 1984 0.29 0.29 0.00   KOREA 1990 2.58 0.00 2.58 
IRELAND 1985 0.12 0.12 0.00   KOREA 1992 1.09 0.00 1.09 
IRELAND 1986 0.74 0.74 0.00  KOREA 1995 0.30 0.00 0.30 
IRELAND 1987 1.65 0.53 1.12  KOREA 1996 0.19 0.00 0.19 
IRELAND 1988 1.95 0.00 1.95   KOREA 2000 2.98 2.98 0.00 
IRELAND 2009 4.74 2.35 2.39   KOREA 2001 0.36 0.00 0.36 
IRELAND 2010 2.50 0.00 2.50   KOREA 2002 0.50 0.50 0.00 
IRELAND 2011 2.20 0.00 2.20   KOREA 2003 0.10 0.10 0.00 
ITALY 1991 2.77 1.69 1.08   KOREA 2004 0.70 0.00 0.70 
ITALY 1992 3.50 1.60 1.90   NETHERLANDS 1981 1.75 0.53 1.22 
ITALY 1993 4.49 2.00 2.49   NETHERLANDS 1982 1.71 0.00 1.71 
ITALY 1994 1.43 -0.27 1.70   NETHERLANDS 1983 3.24 0.49 2.75 
ITALY 1995 4.20 2.41 1.79   NETHERLANDS 1984 1.76 0.00 1.76 
ITALY 1996 0.34 -0.74 1.08   NETHERLANDS 1985 1.24 0.00 1.24 
ITALY 1997 1.82 0.89 0.93   NETHERLANDS 1986 1.74 0.00 1.74 
ITALY 1998 0.68 0.01 0.67   NETHERLANDS 1987 1.48 1.48 0.00 
ITALY 2004 1.30 0.67 0.63   NETHERLANDS 1988 0.06 -0.69 0.75 
ITALY 2005 1.00 0.40 0.60   NETHERLANDS 1991 0.87 0.87 0.00 
ITALY 2006 1.39 0.50 0.89   NETHERLANDS 1992 0.74 -0.58 1.32 
ITALY 2007 1.03 1.32 -0.29   NETHERLANDS 1993 0.12 -0.16 0.28 
ITALY 2010 0.80 0.00 0.80   NETHERLANDS 2004 1.70 0.40 1.30 
ITALY 2011 0.81 0.00 0.81   NETHERLANDS 2005 0.50 0.20 0.30 
JAPAN 1979 0.12 0.12 0.00   NETHERLANDS 2010 1.39 0.00 1.39 
JAPAN 1980 0.21 0.21 0.00   PORTUGAL 1983 2.30 1.35 0.95 
JAPAN 1981 0.43 0.43 0.00   PORTUGAL 2000 0.50 0.00 0.50 
JAPAN 1982 0.71 0.31 0.40   PORTUGAL 2002 1.60 1.20 0.40 
JAPAN 1983 0.42 0.06 0.37  PORTUGAL 2005 0.60 0.52 0.08 
JAPAN 1997 1.43 0.98 0.45  PORTUGAL 2006 1.65 1.10 0.55 
JAPAN 1998 0.48 0.33 0.15  PORTUGAL 2007 1.40 0.50 0.90 
JAPAN 2003 0.48 0.00 0.48  PORTUGAL 2011 2.50 0.00 2.50 
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Country Year 
     
     
Tax 
Rise 
Spending 
Cut 
 
Country Year 
     
     
Tax 
Rise 
Spending 
Cut 
SPAIN 1983 1.90 1.90 0.00  United Kingdom 1995 0.28 0.23 0.05 
SPAIN 1984 1.12 0.37 0.75  United Kingdom 1996 0.30 0.00 0.30 
SPAIN 1989 1.22 0.98 0.24  United Kingdom 1997 0.69 0.53 0.16 
SPAIN 1992 0.70 0.30 0.40  United Kingdom 1998 0.31 0.30 0.01 
SPAIN 1993 1.10 0.80 0.30  United Kingdom 1999 0.21 0.21 0.01 
SPAIN 1994 1.60 0.00 1.60  United Kingdom 2010 0.21 0.00 0.21 
SPAIN 1995 0.74 0.00 0.74  United Kingdom 2011 0.31 0.00 0.31 
SPAIN 1996 1.30 0.20 1.10  United States 1978 0.14 0.14 0.00 
SPAIN 1997 1.20 0.10 1.10  United States 1980 0.06 0.06 0.00 
SPAIN 2011 3.40 0.00 3.40  United States 1981 0.23 0.23 0.00 
SWEDEN 1984 0.90 0.21 0.69  United States 1985 0.21 0.21 0.00 
SWEDEN 1993 1.81 0.42 1.39  United States 1986 0.10 0.10 0.00 
SWEDEN 1994 0.78 0.19 0.59  United States 1988 0.85 0.39 0.46 
SWEDEN 1995 3.50 1.40 2.10  United States 1990 0.33 0.26 0.07 
SWEDEN 1996 2.00 0.80 1.20  United States 1991 0.58 0.29 0.29 
SWEDEN 1997 1.50 0.60 0.90  United States 1992 0.52 0.24 0.28 
SWEDEN 1998 1.00 0.40 0.60  United States 1993 0.32 0.08 0.23 
United Kingdom 1979 0.27 -0.45 0.72  United States 1994 0.90 0.40 0.50 
United Kingdom 1980 0.08 -0.13 0.21  United States 1995 0.53 0.20 0.33 
United Kingdom 1981 1.58 1.43 0.16  United States 1996 0.29 0.08 0.22 
United Kingdom 1982 0.53 0.48 0.05  United States 1997 0.30 0.06 0.24 
United Kingdom 1994 0.83 0.68 0.15  United States 1998 0.15 0.00 0.15 
Note: All the data are in the form of per cent of GDP 
 (-) sign means spending increases or tax cuts. 
           indicates the budgetary effect of fiscal consolidation measured by policy records.  
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Appendix 5.3 
Sensitivity Analysis with Alternative Debt-to-GDP Criteria  
In Section 5.3.2, we extend the baseline model by dividing the fiscal consolidation 
sample into two sub-samples, according to the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio: 90 per cent. 
However, this threshold, 90 per cent of GDP, is arbitrary to some degree. So, it is necessary 
to see whether the results are sensitive to changes in the threshold. We change our thresholds 
variously from 60 per cent to 90 per cent. Table A-1 shows that the results are sensitive to the 
alternative criteria for the debt-to-GDP ratio. As the threshold gets lower, the negative effects 
of fiscal consolidation on GDP growth become similar, regardless of sub-samples. 
Table A-1 The Effects of Alternative Criteria on GDP Growth 
Alternatives 
 
Independent variables 
Criteria for the debt-to-GDP ratio 
Threshold 
90 per cent 
Threshold 
80 per cent 
Threshold 
70 per cent 
Threshold 
60 per cent 
     
0.1874*** 
(0.0629) 
0.1870*** 
(0.0625) 
0.1935*** 
(0.0628) 
0.1920*** 
(0.0630) 
     
-0.0836 
(0.0523) 
-0.0870* 
(0.0526) 
-0.0821 
(0.0528) 
-0.0799 
(0.0535) 
         
-0.0457 
(0.2618) 
-0.0619 
(0.2548) 
-0.3532 
(0.2186) 
-0.3204* 
(0.1921) 
           
-0.4111* 
(0.2219) 
-0.3794* 
(0.2220) 
-0.4257** 
(0.1955) 
-0.4062** 
(0.1773) 
           
-0.3332 
(0.2549) 
-0.2991 
(0.2516) 
-0.1985 
(0.2145) 
0.0011 
(0.1896) 
         
-0.3856*** 
(0.1481) 
-0.4397*** 
(0.1499) 
-0.3156** 
(0.1554) 
-0.3690** 
(0.1729) 
           
-0.3568*** 
(0.1376) 
-0.3509** 
(0.1385) 
-0.3467** 
(0.1431) 
-0.3234** 
(0.1571) 
           
0.2828* 
(0.1461) 
0.2652* 
(0.1472) 
0.3320** 
(0.1532) 
0.2603 
(0.1677) 
No. of observations 544 
Instruments for first 
differences equation 
Standard: 
D.(abfc_hd, labfc_hd, l2abfc_hd abfc_ld, labfc_ld, l2abfc_ld) 
GMM-type : L(2/5).(L.  L2. ) 
Notes:  1. The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here to save space.  
2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
3. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Appendix 5.4 
The Role of Perceived Sovereign Risk in Fiscal Consolidation 
 
The role of the perceived sovereign risk in fiscal consolidation can be estimated 
using GMM estimation. To do this, fiscal consolidations in the baseline model are divided 
into two types: fiscal consolidations with high (below-median) perceived sovereign risk in the 
year before fiscal consolidation; and fiscal consolidations with low (above-median) perceived 
sovereign risk. The following equation is estimated using the GMM method. 
     ∑        
 
   
 ∑              
  
 
   
 ∑              
  
 
   
           
Based on the results of estimation, we can infer that the fiscal consolidations in time 
of low sovereign risk periods have significant negative effects on GDP growth, while those in 
time of high sovereign risk periods have insignificant negative effects on economic activity. 
Table A-2 The Results of GMM Estimation Considering Perceived Sovereign Risk 
Dependent variable :     
Independent variables Coefficient S.E z P>|z| 
     0.1969*** 0.0632 3.12 0.002 
     -0.0782   0.0525 -1.49 0.137 
         -0.2935* 0.1534 -1.91 0.056 
           -0.2264 0.1422 -1.59 0.111 
           0.1076 0.1493 0.72 0.471 
         -0.5202** 0.2406 -2.16 0.031 
           -0.7017*** 0.2179 -3.22 0.001 
           0.1168 0.2429 0.69 0.492 
No. of observations 544 
Instruments for first differences 
equation 
Standard: 
D.(abfc_hr, labfc_hr, l2abfc_hr abfc_lr, labfc_lr, l2abfc_lr) 
GMM-type: L(2/5).(L.   L2.  ) 
Wald test :   (k) 662.91 (8) (p-value =0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 
first differences 
Z = -7.57  (p-value = 0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences 
Z = -1.27  (p-value = 0.204) 
    Notes: 1. The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here to save space.  
2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
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Appendix 5.5 
Robustness Checks for the Determinants of Successful Fiscal Consolidation 
In Section 5.5.3, a fiscal consolidation is defined to be successful if the debt-to-GDP 
ratio for the three years after the fiscal consolidation is at least 4.5 per cent points below the 
level observed immediately prior to the fiscal consolidation. This definition is arbitrary. We 
check whether the alternative definition of a successful fiscal consolidation would change the 
baseline results. Table A-3 shows that most estimates are similar to the baseline results.     
Table A-3 Probit Model with Alternative Definition of Successful Fiscal Consolidation  
Dependent variable:  s Coefficients of Probit Model 
Independent variables 
Baseline 
(3years after, 
Debt/GDP is at 
least 4.5%p lower)  
Alternative 1 
(3years after, 
Debt/GDP is at 
least 3%p lower) 
Alternative 2 
(2years after, 
Debt/GDP is at 
least 1.5%p lower) 
Alternative 3 
(1year after, 
Debt/GDP is at 
least 1%p lower) 
  24.628* 27.316* 12.324 20.277* 
∆CAPB 0.223 0.346 0.102 0.007 
EXP 0.765* 0.707* 0.741** 0.462 
OUTGAP 0.130 0.039 0.076 0.211 
∆EXCH 0.042 0.069 0.033 0.068 
∆INF 0.254 0.224 0.082 0.024 
∆UNR 0.207 0.228 0.243 0.732* 
∆IRL -0.846** -0.708** -0.412* -0.315 
∆IIR 0.735*** 0.679*** 0.842*** 1.049*** 
constant -3.086*** -2.829*** -2.111*** -2.229*** 
   0.759 0.861 0.512 0.375 
  0.366 0.426 0.208 0.123 
 
Log likelihood -45.15 -51.96 -56.91 -50.54 
Wald test for all 
regressors(   (9)) 
19.53** 20.20** 26.20*** 23.74*** 
LR test for     (   (1)) 1.83* 2.44* 2.12* 0.96 
Observations 161 161 161 161 
 Notes:  1. A rise in the average change of exchange rate (∆EXCH) indicates an appreciation of the Korean won. 
 2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 5.6 
The Results of the two-stage least-squares first-differenced estimator 
(FD2SLS)  
The results of 2SLS model are quite similar to those of dynamic panel data 
difference GMM.  
Table A-4  The Results of the FD2SLS and Dynamic Panel Data Difference GMM  
Dependent variable :  
  
FD2SLS Dynamic Panel Data Difference GMM 
Independent 
variables 
Anderson-Hsiao’s 
Coefficient 
Arellano-Bond’s 
Coefficient 
Roodman’s 
Coefficient 
     
0.3069** 
(0.040) 
0.3209*** 
(0.000) 
0.1969*** 
(0.001) 
     
-0.1665*** 
(0.011) 
-0.1182* 
(0.061) 
-0.0793 
(0.119) 
      
-0.3608** 
(0.020) 
-0.2210* 
(0.098) 
-0.3377*** 
(0.007) 
        
-0.2609* 
(0.095) 
-0.2520** 
(0.045) 
-0.3424*** 
(0.003) 
        
0.2191 
(0.140) 
0.2560 
(0.101) 
0.1608 
(0.189) 
No. of observations 490 543 543 
Instruments for first 
differences equation 
abfc, labfc, l2abfc, L(2/5).   
Standard: 
D.(abfc, labfc, l2abfc) 
GMM-type : 
L(2/5).  
Standard: 
D.(abfc, labfc, l2abfc) 
GMM-type : 
L(2/5).(L.  L2. ) 
Wald test :   (k) 
407.44 (5) 
(0.000) 
628.21 (5) 
(0.000) 
603.38 (5) 
(0.000) 
Notes: 1. The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here to save space.  
           2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
           3.  p-values are in parentheses.  
           4. The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables asymptotically distributed as    
  
            under the null of no relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding time dummies). 
 
